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The central problem that this thesis investigates is the concept of person in African 
philosophy and how this concept is used in the construction of African socialism. In this 
study I present some philosophical difficulties for the dominant communitarian concept 
of person in African philosophy. These difficulties pose a grave challenge for the basis on 
which African leaders had built African socialism. I also argue against the substantive 
formulas of African socialism as presented by Nyerere, Nkrumah and Senghor. 
 
The first chapter is an investigation of issues in African philosophy itself as philosophy 
by its very nature is an area of contestation. In that chapter I seek to clear certain 
methodological issues before I take on the two central issues that dominate the thesis. My 
investigation follows Oruka’s classification of African philosophy into six trends. 
 
Chapter two investigates the dominant concept of person in African philosophy. The third 
chapter discusses the political theory of African socialism–linking it with the concept of 
person. The fourth and fifth chapters offer a critique of the concept of person and African 
socialism respectively.  
 
The first chapter critically evaluates the six trends of African philosophy as suggested by 
Oruka. Oruka sees African philosophy as essentially divided into ethnophilosophy, 
sagacity, professional philosophy, nationalist-ideological philosophy, hermeneutics and 
the literary/artistic trend. I argue that ethnophilosophy cannot be taken as philosophy in 
the serious sense of the word. It is a by-product of some other activity that its 
practitioners were engaged in. I claim that sages were not philosophers in the true sense 
as they simply sought to perpetuate shared communal beliefs. My criticism of 
hermeneutics and the professional trend is that they represent a philosophy of 
apemanship. Both trends essentially copy western methods and insist on passing them on 
as methods that apply to whatever they consider to be African philosophy. I argue that the 
nationalists never sought to develop any political philosophy but were more worried 
about developing party slogans and methods of governing their newly independent 
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countries that would be faithful to their own views of the African tradition. My objection 
to the literary trend is that although there might be some reflection going on in these 
works or practitioners that reflection ought not to count as philosophy. The contributors 
to this trend have a definite identity as either authors of fictitious works practitioners in 
various universities’ departments of the English language or literature. My project does 
not closely follow any of these trends. 
 
The second chapter outlines the concept of person in African philosophy. It starts by 
attempting a common definition of the word person and proceeds to show that the 
concept of person in African thinking is taken to be in contradistinction to the Western 
concept. This view is held by Placide Tempels (1959) who explicitly argues that the 
African ontology is to be understood in terms of force. He argues that vital force, increase 
of force as well as vital influence is at the core of Bantu psychology and he proposes to 
pursue his study of the Bantu along that theme of force. This pervasiveness of force is 
what differentiates the Bantu from her Western counterpart. 
 
 Tempels argues that the Bantu conceive life as essentially constituted and categorised by 
different forces. In his view the Bantu conceive of force in hierarchical terms. God is 
placed as the possessor of ultimate force and beneath him are the ancestors who are 
followed by living human beings and then animals and all inanimate objects. Human 
beings occupy the third position in the hierarchy of forces after God and the ancestors. 
They possess great force and have dominion over all other created things. Tempels also 
argues that human beings have different levels of force and the effect of their force on 
each other and on objects differs from individual to individual. Each individual seeks to 
achieve and possess great force at every turn and all her actions are aimed at that 
achievement. The force that individuals possess can be increased or reduced and the 
ultimate destruction of force happens at the death of that individual. But this does not 
spell the end of the individual’s existence. The individual goes on to join, after the 
performance of the right rituals; she joins the world of ancestors (Mbiti, 1995; Boon, 
1996). In real terms, Tempels argues, a person is more than an assemblage of forces. Her 
force comes to fruition when she is in relation with other forces; the gods, her ancestors, 
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her fellow human beings and other forces below her such as animals and inanimate 
objects. 
 
 The individual is essentially a relational being. She always stands in relation to 
something or someone. Tempels argues that the possession of force is not enough, in 
order for one to be recognised as a person she must stand worthy when judged by her 
community and that judgement is based on the quality of her relationships and her ability 
to observe the communal moral dictates of her community. He makes a distinction 
between those who matter and those who do not matter. Those who matter are said to be 
people of real importance who have a real role to play in their respective societies 
whereas those who are not that important are described as non-persons. Thus personhood 
is attained in the arena of communal relations and is determined in direct proportion to 
the quality of one’s relations.   
 
Mbiti (1970) takes this point further by attempting to find the place of the individual 
within the kinship system in traditional African societies. He argues that the kinship 
system ties the tribal group together. The tribe has a single common ancestor and 
members are related by blood ties. Tribal membership is closed and not open to other 
people except by marriage and betrothal. Mbiti argues that the kinship system is like a 
vast network of relations that spreads itself across large horizons to touch everybody. 
This network extends to include the living, the dead and those who are yet to be born. 
That tribal membership and kinship system gives an individual her identity.  
 
Mbiti argues that within the African system this network of relationship binds everyone 
together such that they conceive their relations as familial. The family in the African 
scheme is not limited to the immediate relations of what he describes as a household. The 
household is constituted by parents and their children. According to Mbiti in African 
thinking the family is not conceived in such narrow terms but is taken to include one’s 
grandparents, aunts, cousins, uncles, nephews and other distant relatives who belong to 
the same kinship system. 
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Mbiti then moves to establish the position of the individual within such a system. He 
argues that the individual cannot exist alone but corporately. “He owes his existence to 
other people, including those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply 
part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; 
for the individual depends on the corporate group” (Mbiti: 1970; 141). Mbiti argues that 
physical birth is not sufficient for one to count as a person. What is required is the 
observance of social rituals throughout the individual’s life and these rituals are 
performed on her by the community as she goes through each stage of her life. Thus the 
community gives the individual the status of person through these rituals of incorporation 
at every stage of her life. The individual does not make herself. She finds herself standing 
in essential relationship to her community her fellow beings. It is that standing in 
relationship that gives her the status of person. 
 
Mbiti concludes by arguing that the individual is essentially in a corporate existence with 
others. That relationship is constitutive of who she is. She derives her identity from her 
shared fate with her other fellow human beings. The links between the individual and the 
community are of such an enduring nature. She cannot think of her existence apart from 
the existence of her community. Hence he coined his now famous phrase; “I am because 
we are; and since we are therefore I am”. 
 
Menkiti (1984) takes the argument further by explicitly arguing that the African 
conception of person is radically different from the Western conception, in his view, the 
Western conception goes for what he calls the minimal definition of person by 
identifying a sole characteristic such as rationality, memory or will. On the other hand the 
African conception of person goes for what he calls a maximal definition of person. 
Menkiti says the conception of person in African thinking cannot be reduced to a slogan 
such as the Cartesian corgito but is determined by the environing community. 
 
He argues that the reality of the community takes precedence over that of the individual. 
Hence it is the community that is best suited to decide what counts as persons. Menkiti 
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argues that it is the community that gives the individual her identity and for that reason 
the community must take both epistemic and ontological precedence over the individual. 
 
Further, Menkiti argues that personhood is something that is attained in direct proportion 
to one’s discharge of her moral obligations. Personhood is something that is acquired as 
one gets along in society and he holds that personhood is the sort of thing that one could 
fail at. The proper discharge of one’s moral obligations makes that individual more of a 
person. Failure to observe the moral dictates of one’s community may lead to failure at 
personhood. He ties the observance of the rites of incorporation to moral achievement 
and argues that older people who have gone through these rites of incorporation and are 
in good standing with their communities in respect of their moral conduct have become 
more of persons or have attained full personhood. Thus on Menkiti’s scheme personhood 
is determined by the individual’s community. 
 
Gyekye (1997) has identified the above characterisation of the function of the community 
in determining personhood as radical communitarianism. He argues that this position is 
erroneous as it confuses the cultural structure and the person who is supposed to function 
within that structure. Hence he proposes his own version of moderate communitarianism. 
He argues that while it is true that an individual is a social being, she is other things as 
well as well. The community may nurture the individual but she possesses mental 
attributes at birth which are not handed to her by the community. These mental features 
are responsible for the individuality of the person and the exercise of certain capacities 
such as rationality and free will. He argues that his own version of moderate 
communitarianism retains the attraction that it takes the rights of the individual seriously. 
Although, by his own admission, a communitarian society will not be overly obsessed 
with rights; his version will recognise the individuality of every person. He goes on to 
argue that within the traditional Akan society there exists a number of proverbs that show 
recognition of individuality of the person that is not wholly subsumed by the community. 
 
Gyekye bitterly criticises Menkiti’s argument that personhood is determined by one’s 
moral achievement and that one becomes more of a person as she gets along in society. 
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Firstly Gyekye argues that it is not entirely clear how rituals are supposed to add any 
moral worth to a person. Secondly, he notes that Menkiti’s assertion that one becomes 
more of a person or a fuller person as she gets along in society is beset with incoherences 
and confusions as it fails to articulate what those excellencies could possibly be. Further, 
Gyekye argues that Menkiti’s position runs into difficulty because it necessarily 
conceives of old people as having the disposition or ability to practice moral virtues. 
Gyekye notes that there are a lot of elderly people who are known to be immoral yet we 
would not rush to identify them as non-persons. Gyekye’s conception of persons is 
communitarian but only the moderate kind, according to him. 
 
Another strand that seeks to articulate the nature of persons in African thinking is 
metaphysical. This strand seeks to ground the nature of persons by articulating the nature 
of their physical attributes; how they function and how they interact with non-physical 
entities (Wiredu: 1995, Gyekye: 1987, Gbadegesin: 1991, Onwuanibe: 1984). However it 
suffices to note that while these philosophers attempt a metaphysical conception of 
person in African thinking most of them are agreed that personhood only finds fulfilment 
in the social arena. Thus essentially the second chapter of this thesis concludes that this 
conception of personhood is essentially communitarian. 
 
In the third chapter I discuss Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor’s ideas of the basis of 
African socialism. Nkrumah (1964) is of the view that the traditional view of man 
imposes socialist obligations on society. He emphasises egalitarianism and the inherent 
dignity of man that was found in African traditional societies as the sources of his 
doctrine of consciencism. His socialism rides on that traditional model of communality 
and egalitarianism which influenced the communitarian view of persons in chapter two.  
 
On the other hand Nyerere argues that there is a need to return to the traditional way of 
life which he expresses as ujamaa or familyhood. The traditional way of life will in turn 
animate modern African socialism. That traditional way of life retains certain 
fundamental principles such as the non-ownership of property. Nyerere (1968) is of the 
view that there is need to re-educate ourselves on what really constituted traditional 
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African values. He argues that in traditional Africa the individual was part of the whole 
community and the community also constituted the individual. From this he argues for a 
classless system where individual needs are taken care of by the community.  
 
Senghor (1964) not only emphasises the social differences between the West and Africa 
but also points out to the crucial difference between how Westerners and Africans come 
to gain knowledge. He is of the view that while Westerners are discursive and distant 
from the objects they seek to know; Africans abandon themselves into the object and they 
become one with the object. He claims that the Negro-African has inherited this 
characteristic from his ancestors. Thus there is a certain African personality that 
essentially differentiates him from his Western counterparts. He develops his African 
humanism which he calls Negritude. This Negritude takes cognisance of the traditional 
communal way of life and it informs how society is to be organised. Senghor is of the 
view that Africa’s encounters with the West should be incorporated into his Negro-
humanism to create African socialism. 
 
Although the fathers of independence did not offer an explicit or detailed account of the 
concept of person, however, their discussions on the nature of persons and resultant 
communities in Africa clearly show a reliance on the communitarian view that was 
discussed in the second chapter. The basis of such a view of persons informs their 
versions of African socialism or political theory. 
 
For Nyerere this communitarian view of person wherein everyone shares the same fate 
leads him to advocate a system where private ownership is abolished. He is of the view 
that just as everybody shared in everybody’s fate in the communitarian sense, in African 
traditional societies, including non-ownership of land and property – this must also be 
extended to modern African societies. Land and other valuable assets will be held in 
common and on behalf of the people by the state. To him this state of affairs would 
represent an animation of the African reality.  
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Nkrumah’s consciencism also seeks to give full effect to the African reality by diluting 
western and Islamic influences. Thus he argues for egalitarianism which is informed by 
what he calls the African personality. This African personality is essentially an 
embodiment of the traditional way of life including the communitarian concept of person. 
It is this view that leads Nkrumah to argue that socialism gives full expression to 
traditional African values. He is riled by capitalism which he sees as an ideology that is 
alien to African values. The basis of his socialism is informed by the African traditional 
society that includes its conception of the person and how such societies were organised 
socially and economically. 
 
Senghor starts by rejecting Marx and Engels’ theory. He argues that Marxist socialism 
must be tempered with African humanism which he calls Negro-Berber humanism or 
negritude. He sees Negro-African societies as communitarian societies that value the 
communion of persons as opposed to individual autonomy. These societies take care of 
the individual needs of its members. They are not divided into any class distinctions. He 
suggests that practical socialist programmes should be developed from this understanding 
of Negro-African humanism.  
 
In the fourth chapter I offer a critique of the communitarian conception of person. This 
concept is one that is relied on by Nkrumah, Senghor and Nyerere. This view is discussed 
in greater detail in the second chapter. My critique follows the distinction made by 
Gyekye by first arguing against radical communitarians followed by a critique of 
moderate communitarianism. The main aim of the chapter is to mount criticism against 
the metaphysical construal of the relation between person and community in the 
conception of persons. 
 
 I contest Tempels’ understanding and use of force. I argue that his project merely seeks 
to mystify the Bantu ontology and is merely intent on finding the difference between 
Africans and Europeans. His notion of force is essentially a distortion of that which he 
describes as Bantu ontology. I argue that Tempels fails to explicitly account for what the 
nature of this force could be and what role it plays in the construal of persons. 
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My critique of Mbiti is that he erroneously follows Tempels in insisting on the African 
difference in the conception of personhood. I also attempt to show that Mbiti’s assertion 
that the community takes precedence over the individual is not accompanied by premises 
that lead to such a conclusion and that he fails to take sufficient cognisance of the 
separateness of individuals. I also present an exception to the communitarian view by 
pointing to an exception among the Shona people of Zimbabwe which shows the 
existence of individual self-concern as opposed to group solidarity.  
 
Against Menkiti I contend that his account fails to clearly spell out the criteria for the 
attainment of personhood. His position does not make clear what excellences are required 
in order for one to be recognised as a full person. I argue that his collapsing together of 
the ontological questions of the status of personhood with moral achievement, ageing and 
observance of rituals is at the very least bizarre. 
 
 I argue that Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is not really different from Menkiti’s 
account which he has characterised as radical communitarianism. Gyekye commits 
himself to the same values as radical communitarianism. He fails to take the question of 
human rights seriously. Instead he argues that communitarianism is not to be obsessed 
with individual rights as any communitarian society will abridge these rights if it feels 
that its interests are threatened.  
 
In conclusion I argue against the inevitability of the communitarian view. I suggest that 
the search for the African difference has led to an exaggeration of the prominence of the 
African communitarian view. Traditional African societies have as much in common with 
other non-African but traditional societies. I seek to show that traditional practices and 
customs do not constitute metaphysics and should not be presented as authoritative, 
beyond question and for all time for Africa. 
 
In the fifth chapter I argue against all these versions of African socialism. I start by 
noting that many of the leaders failed their countries and themselves with their ideas on 
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African socialism. I argue that these leaders/thinkers were also caught up in the project of 
finding the African difference. Erroneously they believed that there is a certain essence of 
the African personality and society. What is taken as the key characteristics of the 
African reality expressed as communitarianism and the resultant African socialism is 
essentially characteristic of most traditional societies. Instead of seeing 
communitarianism and the concept of person espoused in this thinking as essentially 
constitutive of African thinking it should be seen as constitutive of African folk-
philosophy. I argue that all traditional societies everywhere have certain features which 
are folk philosophies, Africa included.  
 
I argue that Nyerere’s assertion that socialism is essentially about the attitude of the mind 
does not succeed. He fails to show what it is that makes the mind of the African so 
oriented towards socialism. Nyerere’s problem is that he is an ideologue who erroneously 
anchors his ideology in African communitarianism. I contest the veracity of Nyerere’s 
claim that traditional African societies did not allow private ownership and control of 
property. I find his argument that modern African governments ought to hold property on 
behalf of citizens to be without basis.  
 
I argue that Nkrumah’s consciencism holds two contradictory positions. On the one hand 
he holds that consciencism is informed by a fixed communitarian ethic of traditional 
African societies while on the other hand he holds that consciencism is not governed by 
any fixed ethical rule. Another problem with Nkrumah is that he sees philosophy as an 
instrument of ideology which truncates the role of philosophy. He also oversimplifies the 
western tradition and the Islamic tradition by suggesting that they simply have to be 
incorporated into the African tradition.  
 
I argue that Senghor’s claims that there are certain key characteristics that make up the 
African personality are problematic. I argue that Senghor’s claim that Africans have a 
different way of acquiring knowledge invokes a racist tone. Further, I argue, negritude 
avoids dealing with serious political problems afflicting the continent having reduced all 
them to cultural problems.  
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Chapter One: The Nature of African Philosophy 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to offer an evaluative and critical analysis of the nature of African 
philosophy. I think it is worthwhile, in this first chapter, to investigate the nature of 
African philosophy as a forerunner to the problems that this thesis seeks to address. It is 
important that I do this investigation in the first chapter since my thesis is an 
investigation of issues in African philosophy and philosophy is in itself an area of 
contestation. There have been arguments that certain practices and issues are either 
required or disallowed of any exercise in African philosophy. This has the implication 
that I would have to do things in a certain way or that I may not do them in another way; 
that I must or must not raise certain issues; that I must or must not argue in a certain way; 
that I must or must not adhere to certain beliefs or respect others. There are thus 
methodological issues that need to be cleared up before I can take on the central task of 
the thesis. While I cannot hope to provide any definitive set of answers as to what 
constitutes African philosophy, I can at least begin by clearing the ground to such an 
extent that I can continue. 
 
The rest of the thesis attempts to deal with two important issues in African philosophy. 
The first issue is the philosophical conception of personhood and the second issue is the 
political organisation that is based on the concept of person. Chapters two and three 
narrate these two conceptions and chapters four and five are essentially a critique of these 
concepts while chapter six concludes this study and offers recommendations for further 
study. 
 
 This chapter will consider what constitutes a philosophical discourse in Africa in the 
light of what has been discussed in the literature of African philosophy. The importance 
of this discussion is that it sheds light on what may count as philosophy and the sense in 
which we describe that activity on this continent. I seek to argue that certain ways of 
doing philosophy are more beneficial to the continent than others. I also seek to argue 
against a dogmatic approach to the enterprise of philosophy on the continent. This in turn 
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informs and guides the manner in which I seek to deal with the central issues that this 
thesis seeks to address.  
 
Henry Odera Oruka has suggested that there are six trends in African philosophy. I will 
use those trends as a guideline to investigate the nature of African philosophy. There is 
no gainsaying that Africa is faced with numerous problems and some of them are beyond 
the reach and expertise of the philosopher. However, the African philosopher, being 
aware of the philosophy of the West and the thoughts of the Western tradition, as well as 
other traditions-and also aware of her own philosophy and tradition - may be well placed 
to assist in the mission towards improving the lot of Africans on the continent. 
 
She is well placed to take into consideration all the valuable theories and practices of all 
traditions and to adumbrate their importance as well as how they apply in the real world. 
The most important call on today’s African philosopher, as suggested by Wiredu (1980), 
is to answer to Africa’s peculiar problems and situate Africa within the larger context. 
She is called to embrace those aspects of her culture which represent progress and discard 
the anachronistic elements of her culture. I will now move to evaluate the trends that are 
said to be extant within African philosophy. 
 
1.1 Oruka’s Six Trends of African Philosophy 
Oruka famously identified what he initially described as four trends of African 
philosophy. Later on he was to add two more trends to make six trends of African 
philosophy.  Oruka writes: “A number of years ago I described four trends in the 
development of African philosophy: ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy, 
nationalist-ideological philosophy, and philosophic sagacity. To this list, we probably 
need to add two more: the hermeneutic trend and the artistic trend” (Oruka: 1998; 101). 
P.O. Bodunrin has chosen to describe these trends “perhaps more appropriately [as] 
approaches” (1984; 1). However one chooses to describe these trends/approaches it 
seems fair to opine that the trends or approaches in African philosophy are still emerging 
and they cannot be limited to any specific number. Thus Didier Kaphagawani observes 
that “…African philosophy is, as accepted by philosophers in Africa, still in its 
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embryonic stage. As such it has yet to establish not only a tradition, as some scholars in 
Africa as well as elsewhere would have us believe, but seemingly several such traditions” 
(1998; 86).  
 
Thus while the approaches that have been developed so far may be counted as six it is 
quite possible if not altogether inevitable that more traditions in African philosophy will 
emerge with time. As Kaphagawani argues, paraphrasing Wiredu (1980; 1-5), these 
traditions will emerge as a result of debate and critical and constructive analysis that will 
seek to deal with problems such as “authoritarianism, a permanent control of all aspects 
of life politics included, that ensues in people doing things against their will; 
anachronism, systems or principles outliving their suitability and utility; 
supernaturalism, the tendency to establish supernatural foundations for a natural code of 
conduct” (Kaphagawani: 1998; 86). For Kaphagawani, the emergence of different 
traditions in African philosophy will not proceed from idle speculation but a critical 
analysis of the problems that besiege Africa and these traditions would strive to challenge 
concepts and beliefs that no longer work in modern-day Africa. Further he argues that it 
is essential that an African philosophy be developed because it serves two crucial 
functions. In the first it challenges the racist views of people such as Levy-Bruhl who 
held that Sub-Saharan Africans lack the capacity for ratiocination. Second, it seeks to 
address the colonial factor by initiating a search for a post colonial identity. 
 
I will now look at each of the six approaches to African philosophy. I will start with 
ethnophilosophy, move on to look at philosophic sagacity, followed by professional 
philosophy and then nationalist philosophy and end with the last two approaches which 
are hermeneutics and the literary trend. 
 
My motivation for following this order is partly to present the development of African 
philosophy in a historically unfolding account. I will argue that ethnophilosophy marked 
the beginning of African philosophy and sagacity as well as professional philosophy were 
a response to that beginning. Nationalist-ideological philosophy, on the other hand, with 
its ideological slant was consistent with the times and context in which it developed. I 
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will conclude by discussing the implications for the growth of African philosophy by 
adding the other two trends-the hermeneutic and the literary trend. I seek to argue that 
although the growth of the approaches to African philosophy is welcome the addition of 
literary philosophy as a philosophical approach does more harm than good in the sense 
that it invites the age old question that professional philosophy has tried to settle. Adding 
literary philosophy as yet another approach of African philosophy does not help the quest 
for an African philosophy. 
 
1.2 Ethnophilosophy 
“The word ethnophilosophy is a coinage from ethnology and philosophy. It was first used 
by Paulin Hountondji in the context of contemporary African philosophical discussions. 
It refers to the trend in contemporary African philosophy which originated from Placide 
Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy published in 1948” (Oguejiofor: 2005; 71). In essence 
Tempels believed that the Bantu had a philosophy of their own through which they came 
to interact and interpret reality. This philosophy was a world-view of the Bantus. His 
primary concern was to find and articulate that philosophy of the Bantu. “It is this attempt 
to find philosophy in what would be regarded as ethnological work that was designated 
ethnophilosophy” (ibid). Thus the primary concern of the people who have come to be 
known as ethnophilosophers was to embark on ethnological investigations that were to 
yield an African philosophy. 
 
P.O. Bodunrin characterises ethnophilosophy as the product of the works of 
anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers and some philosophers “who present the 
collective world views of African peoples, their myths and folk-lores and folk-wisdom, as 
philosophy” (1984; 1). Their work is primarily restricted to giving descriptions of a 
thought system or world outlook of a single community or the whole of the African 
continent. According to Bodunrin, philosophy is conceived as communal thought and the 
ethnophilosophers emphasise the emotional appeal of their type of philosophy. Bodunrin 




Kaphagawani concurs with Bodunrin on who the inventors of ethnophilosophy are but 
also sheds more light on the term ethnophilosophy. He states that the “term 
ethnophilosophy, for etymological interests, was coined by francophone African 
philosophers. It is an approach which has a large following, for it is heavily subscribed to 
by anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists, and some philosophers” (Kaphagawani: 
1998; 89). Kaphagawani argues that this method essentially sees African philosophy as 
communal thought which seeks to find a certain cultural identity and turn it into a 
philosophy.  
 
Paulin Hountondji renders the project of ethnophilosophers more clear when he states 
that their major concern is to locate under the numerous manifestations of African 
civilisation a  
 
solid bedrock which might provide a foundation of certitudes: in other 
words, a system of beliefs. In this quest, we find the same preoccupation 
as in the negritude movement-a passionate search for the identity that was 
denied by the coloniser-but now there is the underlying idea that one of 
the elements of the cultural identity is precisely ‘philosophy’, the idea that 
every culture rests on a specific, permanent, metaphysical  substratum 
(1996; 60). 
 
Oruka also sees ethnophilosophy as the product of certain efforts that seek to replace 
reason and individuality with emotion and communalism. The result is that 
“idiosyncrasies of the traditional or communal African customs, poems, taboos, religious, 
songs, dances, etc easily come up as undeniable candidates for what is required. These 
actually form a radical contrast with the rationalistic elements in a reflective, critical, and 
dialectical philosophy” (Oruka: 2003; 121). 
 
Thus it becomes evident that the major task of ethnophilosophy is to search for African 
philosophy through the collective thought of a people which is found in their cultures. 
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Oruka argues that since ethnophilosophy seeks to present group or communal thought it 
should be taken as folk-philosophy.  
 
Hountondji has sharp criticism for Tempels, the very first ethnophilosopher, whose work 
is an attempt to describe a certain worldview based on data about the lives of African 
people. For Hountondji, Tempels’ work appears to seek to reverse Levy-Bruhl’s racism 
by according African people a philosophy. But in actual fact Tempels has written his 
book for the colonisers and the missionaries. Hountondji argues that a chapter in the book 
entitled ‘Bantu philosophy and our mission to civilise’ clearly shows that the black 
person is not a participant in that conversation but is under some private investigation 
(2003; 126). Hountondji argues that ethnophilosophy is not an African product and is not 
meant for Africans. He argues that it is necessary to free African philosophy from the 
shackles of ethnophilosophy. For Hountondji, the origins of ethnophilosophy are not 
African and its ideology represents a myth. I concur with Hountondji’s view that the 
origins of ethnophilosophy are not from Africa since, as Hountondji has observed, 
starting with Tempels, the whole discourse of ethnophilosophy is aimed at articulating a 
certain worldview of Africans not for the benefit of Africans but outsiders, as it seeks to 
inform outsiders what Africans really are. The Africans already have this worldview 
hence they do not stand to benefit from ethnophilosophy. The major purpose of 
ethnophilosophy is to parade the African difference. This is what drives the whole 
project-to find that difference and show it to the whole world.  
 
Although raising differences between Western culture and African culture can be 
valuable in itself or for other purposes, ethnophilosophers must be criticised for trying to 
make the African difference appear like African philosophy. Hountondji rightly 
condemns black African ethnophilosophers for engaging in that project. 
 
Theirs is clearly a rearguard action. The quest for originality is always 
bound up with a desire to show off. It has meaning only in relation to the 
Other, from whom one wishes to distinguish oneself at all costs. This is an 
ambiguous relationship, in as much as the assertion of one’s difference 
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goes hand in hand with a passionate urge to have it recognised by the 
Other. As this recognition is usually long in coming, the desire of the 
subject, caught in his/her own trap, grows increasingly hollow until it is 
completely alienated in a restless craving for the slightest gesture, the most 
cursory glance form the Other (Hountondji: 2003; 132). 
 
This is a serious but correct indictment. The black African ethnophilosophers seem to be 
engaged in an unusual relationship with their intended audience. Their work is definitely 
not aimed at the African audience but at the European audience. It is not exaggeration at 
all to say that the black African who is not a philosopher may find the work of 
ethnophilosophers far too obvious to excite their attention. It is not entirely clear to my 
mind what that parade of the African difference is meant to achieve. Hountondji opines 
that the whole enterprise of ethnophilosophy aids the “Other” who is the European. 
Having created a colossal gap between herself and the African she now celebrates the 
difference as a gesture of repentance or to deal with her own spiritual crisis in order to 
start a dialogue. That dialogue, for Hountondji, comes in the form of the 
ethnophilosopher speaking on behalf of the whole continent to all of Europe. 
 
Theophilus Okere has an enlightening and serious accusation for Tempels. He accuses 
Tempels of not being original in his presentation of Bantu philosophy. Instead, in Okere’s 
view, Tempels replaces the theory of primitive magic as used by ethnologists and 
evolutionists with the theory of force. I think it would do Okere justice to quote him at 
length: 
 
In short, La Philosophie Bantoue is the theory of magic promoted to 
ontological status. What the author has called a philosophy is hardly even 
a Weltanschauung: no customs, rites, myths, or theologies are presented in 
a coordinated fashion or even described individually at length. La 
Philosophie Bantoue is Bantu only insofar as the author takes the scattered 
examples he invokes to prop his theory from the Bantu among whom he 
lived. The theory could well have been formulated on Oceania or 
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Melanesia and the author freely generalises about Bantu or all primitives, 
that is magical societies without discrimination. The essence of Tempels’ 
revolution is thus the systematic substitution of the word “force” wherever 
one formerly read “magic” or indeed wherever one formerly read “mana” 
in the theories of religion and magic formulated by the rationalist-
evolutionist schools of ethnology (Okere: 1983; 5). 
 
Tempels’ notion of force and his excessive use of the word also invites Okere’s 
perceptive wrath. “There is force all over. The term explains so many things that one has 
the right to suspect that perhaps it really explains nothing. When a word becomes so 
overworked it is probable that it has lost all its force” (ibid). It is easy to see Tempels’ 
motives; he was interested in finding that single aspect that made Africans so radically 
different from their Western counterparts so much that he hangs to the word at the cost of 
reason.  
 
The futility of ethnophilosophy as a philosophical a project is not too difficult to discern. 
The shallow insistence on finding and articulating African differences followed by 
celebrating those differences, either by the European or the African, does not advance the 
project of finding an authentic African philosophy. Ethnophilosophy confines itself to the 
less interesting exercise of discussing cultural differences and whatever philosophy is 
conceived to be it is not just discussing cultural differences. 
 
As the ethnophilosopher speaks on behalf of Africa her attempts to present Africa as a 
unified single voiced continent with a monolithic culture, worldview and philosophy 
must be rejected. Oruka is correct that the claim that Africa is a place of philosophical 
unanimity where individual thought does/did not thrive is false. “This claim is both false 
and absurd: it is false because traditional African thinkers are as diverse in their views as 
it is possible for any system of thinkers to be, and it is absurd because its application 
makes African politics totalitarian and African philosophy static” (Oruka: 1998; 99). The 
ethnophilosopher’s presentation of African thinking as one dimensional does not do 
Africa any good. It defies common-sense knowledge that is hardly contentious that 
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people have different thoughts in any given situation. The ethnophilosopher can only 
insist on his views on unanimity but only in sharp defiance of what is common 
knowledge-both about human nature and human societies. Human nature is consistently 
characterized by differences and differences did exist in traditional African societies and 
they continue to do so in modern day Africa and that alone undermines the 
ethnophilosopher’s unanimity claims.  
 
Hountondji takes the issue further by questioning how the word philosophy is used by 
ethnophilosophers and what it is supposed to mean. He observes that the word changes its 
meaning when it is no longer applied to America and Europe but applied to Africa. He 
says the meaning of the word philosophy changes to both the European and American 
writers as well as the African who has been invited to participate in the whole 
programme.  
 
This is what happens to the word ‘philosophy’: applied to Africa, it is 
supposed to designate no longer the specific discipline it evokes in the 
Western context but merely a collective world-view, an implicit, 
spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious system of beliefs to which all 
Africans are supposed to adhere. This is a vulgar usage of the word, 
justified presumably by the supposed vulgarity of the geographical context 
to which it is applied (Hountondji: 1996; 60). 
 
Hountondji argues that behind this particular usage of the word philosophy is a myth that 
is at work. He calls this “the myth of primitive unanimity” (ibid). The myth that is at 
work is that primitive societies, particularly non-Western societies are characterised by a 
situation where everyone is in agreement with everyone. “It follows that in such societies 
there can never be individual beliefs or philosophies but only collective systems of belief. 
The word ‘philosophy’ is then used to designate each belief-system of this kind, and it is 
tacitly agreed among well-bred people that in this context this could not mean anything 
else” (ibid). But more seriously it denies the people on the African continent the ability to 
develop individual philosophies that share the same characteristics as Western 
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philosophy. Ethnophilosophy robs people of their philosophical skill and deprives them 
of recognition of an authentic philosophy reducing it to a unanimous communal 
philosophy that is essentially uncritical. As Oruka notes the greatest “shortcoming of 
ethno-philosophy is that it is derived not from the critical but from the uncritical part of 
African tradition” (2003; 121). I am convinced that ethnophilosophy suffers this 
shortcoming because it is primarily interested in finding and showing the African 
difference when it comes to philosophical matters. That difference, which essentially 
leads to the development of culture philosophy, is consistently paraded as a unique 
African feature. When the question of the definition of philosophy arises for the 
ethnophilosopher she will insist that African philosophy is radically different from 
Western philosophy. “To the extent that European philosophy is known to manifest 
critical and rigorous analysis, and logical explanation and synthesis, African philosophy 
is considered to be innocent of such characteristics. It is considered to be basically 
intuitive, mystical” (Oruka: 2003; 120). To view African philosophy in this way does not 
help the cause of philosophy in Africa. It may make African philosophy appear unique 
and different to the ethnophilosopher but by the same measure it robs African philosophy 
of almost all things that might count as philosophical qualities leaving it bereft of any 
serious claim to philosophical activity. It hangs on to the word philosophy in a demeaned 
manner admitting all sorts of things into a pseudo philosophy-which yields no significant 
philosophical result. 
 
 In essence ethnophilosophy “has been criticised for conflating two senses of the word 
“philosophy” when used in the phrase “African philosophy”. These two senses are the 
ideological sense, used when making reference to a group or a people’s slogan; and, 
secondly, the technical sense in which philosophy is conceived as a product of systematic 
and ratiocinative methods” (Kaphagawani: 1998; 91). Kaphagawani argues that the word 
philosophy has been used carelessly in the African context.  
 




Though much ethnophilosophical material is indeed very interesting-at 
least where it is not, as it too often is, woefully inaccurate-we should go 
carefully in discussing how to put it to philosophical use. For though 
anthropology (like travel) may broaden the mind, the kind of analytical 
work that needs to be done on these is not something that is easily done 
second-hand, and most anthropological reports-though not, perhaps, the 
best ones-are pretty philosophically naïve. This would be mere carping 
(there is, after all, too little written about Africa that is philosophically 
serious) were it not for the fact that the view that African philosophy is 
just ethnophilosophy has been largely assumed by those who have thought 
about what African philosophers should study (1998; 118). 
 
Appiah’s observation is accurate. The philosophical naivety of the anthropological 
reports should prompt us to treat any philosophical claims gleaned from these reports 
with a great deal of caution. We should not assume, alongside those who have already 
done so, that the African philosopher’s primary occupation must be limited to 
ethnophilosophy. Ethnophilosophy as a folk philosophy that lacks critical analysis will 
engender condescending attitudes. This is precisely what ethnophilosophy will ultimately 
achieve. It will cause curious excitement to its intended audience and when that 
excitement eventually dies down the audience will have been made aware of how 
Africans are different from them.  
 
Whatever the claims of ethnophilosophy may be-they cannot be serious philosophical 
claims in any interesting sense. They are philosophical claims in the weakest sense of the 
word. In fact some ethnophilosophers are not mainly interested in working out a 
comprehensive philosophical system. Their philosophical positions are a by-product of 
some other important activity they are engaged in. 
 
This is particularly the case with John Mbiti as Barry Hallen has observed. Hallen 
accuses Mbiti of seeing African philosophy as subordinate to African religion. Mbiti is 
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seen to be adopting an essentialist rendering of African philosophy wherein it consists of 
beliefs and values that all Africans share.  
 
This makes his approach to philosophy much less technical both in 
character and content, more in line with the popular expression that every 
culture must have some sort of “philosophy of life” or “worldview”. The 
greater proportion of his book is devoted to discussions of conventional 
African views about God, creation, and the afterlife rather than of 
technical philosophical problems or topics (Hallen: 2002; 16).   
 
This renders Mbiti’s work, and indeed the work of all other ethnophilosophers 
excessively weak when confronted with technical philosophical objections. For that 
reason ethnophilosophy should not be accepted either as a representative of African 
philosophy or even as a trend of African philosophy. If we are to confront its tenets and 
way of proceeding as philosophers we shall find it woefully lacking the technical 
arguments that accompany most of philosophical products.  
 
Marcien Towa correctly characterises Mbiti’s work as primarily non-philosophical when 
he argues that: “The methodological weaknesses of ethnophilosophy from a philosophical 
point of view derives from the fact that its real purpose is not philosophical but 
theological. Seen from the methodological angle, the principal characteristic of 
ethnophilosophy resides in its dilation of the concept of philosophy to such a point that 
this concept becomes coextensive with the concept of culture” (Towa: 1991; 189).  
 
Although it can be said that ethnophilosophy has made an immense contribution to the 
development of present day African philosophy that admission must be tempered with the 
objections I have made above. In particular the objectives of the ethnophilosophers 
themselves and who their intended audience really was. Of Tempels, Tsenay 
Serequeberhan notes that, the “basic intent of Tempels’s work was to explore and 
appropriate by subversion the lived world outlook of the Bantu in the service of Belgian 
colonialism, that is, the European “civilising mission” in the Congo. In fact, Tempels’s 
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work, is an exemplary effort aimed at the expropriation of the interiority of the 
subjugated in the service of colonialism” (1991; 10-11). Coupled with its lack of 
philosophical rectitude ethnophilosophy is just but a development that we can afford to 
ignore forever. 
 
For the purposes of my project my discussion of ethnophilosophy will be limited to its 
articulation of the concept of person in African thinking. I will seek to interrogate both 
the method of philosophising as well as the substantive philosophical claims that are 
made by ethnophilosophers on the subject of personhood in African thinking. I will 
contest the claims made by ethnophilosophers on what personhood is on the African 
continent. 
 
1.3 Philosophic Sagacity 
The second trend that Oruka identified is philosophic sagacity. Kaphagawani notes that 
this trend “is still quite new and known in few intellectual circles.  One feature 
characteristic of this approach is that it makes an assumption which is logically opposite 
to that of ethnophilosophy. Ethnophilosophy is holistic; it lays emphasis on the 
dimension of communal thought, but philosophic sagacity is non-holistic, it underscores 
the thoughts of individuals in a community” (1998; 93). Philosophic sagacity rejects 
ethnophilosophy’s central assumption of philosophic unanimity through its search for and 
recognition of the existence of individual thoughts in traditional communities.  
 
The point of departure for philosophic sagacity is the belief that Africans are capable of 
individual and independent thought that may at times be at variance with the generally 
prevalent beliefs held by the community. Bodunrin characterises philosophic sagacity as 
an anti-thesis of ethnophilosophy through its attempts at identifying particular individuals 
who are reputed for their wisdom. These individuals do not have to be literate but are 
known to have a certain in-born insight which enables them to engage in philosophical 
activities. It is this in-born insight that enables these individuals to develop independent 
views that may be in contrast with unanimous communal beliefs. According to Bodunrin 
these individuals are capable of both dialectical and critical inquiry within the bounds of 
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their social structures (1984; 2). They do not have to seek external recourse in order to 
mount successful social or cultural philosophical reflections. 
 
Oruka rejects the idea that traditional Africa is essentially characterised by consensus. On 
the contrary, in his view, traditional Africa goes beyond consensus and it is not “innocent 
of logical and dialectical critical inquiry” (2003; 121). Further he argues that of  
 
…the various African peoples one is likely to find rigorous indigenous 
thinkers. These are men and women (sages) who have not had the benefit 
of modern education. But they are none the less critical independent 
thinkers who guide their thought and judgements by the power of reason 
and inborn insight rather than by the authority of the communal consensus 
(ibid). 
 
Oruka can be seen as the greatest advocate of sage philosophy among African 
philosophers. He sincerely believes that it is possible to find men and women of 
exceptional reason among African traditional communities and these people count as 
philosophers in their own right. He is against any insistence that for anything to count as 
philosophy it ought to be written down. He observes that some Greek philosophers such 
as Thales and Socrates did not write anything down but their thoughts and words count as 
philosophical activity. He argues: “We should not make great issue about writing. 
Writing is a good way to store thought and to store philosophy. But writing is not 
thinking, and philosophy is thinking, and one can think even if one is incapable of, or has 
no facilities, for writing” (Oruka: 1998; 102).  
 
Oruka also rejects the idea that the sayings of traditional African philosophers should not 
count as philosophy. He notes that the sayings of what he calls Greek sages such as 
Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Socrates are treated as constitutive of 
philosophical activity. In this regard Oruka argues that:  
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Some of the Greek sages are known and regarded as philosophers for 
having made only one or two utterances. Thales, for example, is known to 
have said that everything is made of water, while Heraclitus stated that 
strife is the truth of all life. Such sayings have been repeated and 
commented upon in numerous books, giving their utterers the prestigious 
status of philosophers. Now what reasonable proof do we have to believe 
that traditional Africa lacked any such sayings? (1998; 99-100). 
 
In his opinion Africans have made utterances that are equal to the utterances that were 
made by Greek sages. Since the utterances of Greek sages count as philosophy - Oruka 
argues that the utterances of African sages must also count as philosophy.  
 
Oruka is of the view that sage philosophy is very important for the development of 
philosophy in Africa for two reasons. Firstly, he says, the thoughts and opinions 
proceeding from sages offer philosophical counselling on a number of issues on the 
nature and issues that affect human life. Secondly, he believes that the thoughts of sages 
form unrefined data on which professional philosophers can undertake technical 
professional reflections.  
 
On who should count as a sage and what she ought to do Oruka is very lucid: “A person 
is a sage in the philosophic sense only to the extent that he/she is consistently concerned 
with the fundamental ethical and empirical issues and questions relevant to the society, 
and has the ability to offer insightful solutions to some of those issues. An instant and 
one-time only visionary may be a prophet but not a sage” (Oruka: 1998; 100). 
 
For Oruka a sage is a person who uses her critical or rational faculties to offer insight into 
social issues. She does not have to abide with the communal dictates like the 
ethnophilosopher. She follows her own critical reflection and whatever insights she offers 
are out of the efforts and workings of rational mental processes. Oruka insists on that 
single quality as a key characteristic that qualifies one to be a sage philosopher. He 
argues that other qualities such as being a visionary or a prophet do not necessarily make 
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one a sage. In his opinion although a sage may have these qualities as well what makes 
one a sage is her ability to arrive at opinions that impact on society through the process of 
rigorously thinking things through. Oruka also points that every human society, be it 
literate or non-literate, has its own sages and these sages are consistently concerned about 
reflecting on the welfare of humanity and their reflections inform them of what is best for 
humanity. Thus, in his opinion, just as there were Greek sages there were also African 
sages. All these sages had one thing in common-they are critical and independent 
thinkers. 
 
Oruka’s dedication as an advocate of philosophic sagacity is admirable but its 
shortcomings and its lack of relevance to my methodological questions cannot be 
overlooked or easily avoided. For a start philosophic sagacity mirrors so much of 
ethnophilosophy. Sagacity, it appears, seeks to give insight and solutions to problems that 
any given society has. The sage is a person who has an inborn talent or ability to access 
aspects of her society that her fellows may not be able to. This is why she is able to 
concern herself with what Oruka calls empirical and ethical issues. The rest of society or 
non-sages cannot do this precisely because they cannot understand how their society is 
organised. The job is best left to the sage. The sage arrogates to herself the same role that 
Tempels gave himself when he took it upon himself to be the authoritative interpreter of 
the Baluba’s philosophy.  
 
Such a philosophy, just like ethnophilosophy, will lack the rigour and technicality that 
attends to philosophy. It will be a quasi-philosophy, a folk-philosophy whose sole claim 
to difference from ethnophilosophy will be that it is done by an individual who is not 
bound by the dictates of her community. That difference is insignificant; folk-philosophy 
remains so whether it is communal or individual. It can be concluded, without any 
exaggeration, that sage philosophy is not very different from ethnophilosophy and does 
not achieve anything spectacularly different from what ethnophilosophy achieves. Oruka 
responds to this serious charge by putting sages at the same pedestal as Socrates, he 
argues: “Nevertheless, the claim in sage philosophy is this: that sage philosophy is a kind 
of philosophy which is as noble and significant as the philosophy of Socrates in ancient 
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Greece. There are persons in it who think as deeply and are as noble as Socrates was” 
(1997; 183).  
 
This response is not satisfactory. We cannot accept this assertion without any 
accompanying evidence that would show that African sages were concerned about the 
questions of the depth that Socrates was concerned with. What noble and deep questions 
did the ‘sages’ from Greece and our sages from Africa address? Oruka does not tell us 
what these philosophical questions were and what philosophical similarities exist 
between these groups. Sage philosophers cannot claim that they are sages merely because 
they are noble and deep thinkers; even ethnophilosophers can be as deep and noble as 
Socrates. 
 
It must also be noted that most pre-Socratic philosophers were given to making 
statements that may be remembered forever but are no longer taken seriously as 
astounding philosophical endeavours. Claims that everything is made of water are not 
only false but if they were to be treated as philosophical one would conclude that they are 
a rudimentary beginning of a philosophy that has become much more technical, truth-
oriented, rigorous and complex.  
 
Lansana Keita makes an interesting point when he observes that the problem facing 
African thought is that the term philosophy “though debated, has not been much 
examined as a term deriving its meaning from the historical context in which it is used. It 
is instructive to note that the term “philosophy” itself has witnessed important shifts in 
meaning throughout its existence. Consider that “philosophy” in the sense of Aristotle is 
not “philosophy” in the sense of Quine” (Keita: 1991; 133). Oruka pretends that sage 
philosophy, be it Greek or African, is so influential that its impact is everlasting and that 
wherever it is presented it will be immediately recognised and accepted as philosophy. 
This, as Keita points out, is not true. The word may lend itself to different meanings 
depending on its historical context and a multiple other factors.  
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Despite all this Oruka fervently reserves a prominent place for sagacity in the future of 
African philosophy. He writes: “The future of sage philosophy is very promising, I think. 
Though future philosophers may not think highly of it, it at least gives a starting base. It 
will help to produce other forms of philosophy which we cannot think of now. But to 
have a base is very important; our problem in Africa has been that we start from no base” 
(1997; 184). It is not entirely clear to me what base Oruka is talking about. It appears as if 
he is referring to a base that is supposed to be a foundation or mark that represents the 
historical and recorded beginning of African philosophy. Probably, in Oruka’s mind, sage 
philosophy will become the bedrock on which African philosophy is built just like pre-
Socratics and Socrates himself have done for Western philosophy. 
 
 This appears to be the promising future that awaits sage philosophy. But Oruka does well 
by cautioning himself against the importance of sage philosophy by at least considering 
the possibility that future philosophers may not think much about sage philosophy. Of 
course future philosophers will not think much about sage philosophy because it does 
what ethnophilosophy precisely does. They are both the same. However, ethnophilosophy 
edges sage philosophy in that if we were ever to consider what to count as a base of 
African philosophy - ethnophilosophy ought to rightly claim that position. Despite the 
notoriety and philosophical bankruptcy that ethnophilosophy has come to be known for 
over the years; no-one can deny that ethnophilosophy has led in the stirring of much 
interesting debate about what African philosophy is and what it ought to be. The trend 
that has been identified as professional philosophy grew out of reactions against the 
claims made by ethnophilosophy. In so doing ethnophilosophy, though successfully 
debunked, has succeeded in carving a place for itself in the history of African philosophy 
and initiating a genuine inquiry into what really constitutes African philosophy. That 
honour whether dubious or glorious rightly belongs to ethnophilosophers such as 
Tempels and Mbiti. Oruka cannot give that honour to philosophic sagacity. 
 
Oruka urges philosophers to find sages in traditional communities and make their 
philosophy known. This is what Marcel Griaule did and he found an old man called 
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Ogotemmeli. The result of the meeting and conversations
1
 which lasted 33 days was the 
book Conversations with Ogotemmeli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas. 
 
On the first page of the book, Griaule like Tempels, explains his mission clearly when he 
states that: “The Dogon, in short, were thought to present one of the best examples of 
primitive savagery, and this view has been shared by some Muslim Africans, who are no 
better equipped intellectually than Europeans to understand those of their brothers who 
cling to the traditions of their ancestors. Only those officials who have undertaken the 
hard task of governing these people have learnt to love them” (Griaule: 1965; 1). 
 
The purpose of the whole exercise is to report the findings of white colonial officials who 
have taken it upon themselves to understand and love the Africans who appear to be 
castigated by everyone including their close brothers. The only difference between 
Tempels and Griaule is that whereas Tempels talked of the Baluba ontology from a 
communal perspective Griaule simply finds an individual who will speak for the whole 
community. But both writers picture and present Africans as a pitiable misunderstood 
people who are essentially at the mercy and kindness of the colonising officials who have 
a noble mission to civilise. 
 
Ogotemmeli is taken as a sage who expounds the Dogon metaphysics and what the 
Dogon believe in and the basis of that belief. However, the subtitle of the book suggests 
that this is a religious sage as opposed to being a philosophical sage. Ogotemmeli seeks 
to expound the religious ideas of the Dogon people. For example, when Ogotemmeli 
talks about how the world was created he says God known as Amma “took a lump of 
clay, squeezed it in his hand and flung it from him, as he had done with the stars” 
(Griaule: 1965; 17). This according to Ogotemmeli, as written by Griaule, is how the 
world was created. Ogotemmeli gives a systematic exposition of how the world was 
created and what happened after that.  
 
                                                 
1
 It is said that Ogotemmeli led the discussion and he talked freely and systematically about the Dogon 
scheme of things. 
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But that exposition is a mixture of different elements which may not necessarily 
constitute a philosophy as Dismas Masolo observes. He argues that the system 
Ogotemmeli conveys, as a sage, “belongs to a preserved and higher degree of knowledge 
and wisdom-a detailed knowledge of the general principles that chain all things together 
as a single but complex phenomenon. It entails a cosmogony, a metaphysics, and a 
religion. That the teachings comprise all these is clear from the general character with 
which the old sage treats the subject, often reserving the specific details to the relevant 
specialist concerned” (Masolo: 1994; 68-69). In my view Ogotemmeli’s sage philosophy, 
as Masolo attests, conflates other areas of African life so as to arrive at a single complex 
phenomenon. This is reminiscent of Tempels’ ethnophilosophy of force. Both 
ethnophilosophy and sagacity seek to arrive at one unanimous complex reality for the 
African. 
 
Later on, in Ogotemmeli’s systematic exposition, the creation story gets a little bizarre 
when he tells us more about what happened between God and the earth he had created. 
“This body, lying flat, face upwards in a line from north to south is feminine. Its sexual 
organ is an anthill and its clitoris a termite hill. Amma, being lonely and desirous of 
intercourse with this creature, approached it. That was the occasion of the first breach of 
the order of the universe” (Griaule: 1965; 17). This does not count as individual 
philosophising but a rehash of the Dogon beliefs that every member of the community 
held or at least was supposed to hold. If Ogotemmeli was a serious sage able to reflect on 
a culture as opposed to perpetuating communal beliefs he should have questioned the 
veracity of this creation story. That would have made him a sage. On the contrary he 
perpetuates the myth of his people on how the world was created. He is not different from 
the ethnophilosopher. 
 
Samuel Oluoch Imbo captures this objection succinctly when he makes an insightful 
objection. He argues: 
 
A common criticism of ethnophilosophy is that it heralds a philosophy 
without philosophers. The sage Ogotemmeli of the Dogon people of 
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southern Mali presents an exposition of Dogon mythological thinking that 
puts this criticism in a new light. In a sense Ogotemmeli may be 
considered an absent philosopher because he died long before he became 
aware of his notoriety as a philosopher. If he was a philosopher, he was 
not aware of it. In another sense, however, there are those who doubt that 
Ogotemmeli’s exposition, however systematic, amounts to philosophy. On 
this view it can, at best, be read as an expression of collective, 
unconscious myths and a knowledge of Dogon social and cultural features. 
Even if one admits that Ogotemmeli is a philosopher, his exposition of 
Dogon culture still does not qualify as philosophy (Imbo: 1998; 64). 
 
The point that is strikingly important here is that sagacity is not a lone endeavour as 
Oruka would like us to believe. It depends on the community and is generated from 
communal beliefs. It is communal beliefs told systematically by one person. Another 
important point is whatever expositions the sage makes about her culture, those 
systematic expositions do not count as philosophy. The simple reason is that they lack the 
insights and offer society nothing in form of their own intellectual engagement with 
social issues other than a systematic repetition of what is already well known in the 
public domain. What they offer does not count as philosophy as Imbo rightly observes. It 
is primarily ethnographic in nature and may have resonance with what ethnophilosophers 
and ethnographers have as the core of their business.  
 
My project does not refer to any sages as, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
literature that reflects what the sages said on the concept of person. If there were 
recordings of what sages have said on the concept of a person I would treat their 
pronouncements as representing their philosophy and I would look for philosophical 
value from their statements. 
 
1.4 Professional Philosophy 
Professional philosophy has been identified as another trend of African philosophy. “This 
trend consists of works and debates of the professionally trained students and teachers of 
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philosophy in Africa. Most of it rejects the assumptions of ethno-philosophy. Philosophy 
is conceived as a discipline or an activity whose meaning cannot depend just on racial or 
regional make-up” (Oruka: 2003; 123). Professional philosophers are philosophers who 
have gone to university and have earned degrees in philosophy. They are aware of the 
tradition of philosophy in the West hence their outright rejection of ethnophilosophy as a 
philosophical trend.  
 
According to Bodunrin professional philosophers take a universalistic view of philosophy 
arguing that philosophy “must have the same meaning in all cultures although the 
subjects that receive priority, and perhaps the method of dealing with them, may be 
dictated by cultural biases and the existential situation in the society within which the 
philosophers operate” (1984; 2). Thus this school looks for certain universalistic 
characteristics that constitute philosophy. “According to this school, criticism and 
argument are essential characteristics of anything which is to pass as philosophy” (ibid; 
3). This trend, in African philosophy, has been traditionally identified with its first 
leading proponents, who were all agreed on the need for a technical philosophy and these 




Hountondji argues that African philosophy is not to be found in ethnophilosophical 
accounts. Instead what counts as African philosophy, in his view, are the numerous works 
that are generated by Africans that specifically deal with philosophical problems. These 
works may be in any area of philosophy. What makes them African philosophy is that 
they have been produced by Africans. He denies Tempels’ work the status of the title 
African philosophy arguing that Tempels’ work belongs to Western literature. However, 
he is willing to count the work of African ethnophilosophers like Alexis Kagame as 
African philosophy. This also extends to include work done by Africans on non-African 
philosophy. So if an African was to do work on Kant or Rawls that would count as 
African philosophy for Hountondji. In his own words he argues: 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that these philosophers are not from the same country or the same culture. They 
were not interested in advancing a certain cultural knowledge or philosophy. Wiredu is from Ghana, 
Bodunrin from Nigeria, Oruka from Kenya and Hountondji from Benin. What brought them together into 
one school was their position that philosophy ought to be technical and universal.  
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The essential point here is that we have produced a radically new 
definition of African philosophy, the criterion now being the geographical 
origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of content. The 
effect of this is to broaden the narrow horizon which has hitherto been 
imposed on African philosophy and to treat it, as now conceived, as a 
methodical inquiry with the same universal aims as those of any other 
philosophy in the world (Hountondji: 1996; 66). 
 
I do not think Hountondji’s position innocent of serious incoherencies. Firstly, the 
attempt to identify philosophers by their geographical origin, African philosophers for 
that, is a swift return to ethnophilosophy. It amounts to either a chauvinistic or an exotic 
diversionary celebration of “something out of Africa”. If some African philosophers are 
interested in Kant, for example, but consistently make contributions to Kantian 
philosophy that are excessively weak and are not taken seriously in the Kantian tradition, 
they may be excused for being African. If those Africans, on Hountondji’s account, were 
to make sterling contributions to Kantian philosophy their Western counterparts may 
think that they are just as good as them and that may produce a “Whoa!” feeling that is 
impressed with the ability of that African philosopher. At the end, the African 
philosopher smuggles the end product back to Africa and we extol it as constitutive of 
African philosophy and African literature. Of course it is not African philosophy and it is 
not African literature. Its right place is among the best or worst collections of Kantian 
philosophy and not alongside ethnophilosophical accounts of Mbiti and Kagame. In the 
same vein Tempels’ work, though not produced by an African and admittedly seriously 
faulty, easily finds home among other faulty productions and views from 
ethnophilosophers and ethnographers on the continent. Hountondji’s distinction between 
the work of African ethnophilosophers and European ethnophilosophers who seek to 
address the same subject is at the very least arbitrary and is consistent with what is 
normally read to be a racist attitude. It would be far more appropriate to treat 
philosophical issues peculiarly pertinent to Africa as African philosophy. Oruka accedes 
to the same opinion when he repeats a criterion he says he stated in 1975.  
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It is the position that our criterion for an African philosopher should be 
based on the nature of philosophical interest plus the cultural experience 
of the thinker or author to be judged. Therefore, even a non-African 
thinker whose philosophical interest and study have been on topics of 
special concern or historic importance to Africa, and whose life 
experience has been dominated by cultural praxis in Africa, would, by 
his/her contribution, qualify as an African philosopher (Oruka: 1997; 168-
169). 
 
Oruka prefers not to dismiss non-Africans completely as Hountondji does. He admits that 
non-Africans who have immersed themselves in the cultural and philosophical 
experiences of Africans do qualify as African philosophers. But those who have not 
immersed themselves in that experience but have an interest in the philosophical 
scholarship of Africans and make contributions to that scholarship can be counted as 
experts on African philosophy. 
 
Wiredu also concedes that although philosophy can be universal it has always been 
culture-relative in many, albeit subtle, ways. He notes that there are two important 
respects in which philosophy can be culture relative. The first refers to the issues that 
cause concern or germinate inquiry and the second refers to the contents of the 
philosophical discussions that will emerge. Thus, he argues, in the attempt to understand 
what African philosophy is: 
 
There is the need to record, reconstruct, and interpret, and above all to 
correct false interpretations. But it should be clear also that there is a need, 
possibly more urgent, to fashion philosophies based upon contemporary 
African experience with its many sided-ness. From this point of view, one 
might suggest without being whimsical that the term ‘African philosophy’ 
should be reserved for the results of that experience. African philosophy, 
as distinct from African traditional world-views, that is being produced by 
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contemporary African philosophers. It is still in the making (Wiredu: 
1980; 36) 
 
With this move, Wiredu takes African philosophy to another stage by effectively 
dismissing traditional world-views and in their place advocating a philosophy that will be 
sensitive to Africa’s station in the here and now. Such a philosophy will be a conscious 
discussion of the many facets or realities that confront modern Africa. For Wiredu 
African philosophy is not to be found in the oft repeated African world-views but will be 
found in current discussions and is to be treated as an unfinished project but one that is 
emerging. 
 
The most important criticism of professional philosophy, to my mind, is that it is a 
philosophy of apemanship. It seeks to ape and apply the methods of doing philosophy 
that are essentially Western to African ethnophilosophy. Professional philosophers 
formulate their objections to ethnophilosophy without acknowledging that they are using 
a certain method of philosophising from a certain context. Though justified in many 
instances, that attack seeks to replace ethnophilosophy with yet another method, this time 
Anglo-American, of philosophising which is itself a contested method.  
 
That the professional philosophers fail to mention that they have been trained in the 
Anglo-American tradition is no fault of their own. They are victims as much as they are 
beneficiaries of colonialism and post-colonialism on the continent. As Keita notes: “On 
the question concerning African philosophical thought, it seems that the structure of this 
thought has been determined to a great extent by the ideological systems of belief 
imposed on Africa by European scholarship of the precolonial and postcolonial eras” 
(1991; 134). Thus colonialism and post-colonialism imposed a European scholarship on 
the continent without regard for any African scholarship. The professional philosophers 
having benefited from that scholarship and seeing themselves as enlightened take it upon 
themselves to lead the continent in the right kind of way of going about engaging in the 
philosophical enterprise. “Professional philosophy as practised in African universities is 
generally based on the Euro-American model” (Keita: 1991; 141). Although this may 
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appear as advancement for that African philosopher in that it sensitises her to other 
traditions of philosophising; the problem lies in the fact that the Euro-American model is 
but one philosophical model which is also open to serious criticism from other quarters. 
In other words the Euro-American model has its own weaknesses which may truncate 
Africa’s growth and development in philosophy. Hallen makes an incisive observation on 
the problems relating to the origins of African philosophy when he writes: 
 
Academic philosophy in Anglophone Africa arose in a conservative yet 
turbulent intellectual climate. Conservative because philosophical 
paradigms in the English-language academy derived principally from the 
analytic tradition, which provided for a comparatively more narrow 
conception of the discipline than its European Continental counterparts. 
Turbulent because of the competing claims about what could constitute the 
sources of African philosophy as advocated by Africanists and African 
intellectuals from a diverse variety of disciplinary and vocational 
backgrounds-social anthropology, missionary and religious scholarship, 
and academic philosophy (Hallen: 2002; 13) 
 
 Professional philosophers, who in essence were analytic philosophers by their training, 
were immediately faced with the task of establishing, authoritatively as trained 
philosophers, what could count as African philosophy. The so-called professional 
philosopher could only offer a narrow conception of philosophy as conceived by his 
trend-analytic philosophy. Imbo correctly diagnoses the difficulty of professional 
philosophers which is just as serious as the ethnophilosophical problem when he states: 
“Ethnophilosophy unduly exalts the African past and confuses culture with philosophy. A 
universalist orientation valorises rigour for rigour’s sake and uncritically accepts 
European frameworks” (Imbo: 1998; 28). Thus the major weakness of what Imbo calls 
the universalist, otherwise known as the professional philosopher is her acceptance of the 
Euro-American model as the only authoritative philosophical method. 
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Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that the difficulty facing African philosophy is that 
there has been an external intervention on our own folk-philosophies on the continent and 
they have not been allowed to develop in their own way. The second problem is that there 
are African philosophers on the continent who have been trained in the Western 
paradigms and are aware of the difficulties that are attendant to those Western paradigms. 
The real difficult for those philosophers, according to Appiah, is that: 
 
They are bound also to have to make choices within Western traditions. 
Not only is there a considerable difference in the styles of philosophy in 
France and in Germany, on the one hand, and in the Anglophone world, on 
the other, but there is in Britain and in North America a wide divergence 
between the practice-and the metaphilosophical theory-of the dominant 
Anglo-American tradition, and the theory and practice of those whose 
work is conceived as closer to the traditions that remain strong in France 
and Germany (Appiah: 1998; 111).  
 
Thus the philosopher on the African continent has to be sensitive to and be aware of all 
the different styles of philosophy in the Western traditions. From these different styles, 
the African philosopher is expected to choose one or more of these traditions. Needless to 
say the trend she will choose is one she is acquainted with-probably one she has spent 
many years reading on and training in at university. When she makes that choice or when 
she finds that choice already made for her it would be extremely disingenuous for her to 
pretend that this the only universal trend which African philosophy must also live up to 
as so-called professional philosophers have sought to do. 
 
African philosophy, however it is conceived, is not necessarily in need of improvement 
through copying the methods of any other philosophy from any part of the world. As 
Okot p’ Bitek observes: “Africa must re-examine herself critically. She must discover her 
true self, and rid herself of all ‘apemanship’. For only then can she begin to develop a 
culture of her own” (1973; vii). Although Africans are perfectly capable of living up to 
the rigours of Anglophone philosophy it is not immediately obvious that their lot and 
 38 
abilities as philosophers is in need of some awakening from Anglophone trained 
philosophers operating under the guise of professional philosophers on the African 
continent. All other African philosophers such as those trained in the French, Germanic 
or Italian traditions are also professional philosophers in the same vein that African 
Anglo-American trained philosophers lay claim to professionalism. The so-called 
professional trend is no more professional than any other trend which originates from the 
West. If anything it is just another kind of foreign imposition on the continent. I think 
Africans should be sensitive to many of the values of Anglo-American as well as 
continental philosophy.  
 
My project is sensitive to the value that the professional trend brings to philosophy in 
general without necessarily excluding the values that all other trends also bring. My 
philosophical training is broadly the analytic tradition, hence my project relies on the 
related technique of professional philosophy. However I will remain aware of this, and 
will seek not to negate valuable techniques from other methods. 
 
1.5 Nationalist-Ideological Philosophy 
In the third chapter of this thesis I will give an account of African socialism in general 
and the three distinct philosophies that Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor advocate. In the 
fifth chapter I will attempt a critique of Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor who are all taken 
to belong to the nationalist/ideological trend. I will not go into a detailed discussion of the 
nationalist trend here, but certain comments are relevant at this stage.  
 
I wish to highlight a single point in as far as nationalist philosophy relates to the 
enterprise of philosophy. Philosophy admits of many branches; political philosophy is 
just but one of these branches. It may, at the first instance, appear to be correct to 
characterise nationalist philosophy as political philosophy. But this should not be the 
case. Nationalist philosophy is a pseudo philosophy just like ethnophilosophy.  
 
The proponents of nationalist philosophy mainly want to retrieve certain admirable 
aspects of a traditional culture and propose that these attributes are essentially 
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constitutive of a certain people. In this case the Africans. These values are derived from 
ethnophilosophical accounts of what it means for an African to be an African and what 
the metaphysical construal of the African is taken to be.  The nationalist then proceeds to 
promote the conclusions of the ethnophilosopher and affirms them as authentically 
African and a panacea to all the political ills that afflict the continent. It is just another 
form of ethnophilosophy-interested in narrating yet another cultural philosophical 
perspective of the African people.  
 
It is not a political philosophy in the sense that it does not seek to work out a conceptual 
political philosophical outlook but it affirms what has always been in existence and extols 
it as the best representative of the traditional organisation of society that ought to be 
preserved and perpetuated in the future. 
 
Further, it will emerge that the nationalists are not primarily engaged in producing a 
conscious philosophical project. They were mainly interested in producing philosophy in 
the weak sense of slogans and political party theories. Thus nationalist philosophy does 
not live up to being philosophical activity but political activism. Although I present the 
thoughts of the proponents of this trend in chapter three and critique those ideas in 
chapter five my thesis will not be following this method. On the contrary I argue that 
there is no justification in doing it as philosophy. 
 
1.6 Hermeneutics  
Okere identifies hermeneutics as another trend of African philosophy. He argues that the 
main concern of hermeneutics is an analysis of concepts given in African languages and 
arriving at logical implications derived from such concepts.  
 
Hallen notes that the tradition that has received great attention in Africa is that of analysis 
or analytic philosophy. “Another approach that deserves consideration is that derived 
from the phenomenological tradition and is conventionally, at least as far as its African 
manifestations are concerned, referred to as hermeneutics” (Hallen: 2002; 56). There is 
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no disguising that the emergence of what has come to be known as the hermeneutic 
tradition is derived from a non-African tradition.  
 
Serequeberhan describes the project in this way:  
 
The hermeneuticity of contemporary African philosophy-as is the case 
with the hermeneuticity of philosophical discourse as such-consists of the 
interplay of horizon and discourse. This interplay is grounded on the 
concrete and lived historicalness of a specific horizon. The terms 
“horizon” and “discourse,” are here used in a rather specialised sense. 
Horizon designates the historico-hermeneutical and politico-cultural 
milieu within and out of which specific discourses (philosophic, artistic, 
scientific, etc) are articulated (Serequeberhan: 1994; 17-18). 
 
Okere, in his African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the 
Conditions of its Possibility, argues that at the heart of the project of hermeneutics is an 
attempt at understanding the relationship that exists between philosophy and culture. For 
him the study of hermeneutics is the study of the meaning we give to life and how we 
create philosophy out of a culture. He sees hermeneutics as the epistemological tool that 
mediates between culture as lived experience and culture as a reflective exercise (Okere: 
11-15). At the beginning of his book he sets out what he wants to study and he cannot 
hide his great admiration for some Western philosophers in his proposed study. He states:  
 
We shall especially study its ontological roots and anthropological 
implications-the role of Hermeneutics in the manifestation and 
interpretation of Being and who or what is essentially the hermeneutical 
being. We shall see how this hermeneutical being lends its essential 
characteristic of historicity to the hermeneutical enterprise which is 
philosophy itself. All this will entail making prolonged stops at the great 
masters of the Philosophy of Hermeneutics-Paul Ricouer, Martin 
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Heidegger, and Hans Georg Gadamer, who have reflected extensively on 
hermeneutics (ibid). 
 
Thus for Okere hermeneutics is a tradition that has much to teach and instruct African 
philosophy. Hermeneutics is, for Okere, philosophy. In order for African philosophy to 
succeed it has to follow the hermeneutical route. This hermeneutical route, it appears, has 
already been well established by his great masters Ricouer, Heidegger and Gadamer.  
 
I think the problem with this line of argument is that it is rather a form of aping a Western 
trend. The hermeneutic trend is well-established in the West and taking it as it is, by 
making stops at the great masters, is nothing short of paying blind admiration to those 
masters. Further it is an attempt to impose a system of philosophy that has been 
developed in response to a set of circumstances that may just as well not be extant on the 
African continent. If this is a problem with “professional philosophy” then this approach 
is no better off.  
 
Another problem is that phenomenology as a philosophic enterprise is different from the 
trend practised by so-called professional philosophers on the continent. The development 
of hermeneutics with a different language and terminology leads to the creation of a 
chasm among African philosophers on the continent. African philosophers of a 
hermeneutic persuasion will find that their technique and way of philosophising, being 
radically different from professional philosophers, occludes the participation of their 
fellows on the continent. By so doing the division of philosophy into different traditions 
is perpetuated. As Hallen observes in African philosophy “it would be unfortunate if 
analytic and hermeneutic philosophers begin to congregate in increasingly segregated 
intellectual circles (as has been the case in the Western academy)” (2002; 56-57). 
 
Both the hermeneutic philosopher and the professional philosopher who are university 
graduates are perfectly capable of producing a philosophy that is grounded in Africa’s 
socio-economic, political and cultural experience. But as Olusegun Oladipo succinctly 
observes what the African philosopher is “busy doing is to promote an order of 
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knowledge which is largely informed by a socio-economic experience that is, at least in 
its fundamental aspects, anything but African” (2000; 20). The African philosopher is 
firstly preoccupied with living up to the tradition of hermeneutics and how it may fit or 
solve the problems of Africa. African philosophy can and must stand on its own without 
reference to the traditions of hermeneutics or any other Western model. Appiah picks up 
this peculiar problem confronting the African philosopher when he notes: 
 
… the fact is that philosophers in Africa are bound, by their position as 
intellectuals educated in the shadows of the West, to adopt an essentially 
comparative perspective. Even if it is their own traditions they are 
analysing, they are bound to see them in the context of European (and 
often Islamic) as well as other African cultures. No one can be happy 
celebrating her own tradition in the knowledge that it makes claims 
inconsistent with other systems, without beginning to wonder which 
system is right about which issues. A cosy celebration of one’s own 
conceptual and theoretical resources is a simple impossibility (Appiah: 
1992; 151). 
 
It is true that the African philosopher, because of her training, is aware of other 
philosophical traditions and because of her awareness will inevitable compare those 
traditions to her own. If she finds that these traditions make claims that are not consistent 
with the claims that her own system makes; Appiah suggests that the African philosopher 
may find celebrating her system difficult or embarrassing. However, this should not be 
taken to mean a wholesale importation of alien systems such as hermeneutics and 
professional philosophy just for the sake of it. The hermeneutic philosopher as well as the 
professional philosopher would be well advised to look carefully within their own 
systems of professional training with a full understanding that it has its own history and 
developed from a certain social context different from her own. She must therefore strive 
to reach a balanced relationship between her system of training and her own specific 
cultural context to which she seeks to apply her training.  
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Hallen observes that the most important starting point shared by “most hermeneutical in 
and of Africa generally is the conviction that European imperialism and colonialism 
violently and profoundly disrupted Africa’s social, cultural, and political continuity and 
integrity” (2002:61). He says the benefit of this approach is that hermeneutics is able to 
interpret the fabric of African societies which sometimes mix both the European and the 
African ways of life with little success. Hermeneutics is then able to offer what is 
valuable and what is not through its interpretation and that forms the basis for a 
progressive African social, political and cultural heritage (ibid). Thus Serequeberhan sees 
the role of philosophy in this way: 
 
It is in and out of this overall historical-political-existential horizon that 
the discourse of African philosophy carves out and secures a space in 
which, and out of which, it can articulate itself as a viable and pertinent 
undertaking. African philosophy is thus a reflective supplement to the 
concrete efforts under way on the continent…the concerns of African 
philosophy and the efforts of African philosophers hover around this 
central point: the historico-political existential crisis of an African saddled 
with a broken and ambiguous tradition (Serequeberhan: 1991; 9) 
 
Okonda Okela observes that in Germany hermeneutics was born out of a crisis of self-
identity. In Africa, he holds: 
 
The interest in hermeneutics also arises out of the reality of crisis: a 
generalised identity crisis due to the presence of a culture-a foreign and 
dominating tradition-and the necessity for a self-affirmation in the 
construction of an authentic culture and tradition. This crisis, on the 
strictly philosophical plane is the expression of a problematic that 
oscillates between a naïve ethnophilosophy and an unproductive criticism. 
To the imperious need for an authentic and African philosophy, 
hermeneutics seems to give a positive response (Okela: 1991; 201) 
 
 44 
African philosophy then, according to this view, must be concerned with the realities that 
confront Africa which are born from her experience of colonialism. The philosopher must 
endeavour to deal with the crisis born out of the history of Africa. Keita, probably after 
reflecting on the African political and economic situation, gives philosophy a new role 
when he writes: “Thus it is evident that the political and economic realities of 
contemporary Africa make it incumbent on professional philosophy to confront these 
realities, thereby assuming a direction different from that of orthodox professional 
philosophy” (Keita: 1991; 144).  
 
I do not seek to deny the importance of addressing both economic and political issues in 
Africa. However, to truncate the role of the philosopher on the continent to that of 
dealing with economic and social issues tends to rather limit the role of the philosopher. I 
believe that a philosopher should be allowed to pursue all matters that she deems worthy 
of the attention of a philosopher or those particular issues that excite her intellectual 
passions. She must not be forced to consider certain issues just because they are believed 
to be the most pertinent of issues. In other words this trend admits of a weakness that it 
seeks to compel and restrict philosophers to a single dimensional occupation. That in a 
way impoverishes philosophy.  
 
Although the thinkers within the hermeneutic trend attempt to attend to what they think 
are the important issues that the African philosopher ought to deal with based on the 
experiences of Africa; they would do well by not aping the method and language of this 
trend as it was coined in the West. In that respect hermeneutics shares the same weakness 
as “professional philosophy” since philosophers who belong to both trends are simply 
presenting different kinds of Western philosophy as answers to what constitutes African 
philosophy. 
 
My project acknowledges that hermeneutics seeks to address some of the important 
questions on the continent. However, this project is not premised on the same belief as 
hermeneutics that the most important project for the African philosopher is to interpret 
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the continent’s crisis brought about as a result of colonialism. As a result my project will 
not be redolent with the language of hermeneutical philosophers on the continent. 
 
1.7 Artistic/ Literary Philosophy 
Oruka identifies the sixth trend in African philosophy as the artistic or literary trend. He 
argues that this refers to the narrative element in Africa and it is parallel to the nationalist 
project. The literary trend is derived from the works of such people as Chinua Achebe, 
Wole Soyinka and Ngugi wa Thiong’o (Oruka: 1998; 101). Unfortunately Oruka does not 
explicate what aspect of their work is philosophical, or what makes their work 
philosophical. Without that qualification one can only speculate as to what Oruka had in 
mind when he referred to these literary authors as philosophers. It could be possible that 
their work demonstrates some qualitative reflection which counts as philosophy.  
 
I am not convinced that the literary trend ought to be accepted in the strict sense as 
philosophy. Although it may be admitted that some kind of reflection is to be found in the 
works of these African authors it must be strictly remembered that these authors do have 
their own primary identity that they are aware of and that everybody else affirms and 
agrees with. Wole Soyinka, for example, is the first Sub Saharan African to be awarded 
the Nobel Prize for literature. We all know that in the contemporary academic world 
literature primarily belongs to whatever academics in language departments do. The work 
for example, of Achebe, Soyinka and Ngugi wa Thiong’o are works that are studied and 
indeed are a product of efforts undertaken in what we all know to be English language 
departments. These are modern day professional story tellers on the continent who tell 
their stories through the written word. They are authors who are famous for works of 
fiction and poetry. Soyinka, for example, has written a number of essays such as The 
Burden of Memory The Muse of Forgiveness. However, I am not convinced that this work 
should count as any kind of philosophical work. It ought to be treated as a literary essay, 
for that is what it is. An objection I raised earlier on against culture philosophies as non-
philosophical was that the producers of such a philosophy are not aware of the fact that 
they are producing a philosophy. An important requirement for any work to count as 
philosophical is that the producers of such work must be aware of the fact that they are 
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producing philosophy or at least are aiming at doing so. I doubt it very much if the three 
authors cited by Oruka ever thought they were producing philosophical texts in any 
sense, unless they conceive of philosophy in the weakest of all possible senses.  
 
It appears bizarre that Oruka identifies professional philosophy and hermeneutics as 
trends of African philosophy and then adds authors of fiction and authors of poems as 
philosophers as well. It is a kind of identity theft. The true identity of African literary 
giants is stolen by African philosophers who are eager to see their numbers swell. The 
irony lies in that both philosophers of the hermeneutic and professional trend are 
university trained professional philosophers. Both groups know what the different 
traditions and even origins of philosophy are. They are aware of central debates that have 
always characterised philosophical discourses. In short, we may say, they know their 
‘trade’. This ‘trade’, the ‘trade’ of Wiredu, Hountondji, Bodunrin, Okere and 
Serequeberhan is radically different from the ‘trade’ of Achebe, Soyinka and wa 
Thiong’o.  
 
The only thing their work has in common is that it is produced by university graduates. 
African philosophy cannot be African English literary studies and vice-versa. Any 
attempt to force literature into philosophy is vulgarising philosophy once again. “If we 
understand “philosophy” as the tradition to which Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and 
Hume, Kant and Hegel belong, then at least the following concepts are bound to be 
regarded as central to that canon: beauty, being, causation, evil, God, gods, good, 
illusion, justice, knowledge, life, meaning, mind, person, reality, reason, right, truth, 
understanding and wrong” (Appiah: 1998; 110).  Appiah’s observations on the nature of 
philosophy can be cited to disqualify the literary trend from being admitted as a trend of 
African philosophy. He correctly observes that although not all cultures will have the 
same concepts as listed above, at least they all have a close resemblance. Further, all 
these canons are dealt with in an argumentative method. If Appiah is correct in his 
characterisation of philosophy one can notice that the literary trend does not live up to the 
philosophical tradition by seeking to address the concepts identified by Appiah as 
 47 
constitutive of philosophy. But even more woeful is the fact that the literary trend is not 
committed to the argumentative method as philosophy is known to be.  
 
Perhaps it would be very wise to leave the last word to Okere. “The position taken here, 
however, is that philosophy, strictly speaking, is a special form of the march of reason in 
its age-old dialectics with reality, distinct from all other intellectual forms that ape or 
resemble it” (Okere: 1983; ix). I suggest that the so-called literary trend apes the real 
philosophic tradition.  
 
For my project this trend has no impact at all as I see it as not constituting the core issues 
of my thesis. My thesis seeks to enunciate on the concept of person in Africa and its link 
to African socialism. The artistic or literary trend does not shed any further light or help 
in this matter as it lacks the technical and logical inquiry that is necessary for this task. 
Hence my thesis does not use this method. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
From the foregoing it may be inferred that the question of whether an African philosophy 
exists is not a legitimate question. That such a body of activity really exists is evident. 
The questioning of the existence of an African philosophy must be questioned itself. 
Lucius Outlaw is correct in querying the questioning. “While these might appear to be 
benign queries which initiate and frame legitimate intellectual inquiry and discourse, for 
me they convey the putrid stench of a wretchedness that fertilises the soil from which 
they grow” (Outlaw: 2003; 137). Outlaw questions why such questions have been asked 
in the first place instead of seeing African philosophy as a mere truism. 
 
In my opinion and from the foregoing it appears undeniable that the question has been 
asked as a result of the history that Africa has gone through. Because of the negative 
effects of colonialism and neo-colonialism and faced with the need to re-affirm their own 
identity Africans ranging from ethnophilosophers, nationalists to supporters of sagacity-
they all sought to affirm the African identity. But the motive of questioning the existence 
of African philosophy is correctly characterised by Serequeberhan when he notes that: 
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“The bewildered and incredulous hilarity that one encounters behind the question 
“African philosophy?!” is, then, at best nothing more than a myopic view and at worst a 
studied bigotry, a residue of bygone days, the “golden age” of the Enlightenment, when 
Europe confidently saw itself as the measure of humanity and/or civilisation” (2000; 52). 
That kind of incredulity should not be tolerated as it is informed by chauvinism and 
arrogance.   
 
A little caveat has to be sorted out and this relates to the relationship between philosophy 
and culture. For example, on culture and philosophy, Innocent Onyewuenyi holds that the 
main task of philosophy, in general, is to establish order among various phenomena 
founding the world. These phenomena, according to Onyewuenyi, are identical in all 
cultures and societies. “Different cultures will synthesise and deal with these phenomena 
differently depending on each culture’s concept of life, namely the interrelationship 
between objects and persons and between persons and persons themselves” 
(Onyewuenyi: 1991; 38). He argues that each group of people will establish their own 
order in relation to their conception of life and there is no culture that can have final say 
with a universal validity on any matter.  
 
While this may be true, one is well advised to approach this argument with a great deal of 
caution. One outcome of this line of thought is that culture philosophy in its vulgar sense 
like ethnophilosophy is elevated to be a philosophy that is unanimously representative of 
all Africans. A distinction must be made between culture studies and philosophy. One of 
the most recognised African philosophers Kwame Gyekye, in the preface of his book 
African Cultural Values: An Introduction, writes:  
 
The book was not conceived as a philosophical work as such. For this 
reason, I have avoided the nuances and subtleties of philosophical 
language, arguments, and controversies. I use the term “culture” in a 
comprehensive sense, to encompass the entire life of a people: their 
morals, religious beliefs, social structures, political and educational 
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systems, forms of music and dance, and all other products of their creative 
spirit (Gyekye: 1996; xiii). 
 
Thus Gyekye avoids the possible problems that Onyuwuenyi and others of his persuasion 
may face. Though philosophy may be seen as a product of a culture and even 
discoverable in traditional African societies it is essentially marked by systematic critical 
thought (Gyekye: 1987; 11). For any philosophic endeavour on the continent to count as 
African philosophy, in my opinion, it ought to live up to a non-dogmatic search for truth 
informed by rational, discursive inquiry. At the same time such philosophic endeavour 
should always remain truthful and faithful to Africa’s conditions.  
 
Finally on Oruka’s classification of philosophy into six trends is not entirely accurate and 
does not help things that much. Although it was quite novel and didactic to those who 
were not familiar with African philosophy the listing of African philosophy into the 
different trends is misleading. Serequeberhan notes that “Oruka’s classificatory schema 
has pedagogic merit insofar as it presents a concise overview of the field at large. But this 
merit is offset by the fact that this ordering gives the false impression that these trends are 
somehow independent of each other” (1991; 16). Kaphagawani, on the other hand argues 
that the striking thing “about this categorisation of African philosophy into four schemata 
is that it is amenable to misconception in the sense that this classification might be 
misconceived as representing four independent types of African philosophy, as opposed 
to seeing them as four methods used in African philosophy” (1998; 88). I generally 
concur with these observations but I wish to add that this distinction also closes the 
possibility of genuine and fruitful dialogues between the so-called different trends. 
Herein lies the weakness of Oruka’s schematisation; it opens the doors of admission to 
non-philosophical endeavours as philosophical. Three of these trends immediately spring 
to mind and they are sagacity, ethnophilosophy and the literary trend. As I have sought to 
argue above these trends fail into making the mark as philosophy.  
 
Thus African philosophers who seek to advance a much more serious and genuine 
engagement with the philosophy of their continent have to spend time repudiating such 
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hopelessly non-philosophical trends presented authoritatively by Oruka as authentic 
trends of African philosophy. Thus the categorisation is not helpful as it sidesteps the real 
issues that the African philosopher has to face. The rest of this thesis seeks to address a 
philosophical problem in Africa without necessarily aligning itself to any of the six 
trends: the concept of person in African political philosophy. I avoid a dogmatic alliance 
to any of these trends as I engage the conceptual issues at the centre of my investigation.  
The next chapter will outline the concept of person in African philosophy. The third 
chapter outlines African socialism as advocated by some of the first leaders of 
independent Africa which they claimed to be based on the concept of person in African 
thinking. The fourth chapter is a critique of the concept of person in African philosophy 
and the fifth chapter is a critique of African socialism. The sixth chapter sums up the 





      















Chapter Two: The Concept of Person in African Philosophy 
 
2. Introduction 
In this chapter I will be discussing the main schools of thought on the concept of 
personhood in African philosophy.  The African concept of person is an intricately 
interwoven notion that involves issues such as destiny, ancestors, life and death, 
community and individuality. It is an issue that has to be approached with great care and 
patience. Generally, the nature of the discussion of the concept of person in African 
philosophy takes two forms. The first form expresses personhood in terms of communal 
relations.  Personhood is presented as something that is to be measured in terms of how 
the individual conducts herself and how she relates to other people in her personal 
interactions and the community at large. There are certain obligations that are prescribed 
to every individual and each individual is expected to meet these obligations. This school 
of thought holds that personhood is attained in direct proportion to one’s satisfactory 
discharge of her duties and obligations. 
 
The second form of discussion on the nature of person in African thought attempts to find 
and ground an understanding of person that is not necessarily tied to communal 
encumbrances. It takes the position that there are certain key characteristics that 
constitute personhood. These characteristics are taken to be largely independent of 
communal relations. These characteristics can be generally stated as the soul, the spirit 
and the body. These characteristics are taken to be constitutive of personhood.  
 
2.1 Definition of Person 
The Cambridge International Dictionary of English (2002: 1052), defines the term 
person as ‘man, woman or child.’ It adds that this term is also used to describe someone’s 
character, for example, whether one is kind generous, mean or cowardly. This brief 
definition is interesting particularly from the African point of view. The definition 
implies that a person can only be a man, woman or child. This means that entities that are 
not biologically human beings or lack the physical attributes that may make them either 
man, woman or child cannot be considered to be persons in any sense of the word. 
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Secondly, the definition also notes that the word may be used to denote someone’s 
character disposition, which is crucial in African thought. Some thinkers in the African 
scheme of thought hold that character is very important in deciding whether an individual 
can actually make the mark of full personhood.  
 
Appiah gives an interesting account of how different societies conceive the theory of 
person. He notes that each “society has at least one collection of ideas that I am going to 
call a theory of the person. A theory of the person is the collection of views about what 
makes human beings work” (Appiah: 2004; 25). 
 
Appiah says in articulating their theory of person, Westerners do this by talking about 
minds and the brain. Appiah says for the Westerners, states such as fear, hope, etc are 
found in the brain. But, he argues, it is not all societies that think that these states could 
be found in the brain. He gives the example of Homeric epic and the Hebrew bible where 
“breath was for both these societies the name of the animating principle that explained 
why people’s bodies sometimes acted under the guidance of inner states and sometimes 
(when dead) behave like other inanimate things” (ibid). 
 
Appiah’s point here is that when a people use the concept of person they do not merely 
engage in the discussion in a narrow manner that only restricts itself to person as an 
isolated entity that can be comprehended on its own. The approaches of different 
traditions, in discussing persons, represent various attempts to understand what it is that 
makes ‘human beings work’. This proceeds from the uniqueness of human beings and the 
complicated manner in which they operate including the kinds of states that they 
sometimes go through such as fear, hope, despair, gratitude etc.  
 
For Appiah, to understand the concept of a person is not something that is attempted in 
isolation and independent of views on many other issues. He opines that such an attempt 
will not yield a coherent and well organised view on what constitutes a person. People 
cannot afford to ignore other matters that they perceive to be of crucial importance to 
their existence in understanding what a person is.  
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 For people interact, of course, not only with each other, but also with a 
 world, both social and natural, around them; and are also widely believed 
 to interact with the sorts of spirits, gods and the like that we are inclined to 
 call “supernatural.” So, simply asking someone how they explain the 
 things people do or what people need for survival is not generally 
 guaranteed to produce a well-organized body of prepared doctrine 
 (Appiah: 2004; 26). 
 
In this brief discourse, Appiah points out the some of the difficulties that are attendant on 
the discussion of personhood. It seems there is no prima facie reason to believe that there 
is one word or phrase that can serve as a final definition of what a person is. These 
accounts will attempt in the first instance to explain what it is that makes human beings 
function the way they do. Secondly, this explanation will differ from culture to culture or 
from one people to another as exemplified by Appiah’s comparison of the Homeric epic 
and the Hebrew bible to current Western notions. And, finally having considered these 
two factors, there is still a further complication presented by the interactions that people 
have with each other and their surroundings and spirits, which all call for careful and 
cautious treatment of the subject of person.    
 
I now proceed to look at the various ways in which the concept of person is articulated in 
African thinking. At this stage I only seek to present what various authors have written 
about the concept of person. Since these views show two distinct aspects, I also introduce 
a distinction between the communitarian view and what I call the metaphysical view of 
person. That distinction is substantive. I defer the critical analysis of the concept to 
chapter four.  
 
2.2 The Communitarian View 
The communitarian view generally holds that personhood is socially sanctioned through 
an individual’s participation in her respective community and depends largely on her 
ability to fulfil her social obligations. She must demonstrate a loyalty to the community 
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by placing its needs ahead of hers and be prepared to sacrifice her private needs for the 
sake of the common good.  
 
In some cases, this belief holds that the individual should have a certain moral rectitude 
that puts her in good standing with the community at large which in turn guarantees the 
fullness and security of her status as a person. Someone who demonstrates immoral 
tendencies can only be viewed as either less of a person or non-person.  
 
The communitarian view is quite unambiguous in asserting that the status of personhood 
is a derivative of communal standing. Those who have a reputable standing (according to 





’s widely read and debated book Bantu
4
 Philosophy is viewed by many 
as a genesis of written African philosophy. Tempels’s thesis on the thinking of the people 
he called Bantu, was primarily couched in terms of what he called vital force. He thought 
that the greatest principle that governed all Bantu thought and action was that of force.  
 
In the fourth chapter of his book, he states that his aim in that chapter is to examine the 
Bantu’s “philosophical ideas on the subject of man”5 (Tempels: 1959; 63). He states that 
the study of the Bantu psychology that he is about to embark on is not an outcome of the 
observations by Europeans on the Bantu and how they conduct themselves, but rather it is 
situated in the minds of the Bantu themselves. He exhorts his readers to see things from 
the view-point of the Bantus so that they can better understand the psychology of the 
Bantu themselves.  
 
                                                 
3
 Tempels (OFM), (1906-1977) was a Belgian Catholic Franciscan priest who worked among the Baluba 
people of then Belgian Congo, present day  Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was neither a 
philosopher nor an African but invested a lot of his time in trying to understand the philosophy and 
thinking of the Baluba that he subsequently called Bantu philosophy.  
4
 In literature, this term is not taken as offensive, but it is dated and is a relic of Tempels’s times. 
5
 Emphasis his. 
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He says there are no equivalents in Bantu thought and language to Western notions such 
as “soul, mind, will, sentiment” (ibid). He urges his readers
6
 to erase such concepts from 
their minds because the conclusion that he is going to lead them to is radically different 
from their own conception of the person.  
 
Tempels takes force to be central to all Bantu’s scheme of things. “Vital force, increase 
of force, vital influence are the three great notions which we shall find necessary at the 
base of Bantu psychology. It is on this plan that we wish to pursue this part of our study” 
(Tempels: 1959; 64). Clearly for Tempels, the chief distinguishing element that makes 
the Bantu different from Europeans is their unusual reference to force.  
 
For Tempels’ Bantu ‘man’ was a living force. He was supreme force that had dominion 
over all other created things and he had been called by God to share and participate in his 
creation through the exercise of this divinely granted force. ‘Man’, in this view, was not a 
mere living being, he was the ultimate expression of the fullness of life. “The Bantu see 
in man the living force; the force or the being that possesses life that is true, full and 
lofty. Man is the supreme force, the most powerful among created beings. He dominates 
plants, animals and minerals” (ibid). 
 
Tempels said that Bantu saw ‘God as supreme, perfect and complete’. They held that God 
is the one who had caused life and continued to sustain it. Although ‘man’ was not the 
first cause of life, God had invited him to participate in his scheme. ‘Man’ could add or 
cause life to those things that were beneath him in the hierarchy of creation. This means 
that ‘man’s’ actions could just as well increase or diminish the lives of things under his 
care such as animals or the environment. God had left these to the care of man to use for 
his own purposes but also to give life. 
 
                                                 
6
 At the time of writing this book, his readership was decidedly white, either those who were administrators 
in the colony or those who were at home, back in Belgium, and the aim of this writing was to enable these 
whites to develop a better understanding of the Bantu. It is not unreasonable to suspect that Tempels didn’t 
have in mind, as his audience, his subject of investigation. 
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Tempels argued that Bantu ontology admitted that one should be able to grow, increasing 
his force at every turn, becoming greater and stronger, or even more successful. But he 
recognised that this growth was not an endless process. He noted that Bantu thought also 
admitted that one’s vital force could be completely lost, either gradually or suddenly. In 
his own words, ‘man’ can “come to an end in the complete annihilation of his very 
essence, the paralysis of his vital force, which takes from him the power to be an active 
force” (Tempels: 1959; 66). This is death. If a person dies, according to Tempels, he 
loses his vital force and he depends on the living to renew it. The living relatives of the 
deceased individual have a duty to renew his force through some ceremony that will 
induct that person into the ancestral world. The ancestral world cannot be entered 
automatically upon death. It requires that the living keep the force of the recently 
deceased functional. However it may so happen in certain instances that the relatives of 
the deceased do not keep the force of the deceased alive. Then these poor souls will lose 
their force completely in the spiritual world and will not be remembered. “This state of 
ultimate diminution of being is the fate of some of the dead” (ibid). 
 
The South African author, Mike Boon, says the vital life-force identified as the shadow is 
what constitutes the identity of the individual. This vital force, is one that gives the 
individual life, in the here and after. It also gives the individual all the powers she needs 
in interacting with other forces. “A critical base to traditional African Philosophy is 
known as seriti (Sotho) isithunzi (Nguni). The origin of seriti in its form moriti, means 
shade or shadow, but it is seen as the vital life-force identifying an individual. It is part of 
all life, but it is also personal, intimately affected by and affecting other forces” (Boon: 
1996; 35). 
 
Thus Boon is in agreement with Tempels on the concept of vital-force being the essence 
of life in an individual in African thought. Without this force, one may not be viewed as a 
full person and won’t be able to interact with other forces. On the subject of this shadow, 
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 Idlozi (the shade) and isithunzi/seriti are interchangeable. The seriti/isithunzi is 
sometimes called an aura. We Africans believe the isithunzi, which after death 
becomes an idlozi, is shaped by the appearance and the experiences of the person 
of the physical being. This isithunzi, the little soul, is not immortal. If you neglect 
it, it will slowly fade away (ibid). 
 
Thus Mutwa is in agreement with Tempels on the importance of the isithunzi, or shadow. 
This isithunzi, which literally means shadow in the Zulu language, as Boon correctly 
points out, is the life force of the individual when he/she is alive. But most importantly, it 
transcends death as both Mutwa and Tempels opine. But the continued survival of this 
force depends on the care that it receives from the living. If not taken care of then it will 
disappear and die the ultimate death. 
 
John S. Mbiti argues that although a real barrier exists between the dead and the living, 
the recently departed are kept alive in the memories and conversations of their living 
relatives. They are remembered by name and they are talked about all the time. Further, 
he argues, they are taken to make occasional returns to their families to have meals with 
them and listen to their worries. Although the recently departed have not become full 
ancestors they are able to intercede on behalf of their living relatives with other higher 
spirits. They are now a go between connecting the living and the long departed.  
 
Mbiti argues that to show that the recently departed are still with us, careful attention is 
paid to the rituals that are observed when disposing of their bodies. Libations, offerings 
and taking care of the grave are very important to ensure that the soul of the recently 
departed does not become offended and seek revenge. The living treat the dead with 
                                                 
7
 Credo Mutwa is a South African traditional healer, Zulu traditional authority, oral historian who has 
authored at least four books. He was born in KwaZulu-Natal in 1921. 
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respect because they believe that they have gone into another realm, a more powerful 
realm, hence they seek their favourable intervention. 
 
However a distinction must be made between the recently departed and the long departed. 
The long departed have become ancestors, their memory is not retained on an individual 
basis but collectively. Those who are remembered individually are those who have just 
recently died. So, those who died many generations ago, while still alive as ancestors, are 
not remembered by name and libations are given to them collectively as opposed to the 
recently departed. Mbiti describes those who have been dead for more than five 
generations as the “living dead”. He says “they are in a state of personal immortality, and 
their process of dying is not yet complete” (Mbiti: 1995; 107). 
 
Thus two distinctive things can be said about the nature of persons within the 
communitarian school of thought. The first is that personhood is accompanied by some 
vital force that comes from the creator. That vital force gives the person the capacity to 
be a person and to interact with others as well as more powerful forces that may have an 
influence on his/her life. Secondly, death does not necessarily mark the end of that force, 
or more boldly, physical death does not mark the termination of the existence of that 
individual. If the right rituals are followed the departed person continues to live as 
seriti/isithunzi, in Mutwa’s words. 
 
Tempels goes further in explaining what this concept of person means in real terms. He is 
of the view that ‘man’ is more than a mere assemblage of powerful forces within and 
without that may drive his life in one way as opposed to another. Tempels argues that the 
vital force that is found in man, as an individual, comes more to life, fruition or 
realisation when that individual engages in relations with his surrounding environment. 
He relates to the supernatural world, to his fellow human beings, and to inanimate things. 
Tempels says; “The living ‘muntu’ is in a relation of being to being with God, with his 
clan brethren, with his family and with his descendants. He is in a similar ontological 
relationship with his patrimony, his land, with all that it contains or produces, with all 
that grows or lives on it” (Tempels: 1959; 66). 
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So, according to Tempels, the individual in African thought is one who always finds 
himself/herself standing in relation to someone or something. It is not possible for this 
individual to be indifferent to what surrounds her simply because relationships arouse 
passion and deep feeling. So the individual relates to a high being such as God, the fellow 
humans and then finds himself/herself equally obliged to relate to his/her surrounding 
environment like her fields and livestock.  
 
But these relations are not just any kind of relation that the individual’s fancy may have 
him/her do. These relationships are deeply rooted in observing communal dictates that 
are normally observed as sacrosanct rules that must not be violated. All individuals abide 
by these rules in relating to each other and everything that they have to relate with. They 
will follow what the community says about how they should relate depending on who 
they are to each other. But at the heart of all these relations is the observance of moral 
rules and indeed achievement of moral worth. Importance in stature arises as a result of 
the ability to abide by these moral dictates. Those who are seen as great in stature, in their 
respective communities, would no doubt have succeeded in exhibiting a virtuous ability 
to relate to others morally and in accord with social dictates. Thus Tempels says:  
 
 It is always to accord with this conception of forces that the Baluba speak 
 of “muntu mutupu” to indicate a man of middling importance devoid of 
 real force; while the “muntu mukulumpe” indicates the powerful man who 
 has his part to take in the community. The word “muntu” inherently 
 includes an idea of excellence or plenitude. And thus the Baluba will 
 speak of “ke muntu po”, “this is not a muntu”, of a man who behaves 
 unworthily. They will use the phrase of a newly-born who has been 
 begotten outside the normal ontological, moral and juridical conditions of 
 clan life (Tempels: 1959; 67). 
 
These terms are used to describe the status and achievements of the individual in the 
community. One who commands less importance can not be described in the same way 
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as, for example, the chief. Thus it is clear that categorisation according to how one 
handled herself in her relationships did exist in certain traditional African communities. 
These differences in categorisation had nothing to do with wealth or class but everything 
to do with how one interacted with other people and things entrusted to her.  
 
Tempels goes further to argue that Bantu ontology is very different from European 
ontology. He claims that the concept of individuated things existing apart of each other 
does not exist in African thought. Tempels says that, for the Africans, what they have in 
their communities is more than a benign social relationship. It is so close to them that it 
actually constitutes their identity. 
 
 The Bantu cannot be a lone being. It is not a good enough synonym to say 
 that he is a social being. No; he feels and knows himself to be a vital force, 
 at this very time to be in intimate and personal relationship with other 
 forces acting above him and below him in the hierarchy of forces. He 
 knows himself to be a vital force, even now influencing some forces and 
 being influenced by others. The human being, apart from the ontological 
 hierarchy and the interaction of forces has no existence in the conceptions 
 of the Bantu (ibid). 
 
Whatever one may take this force to be, what Tempels is driving at is that this force alone 
is not adequate to grant existence to the individual. The extra requirement that is needed 
is that the individual must be able to interact with other forces in the hierarchy of forces. 
Once that interaction is underway then, ontologically, the individual is thought of as a 
real person that exists. Existence is affirmed by the ability to interact, the ability to turn 
vital force into meaningful relationships that are respectful of other forces and that create 
life in lower forces.  
 
This view is echoed by N.K Dzobo who argues that the whole of life in Africa is geared 
towards creativity. He says that ‘man’s’ ultimate task is to multiply and increase, but this 
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power is not merely restricted to the ability to create children. It must extend to relations 
in community and good social standing, he says.  
 
 The creative process is not limited to bringing forth children, but it is seen 
 as embracing the whole of man’s life and his relationships. The individual 
 therefore is to grow in the development of a creative personality and to 
 develop the capacity to maintain creative relationships. He is to see his 
 individual life and that of his society as fields that are sown with life’s 
 experiences and which should yield fruit (Dzobo: 1992; 131). 
 
Dzobo’s point is that relations and the goodness they produce are very important in 
enhancing the creative force in society. Although this creative force is found in each and 
every individual it must be communally shared so that the whole of society can benefit 
from it. This sentiment echoes Tempels’s views on how vital force is shared in 
relationships by individuals. It is a requirement of African life and of being in Africa. 
Dzobo goes a step further and describes under what conditions one is considered to be a 
person in African thought. Like Tempels he points to some kind of achievement that 
comes through social relationships.  
 
 The person who has achieved a creative personality and productive life 
 and is able to maintain a productive relationship with others is said to 
 “have become a person.”  (Ezu ame-Ewe; Oye onipa pa.-Akan). The 
 persons who are considered models of creative life are the chief, the elders 
 and the ancestors. Such a life is counted as the greatest value in the 
 indigenous culture (ibid). 
 
Here, Dzobo agrees with Tempels on a very important point which is that persons of 
importance in the community represent a more full and successful version of personhood 
than those who are not that important. For example, above, Tempels argues that there is a 
difference between a person of little importance and a person of great importance who 
has a part to play in the community. Those with a great role to play are not only 
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hierarchically more important than deviants but are also seen as having attained the full 
status of personhood by virtue of their good standing in community.  
 
But Dzobo does not end there; his final statement is to insist on the importance of the 
community in the individual’s life. He actually endorses the view that the community is 
more important than the individual, that it takes precedence over the individual. This 
seems to stem from his observation that the individual comes out of a system that has 
been prior to her and exists to support the development and well being of that very 
individual. Just like Tempels, Dzobo does not see what can become of the individual 
without the community. He sees the individual as essentially a communal being, one who 
needs the community not merely for physical sustenance but also for becoming who she 
is. Once again the claim being made here is not a benign reference to the sociality of the 
self. Rather it is a strong ontological reference to the all-pervasive presence of the 
community in the defining make-up of the individual.  
 
 The individual’s being emerges from a prior social whole which is truly 
 other; it comes into being for the sake of him and exists for his 
 development and growth. Hence, an individual who is cut off from the 
 communal organism is nothing. By living creatively the individual is also 
 contributing to the life and quality of his community and so can say ‘we 
 are, therefore I am, and since I am therefore we are’ (Dzobo: 1992; 132). 
 
The argument here, at least ideally, is that the individual’s personal identity is inseparable 
from her community’s own aspirations and goals. The individual is fused to the 
community such that she cannot separate her own goals from the broad aspirations of her 
community. The community in essence is her fellow clansmen and women who share the 
same kind of world outlook with her. The ‘I’ and the ‘We’ cannot exist independent of 
each other, they only make sense if used in reference to each other. Tempels’s vital force 
and Dzobo’s creativity, though individually owned are commanded to be brought into the 
community. A very clear claim made by these two thinkers is that apart from/out of the 
community and the relations exercised therein, the individual is nothing. 
 63 
 
Tempels points that another important criterion in defining the individual in the African 
context is the name that is given to the newly born child. He says that the name is not 
merely given to the child for the sake of naming a baby, like John or Ben. The name has a 
lot of meaning. It tells the story of the parents, the clan, the family or the child itself that 
has been born. Sometimes the newly born child can be seen as a deceased relative who 
has returned to life. It is normal that a parent names his son after his deceased father or 
any other deceased relative. “The name expresses the individual character of the being. 
The name is not a simple external courtesy, it is the very reality of the individual.” 
(Tempels: 1959; 70). 
 
 Tempels argues that the name indicates who the child is and if there was an outstanding 
or unique story behind the child’s birth or if some event had happened to its family just 
before it was born that would be reflected in the name that she gets. Tempels identifies 
three sources of names amongst the Baluba. He says there is a name that is normally 
identified as the inner name; this name has lots of meaning and it is normally given at 
birth. Then there is another name that is given at what he calls ‘an occasion of force such 
as initiation, investiture’ etc. For example if someone was training to be a traditional 
healer, at her graduation she might assume a new name. Then, finally and least important, 
is a name that one gives to herself. Tempels says this was the case, especially, with black 
servants who worked for white people. Their masters being unable to pronounce their 
native names properly, these locals would then decide to give themselves a 
Western/Christian name or corrupted version of it.  
 
These names showed that ‘man’ could never just appear alone and exist on his own. The 
names that were given to individuals showed the connectedness of the tribe, clan, and 
family or tried, at times, to show the ties between the living and the dead. Hence every 
African name has a meaning.  
 
Dzobo echoes Tempels’s views by arguing that the “African view of man is derived from 
the African view of reality which is found in the indigenous religion, creation myths, 
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personal names, symbols and proverbs” (Dzobo: 1992; 128). This shows that the Africans 
had a holistic approach to life. Everything that they did affected everything else in their 
society and their life cycles. As Dzobo argues the view of ‘man’, according to this school 
of thought is not derived from one single characteristic but involves almost all facets of 
the African’s life.  
 
Peter J. Paris argues that names do not only express the family history and the story of the 
child’s birth. He argues that they actually determine someone’s future and shape that 
person’s destiny. Just by bringing one to understand the name, Paris says, one will know 
so much about that individual. “All African names are meaningful. They tell the story of 
the child’s birth and destiny. Much can be known about a person by understanding his or 
her name. While revealing the family’s understanding of the person’s value, the name 
eventually shapes the person’s own self-understanding” (Paris: 1995; 104). 
 
Finally Tempels, on the subject of person, concludes by saying that another criterion of 
the individual, ‘of the concrete vital force is a man’s visible appearance.’  He says that 
the level of force in an individual can be expressed in different ways. “His vital force can 
be itself in a particular way in certain aspects or modes of external appearance of the 
man, which we may call moments or knots of high vital tension.” (Tempels: 1959; 74).  
 
For Tempels, these expressions may come in the form of the speech or eye movement or 
any bodily expression that the individual may use. This would show his state of force, 
whether it’s very high, diminished or somehow exhausted. Tempels also notes that this 
vital force can exert itself on other individuals in a negative way. That for example, a 
person who curses another, and the cursed gets sick may as well be held responsible for 
that illness.  
 
In conclusion, Tempels’s thesis is expressed in terms of vital force that is lived and 
shared out in creation of life through communal relations. Outside these communal 




Didier N. Kaphagawani has accused Mbiti of following, wrongly, in the footsteps of 
Tempels, trying to find an authentically African conception of the person that was to be 
radically different from the Western conception of personhood.  
 
Kaphagawani has a very uncharitable description of Mbiti dismissing him as Tempels’s 
enthusiastic disciple. Kaphagawani writes:  
 
As is well known Mbiti excelled as one of Tempels’s chief disciples. Like 
Tempels, Mbiti too was greatly driven by the zeal to reveal another way in 
which he believed African modes of thought to be characteristically 
distinct from Western counterparts (Kaphagawani: 2000; 72). 
 
Mbiti’s widely read book, ‘African Religions and Philosophies’, is taken as the authority 
to be consulted on issues pertaining to African communitarianism and understanding the 
concept of personhood. His tenth chapter, entitled ‘Ethnic Groups, Kinship and the 
Individual’, is the most widely quoted as representative of what that brand of African 
communitarianism essentially is. Mbiti starts this chapter with a claim that each and 
every different tribal group or people in Africa have a common ancestor and share a 
common language as well as common rituals. Where a tribal group shares the same 
history it, at least mythologically, will trace its ancestry to the first man created by god, 
or they will trace their ancestry to the first leaders of their tribe who established their 
group.  
 
Mbiti also asserts that every tribal group in Africa has got its own political and social 
system. Each tribe will, at least, have its own chiefs and councillors but their importance, 
authority or influence will vary from tribe to tribe. Apart from the political system, 
equally important is that each tribe has got its own distinct religious system and 
membership of that tribe is not open to outsiders. This means that no-one can be 
converted from one tribe to another. One has to remain in the tribe that she was born in 
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and membership of a tribe is by birth only. On the permanence and fixed nature of tribal 
membership, Mbiti says:  
 
These then are the main features of an African “tribe,” people, society or 
nation. A person has to be born a member of it, and he cannot change 
tribal membership. On rare occasions he can be adopted ritually into 
another tribal group, but this is seldom done and applies to both Africans 
and non-Africans. Tribal identity is still a powerful force even in modern 
African statehood, although that feeling of tribal identity varies like 
temperature, from time to time, depending on prevailing circumstances 
(Mbiti: 1970; 135).  
 
Tribal identity, Mbiti argues, formed one of the strongest forms of identity among the 
tribal members.  A tribe would not allow that identity to de diluted by admitting outsiders 
into their ranks. One way in which a person could be inducted into a new tribe was 
normally through marriage
8
; otherwise it was a very rare occurrence. Mbiti argues that 
kinship was made very strong through blood and betrothal. What this means is that kin 
relations were deemed genuine and strong if they could be grounded either in marriage or 
in blood relationships such as parent and children, brothers and sisters, cousins, uncles, 
grandparents etc.  
 
This kinship system in turn, Mbiti says, governed the life of all the members of the tribe. 
The whole tribe was tied to this kinship system. Everyone knew where they stood in 
relation to everyone else.  
 
The kinship system is like a vast network stretching laterally (horizontally) 
in every direction, to embrace everybody in any given local group. This 
means that each individual is a brother or sister, father or mother, 
                                                 
8
 If a society was matrilineal, the children born by the couple would be said to have the blood of their 
mother and would belong to their mother’s tribe, but if a society was patrilineal the children would belong 
to the father’s tribe. 
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grandmother or grandfather, or cousin, or brother-in-law, uncle or aunt, or 
something else to everybody else (Mbiti:1970; 136). 
 
Simply, this means that everybody is related to everybody in that tribal group. No-one is 
a stranger and no-one is treated as such. To make his point more vivid, Mbiti claims that 
even when strangers meet, the first thing that they do is that they sort out how they may 
be related to each other and then conduct themselves as if they were really related in that 
manner. 
 
Mbiti goes on to say that the kinship system is not merely restricted to the relations of the 
people who are the living but it also extends to include those who have passed on in life 
and those who are yet to be born. The living have a duty, as seen above towards the dead, 
to keep their ‘isithunzi/little soul’ alive and offer libations for it.  
 
Appiah makes the same point when he observes that: “For, as we shall see, many ritual 
acts of a religious nature have components that appear to be modelled on other social acts 
and the conception of social relations among people informs the notions of relations with 
other sorts of beings” (Appiah: 2004; 26). Appiah’s point is that all aspects of life are 
inseparably intertwined. Life is a long continuum that starts before birth, is lived and 
even continued after death. So, human beings who are alive now have to know that they 
do not limit their relations amongst themselves only but that those relationships extend 
beyond the life they know to interact with other beings.  
 
Mbiti, then, moves to discuss the idea of a family in Africa. He suggests that the idea of a 
family in Africa is much wider than the one that is to be found in Europe. Not only does 
the family include what he calls the ‘living dead’ and the unborn, it is much bigger than 
the Western notion of limiting the term family to parents and children. It will definitely 
include other extended family members such as uncles, cousins, aunts, grandparents, etc. 
Mbiti says parents and children only constituted what he calls the household.  
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Having described the kind of life and relations found in the various facets of traditional 
African society, Mbiti then proposes to establish what the place of the individual could be 
in this whole system. It would do Mbiti better justice if I were to quote him at length to 
ensure that we don’t miss the essence of what he is saying:  
 
We have so far spoken about the life and existence of the community. 
What then is the individual and where is his place in the community? In 
traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except 
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past 
generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The 
community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the 
individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough: 
the child must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully 
integrated into the entire society. These rites continue throughout the 
physical life of the person, during which the individual passes from one 
stage of corporate existence to another. The final stage is reached when he 
dies and even then he is ritually incorporated into the wider family of both 
the dead and the living (Mbiti: 1970; 141). 
 
Thus Mbiti thinks the individual’s links to the community are of such an enduring nature 
that they can’t be separated from her own existence. The community also has a role in 
ensuring that the individual is indeed transformed into a real person. For Mbiti, biological 
birth alone is not enough. There has to be some induction into all the stages that he calls 
‘corporate existence’, and an individual cannot do that induction on her own, she requires 
the assistance of her fellow human beings in her community to attain that existence. “It is 
a deeply religious transaction. Only in terms of other people does the individual become 
conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards 
himself and towards other people” (ibid). As Appiah suggested above, these religious 
ceremonies must be understood as encompassing the whole of life in traditional Africa 
including the existence and essence of the human being or the human person.  
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The emphasis that Mbiti frequently points out is that the individual is never alone. She is 
a communal being who finds herself in a community of people who share with her 
agonies and joys. Mbiti says when the individual suffers she will not be alone, and when 
she marries her kinsmen are there to celebrate with her, even the children that she bears 
are never just hers alone but belong to the whole community. The place of the individual 
in the community is a strong membership of that community which is constitutive of her 
identity and governs the way she leads her life. One cannot think of the individual 
without thinking of the community. The symbiotic relationship that exists between the 
individual and the community is inseparable and neither can do without the other. It 
appears as if it would actually become incoherent to speak of either without speaking of 
the other as this quote from Mbiti will show:  
 
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and 
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The 
individual can only say: “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore 
I am.” This is a cardinal point of in the understanding of the African view 
of man (ibid). 
 
I will not evaluate Mbiti and his detractors’ positions at this stage. The preliminary 
observations I have made about his arguments will be kept in abeyance until the fourth 
chapter where I will critique and evaluate them.  
 
For now it suffices to summarise Mbiti’s thesis as one that positions the individual as an 
essentially communal being who owes his existence, allegiance and whole being to the 
community. She is one with the community and without the community she cannot be. 
Her community constitutes who she is in the strong sense of this word. 
 
2.2.3 Menkiti 
In his article ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought,’ Ifeanyi Menkiti 
seeks to articulate what he views as a genuinely African position on the concept of 
personhood. Menkiti starts by citing what he sees as differences that exist between the 
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Western and the African concept of personhood.  He claims that whereas most Western 
views  
 
abstract this or that feature of the lone individual and then proceed to 
make it the defining or essential characteristic which entities aspiring to 
the description “man” must have, the African view of man denies that 
person can be defined by focussing on this or that physical or 
psychological characteristic of the lone individual. Rather man is defined 
by the environing community (Menkiti: 1984; 171). 
 
For Menkiti the concept of personhood cannot be reduced to one slogan like the Cartesian 
corgito ergo sum
9
. For Menkiti the African way of understanding what constitutes 
personhood does not attempt to find a certain character or certain isolated characteristics 
in all individuals or ideal individuals and then hold it up for all entities that want to be 
persons to emulate. Rather, Menkiti proposes that this is a matter that is best decided by 
the community since “the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the 
reality of individual life histories, whatever these maybe” (ibid).  
 
Godwin Sogolo, like Mbiti, sets out to outline the African difference when he argues that 
the African conception of ‘man’ “refers to a set of beliefs or picture of man in the form of 
empirical generalisations” (1993; 190). Sogolo is firmly against any formulation of 
personhood that has an appeal to universal understanding. He says such a view is devoid 
of experience but only heavily laden with theory. I quote him at length; 
 
There may be some intellectual satisfaction in formulating a general 
theory or theories of human nature but it appears that the manifestation by 
a community of any theoretically implied human characteristics stands 
more significant. The point of significance here does not lie in some 
abstract understanding of what man is capable of becoming but on the 
actualisation of his potentials and capabilities. In discussing the African 
                                                 
9
 I think, therefore I am. 
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conception of man and society, the main objective is to provide a picture 
of man and society held by African communities and to establish how 
human conduct, institutions and thought patterns are governed by this 
conception (ibid).  
 
Sogolo’s emphasis on seeing to the actualisation of ‘man’ ultimately has a communitarian 
ring to it in that it seeks to find what kind of relations the individual has in her 
community and what effect those relations have on her respective community. Sogolo 
wants to establish how the individual relates to other people in her community and her 
specific role in that community. The questions that he would seek answers to would be 
questions around whether the individual is relating with others in a manner that enhances 
communal harmony and unity or in a manner that is disruptive. If it is the latter then that 
individual would, undoubtedly, be deemed to be a non-person. Both Menkiti and Sogolo 
seek to establish an understanding of the self that is based on the true African communal 
experiences.  
 
Menkiti contends that the individual comes to be aware of herself through the 
community. She comes to be whatever she is because of the community. Menkiti 
comments that the individual realises “the community as a stubborn perduring fact of the 
psychophysical world that the individual also comes to know himself as a durable, more 
or less permanent, fact of this world (1984; 172).  
 
Menkiti argues that the individual can only become ‘man’ because of the existence of the 
community and the community, in his view, must take epistemic and ontological 
precedence over the individual. Menkiti makes it quite clear that in Africa it is the 
community that defines and gives the status of personhood to individuals. In his own 
words; “in the African view it is the community which defines the person, and not some 
isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory” (ibid). 
 
Menkiti’s position is rather different from the other two positions stated above. The other 
two positions seem to recognise the importance of the individual in her community. She 
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is not just a passive recipient or obedient follower to the anonymous dictates of her 
community. Mbiti sees the individual ‘I’ as part of a greater ‘We,’ where one cannot do 
without the other. The individual and the community in Mbiti’s terms are one, they 
cannot be separated and one cannot thrive without the other.  
 
Tempels’s position recognises each individual’s unique force and the effect it can have 
on creation that is less than human on the hierarchy of creation. His position also gives 
sufficient room to an interaction of different forces by different people in the community 
in the hope that they will create something of beauty as they have been invited by the 
great creator God to participate in his creation. Tempels recognises that although the 
community is very important, the individual still has some role to play which can be 
uniquely his/hers in his/her respective community. For example a person of great vital 
force, to use Tempels’s words, can and is able to make a change in his/her community in 
a time of turmoil.  
 
Menkiti’s claim on the nature of personhood in Africa is much stronger than Tempels and 
Mbiti’s claims. He sees the community not only constitutive of the person but as taking 
precedence over the individual. He claims that whatever rights an individual claims to 
have-those rights come second to the reality of the community.  
 
The second point that Menkiti makes as regards the African conception person is 
probably more controversial, and we will later see Gyekye taking him to task on it. 
Menkiti urges that a proper understanding of person or more precisely, the attainment of 
such a status is based on the belief that the concept of muntu in Africa “includes an idea 
of excellence, of plenitude of force at maturation” (ibid). 
 
Menkiti argues that those who do not have the above mentioned attributes could just as 
well be referred to as non-persons. He uses the phrase ‘ke muntu po’, which literally 
means-‘this is not a man’ to refer to those who show a lack of that plenitude of force, as 
suggested by Tempels. Menkiti argues that it is not enough to understand ‘man’ as a 
biological organism with certain psychological traits. Instead, he proposes that for 
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personhood to be attained, an individual has to go “through a long process of social and 
ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly 
definitive of man” (ibid). 
 
Menkiti argues that in this whole process the community plays the role of prescribing 
norms to the individual. The individual then imbibes and retains these norms as definitive 
of him/her. Individuals may not question the prescriptions they get from their societies. 
They are simple and unquestioning recipients whose sole aim is to live out these norms to 
the best of their abilities so that they can become fully recognised persons in their 
respective communities. Menkiti states that the Western conception of personhood is 
minimal while the African conception is maximal: 
 
 As far as African societies are concerned, personhood is something at 
which individuals could fail, at which they could be incompetent or 
ineffective, better or worse. Hence the African emphasized the rituals of 
incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the social rules by 
which the community lives, so that what was initially biologically given 
can come to attain social self-hood, i.e, become a person with all the 
inbuilt excellencies implied by the term (1984; 173). 
 
Clearly, this maximal definition in Africa, which Menkiti alludes to, is not hesitant to 
treat certain human beings as non-persons if they fail to adhere to certain social rules that 
govern the society. Whereas the Western conception of personhood is fixed and 
indifferent to how a particular individual behaves or what her moral worth could be, the 
African view takes such issues seriously that it actually affects one’s status as a person.  
 
Menkiti argues that in Africa personhood is not automatically granted at birth but is 
acquired as one gets along in society. And this getting along in society takes quite a lot of 
time, usually being attained by people who are of advanced age. These people, who are 
much older, according to Menkiti, have had the time to learn what it means to be a person 
through accumulation of knowledge of social values and norms that govern their 
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particular societies. By living up to, and adhering to these norms, they become successful 
in living up to the standard of personhood. Young people and children are lesser persons 
because they still have to learn all the moral requirements of their society and they still 
have to come to know how to behave as their elders do. So, for Menkiti, personhood is 
something that is gradually acquired as one gets older and more accustomed to the ways 
of her respective community. If one defies or fails to fully comprehend the requirements 
of her community then she cannot become a person in the maximal sense of the term. 
 
Menkiti argues that for one to be considered a full person, that individual has to exhibit 
moral worth that is beyond question or rebuke. He claims that the English language 
supports this notion of personhood as a status that is gradually acquired, by noting that it 
is acceptable, grammatically, in English, to refer to a baby as an ‘it’ while the same 
reference cannot be used for an adult. The transition from an ‘it,’ as a baby to a him/her, 
as an adult depends largely on the moral conduct of the individual.  
 
The various societies found in traditional Africa routinely accept this fact 
that personhood is the sort of thing which has to be attained, and is 
attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life through 
the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations. It is the 
carrying out of these obligations that transforms one from the it-status of 
early childhood, marked by an absence of moral function, into the person-
status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense—an 
ethical maturity without which personhood is conceived as eluding one 
(Menkiti: 1984; 176). 
 
An immoral and evil person is not a person at all, while a virtuous or generous person is a 
full person. As we saw above, a chief is a person who has great force and retains great 
importance in society. His status is representative of the ideal person and his contribution 
to society is one that is based on goodwill. Evil and self centred or immoral people 
contribute nothing to society hence Menkiti thinks they are not persons. Paris echoes 
Menkiti’s view as his own words indicate:  
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The symbiotic functions of various societal practices contributed 
immensely to the ongoing task of moral formation, which was not 
complete until the end of the person’s life. Hopefully, by the time the 
person became an elder he or she would have attained wisdom, viewed as 
the accumulated communal knowledge underlying all of life’s 
experiences. This connoted the capacity to guide and judge others. In fact, 
old age implied not only the attainment of such wisdom but also the 
temporal proximity of elders to ancestorhood. These factors were the basis 
for the African reverence of elders whose words of blessing or curse were 
extremely powerful (Paris: 1995; 109). 
 
The reasons why the elders were respected were twofold. In the first it was accepted that 
they were wise by virtue of having lived a long life which meant that they had become 
more of moral beings. It was also thought that the elders knew quite a lot of things and 
their word was to be treasured. Secondly, it was believed that because of their advanced 
age they were close to the ancestors since they didn’t have that long to live. They were 
also tasked with the duties of communicating with the ancestors. But above all of this 
they were thought to be on the verge of becoming ancestors themselves.  
 
In conclusion, Menkiti sees the community as taking precedence over the individual. 
Whatever rights the individual may have they only come second to the obligations that 
she owes her respective community. Secondly, Menkiti argues that full personhood is 
attained when one exhibits moral worth in her adult life. 
 
2.2.4 Gyekye 
Kwame Gyekye has argued against the above stated positions
10
. He generally brands 
them collectively as radical communitarianism/communalism. He is of the view that this 
concept of personhood is philosophically indefensible. He claims that his own moderate 
                                                 
10
 Gyekye has developed his objections over the years but for his most comprehensive articulation of his 
objections refer to the second chapter of his Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the 
African Experience.  
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communitarianism triumphs over radical communitarianism. He mostly expresses his 
objection to radical communalism by evaluating Menkiti’s position and attempting to 
show its philosophical incoherence. Gyekye accuses Mbiti and Menkiti of exaggerating 
the importance of community in the understanding of personhood in Africa.  
 
Gyekye also takes issue with Menkiti’s assertion that full personhood is attained when 
one is older and has been a member of the society for a long time. Gyekye claims that the 
terms ‘more of a person’ and ‘full personhood’ are incoherent and bizarre. Gyekye notes 
that Menkiti does not tell us what those excellencies are which enable the old to be more 
of persons than the young.  
 
But Gyekye pushes the issue further. He argues that if it is correct that personhood comes 
with age and the attainment of moral rectitude, it then raises a special difficulty that 
Menkiti could just as well fail to solve.   
 
The difficulty is in considering elderly people as necessarily moral, or as 
necessarily having the ability or disposition to practice moral virtues 
satisfactorily. For, surely there are many elderly people who are known to 
be wicked, ungenerous, unsympathetic: whose lives in short, generally do 
not reflect any moral maturity or excellence. In terms of a moral 
conception of personhood, such elderly people may not qualify as persons. 
(Gyekye: 1997; 49). 
 
Gyekye accuses Menkiti of proposing an account that is fraught with ‘confusions, 
unclarities, and incoherences.’ In other words, according to Gyekye, Menkiti’s concept of 
person is confused and philosophically indefensible. However, Gyekye concedes that 
Menkiti’s account, based on moral conception, is interesting to the communitarian view 
of person. He turns his attention to the understanding of person that exists among the 
Akan. Gyekye notes that the Akan understanding of person, which is communalistic, 
would classify someone who chooses to lead an isolated lifestyle as a non-person. An 
individual who exhibits morally reprehensible conduct is also branded as a non-person. 
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He says for the communitarians personhood is earned in the moral arena and not just 
handed over to the individual at birth. Gyekye argues that the moral conception of 
personhood is given concrete expression by the Akans, especially when it comes to 
burying their dead. The grief shown in mourning the departed individual is dependent on 
her moral conduct. If a person conducted herself in a manner that was morally worthy, 
then she is properly mourned regardless of her class or wealth. 
 
Gyekye argues that what he terms radical communitarianism, as supported by Mbiti and 
Menkiti, does not recognise individual freedom. He claims that although an individual is 
a social being he is also other things. The other things that he has in mind concern 
attributes such as virtue, the ability to make individual choice and rationality. He argues 
that if these attributes play any meaningful role in the individual’s life like setting goals 
and making important decisions, then it cannot be said that an individual is completely 
defined by the social structures that she finds herself in. He concedes that although many 
of our goals are set by the communities we live in, it is still possible for individuals to 
make their own choices and decide on what goals to pursue and what to give up. 
 
 In the light of the autonomous (or near-autonomous) character of its 
activities, the communitarian self cannot be held as cramped or shackled 
self, responding robotically to the ways and demands of the communal 
structure. That structure is never to be conceived as reducing a person to 
intellectual or rational inactivity, servility, and docility. Even though the 
communitarian self is not detached from its communal features and the 
individual is fully embedded or implicated in the life of her community, 
the self nevertheless, by virtue of, or by exploiting, what I have referred to 
as its “mental feature” can from time to time take distanced view of its 




Richard H. Bell holds a similar position arguing that although the community is seen as 
prior to the individual, that view does not absolve the individual of her responsibility and 
it does not deny the individual her own identity.  
 
To uphold the value of the priority of community does not necessarily 
deny an individual of her own identity, her potential creative role in a 
community, nor does it absolve her of personal responsibility for her 
actions toward the whole community. It is also clear that that as 
multicultural factors increase, new values are placed on older ones – the 
African concept of community must be revalued in light of present 
realities (Bell: 2002; 64). 
 
Bell actually suggests that the traditional view of community is becoming diluted with 
the increase of multicultural factors that are ever so present in modern and urban Africa. 
However, he concedes that there is still a place for community in understanding the 
individual in Africa. His point, like Gyekye, is that this understanding must not be at the 
cost of individual recognition and responsibility. 
 
Gyekye argues for a concept of person that is different from Mbiti and Menkiti’s. 
Drawing on his knowledge of the Akan language and traditions, Gyekye argues that there 
are certain proverbs
11
 that exist in his language which clearly show that it is accurate to 
conceive the individual as an entity that exists on his own and who is responsible for 
what happens to him in his own life. The individual is not completely at the mercy of 
communal dictates but does have responsibility for her own fate and decisions. He terms 
his version moderate communitarianism and argues that it is the defensible version that 
should be preferred over Mbiti and Menkiti’s radical versions.  
 
Gyekye is echoed by Chukwudum B. Okolo who in his effort to understand the self found 
that the traditional African position tended to emphasise the communitarian aspect at the 
expense of the distinctness of the individual. He argues that while the self is social it is 
                                                 
11
 See on the next page where I quote those proverbs. 
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important to also note that it is an entity that exists apart of its fellow community 
members and claims that this fact is recognised in African philosophy:  
 
The status of the self as an individual entity, then, is recognised in African 
philosophy, proof that self has somehow a double status-one as a being-in-
relation-to-others, the other as unique and unduplicatable. One of the 
clearest ways the African establishes this fact of uniqueness, identity and 
discreteness is through names. African names are just not mere labels of 
distinction, to differentiate, for instance ‘James’ from John’ (Okolo: 2003; 
215).  
 
Thus Okolo believes that there is a real distinctness that exists between individuals and 
that distinctness is expressed through the names that African people receive. Here he is 
referring to African names that may have a special meaning for each individual or her 
family or may be explanatory to the circumstances of her birth, as we saw above.  Below 
are some translations of the proverbs quoted by Gyekye from his Akan language which, 
he claims, show the individuality of each member of the African community: 
 
1. The clan is like a cluster of trees which, when seen from afar, appear huddled 
together, but which would be seen to stand individually when closely approached. 
2. Life is as you make it yourself. 
3. It is by individual effort that we can struggle for our heads. 
4. Life is war (Gyekye: 1997; 40). 
 
Gyekye argues that his views as supported by these proverbs “represent a clear attempt to 
come to terms with the natural sociality as well as the individuality of the human person” 
(Gyekye: 1997; 41). Interestingly, Gyekye claims that Senghor was a supporter of 
moderate communitarianism. This issue will be deferred until the third chapter where 
political views will be discussed. 
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However, Okolo, like Gyekye, concedes that in the African mode community is 
inescapable and understanding of the self is always couched in the language that 
constantly refers to the community:  
 
The cognisance of an individual, unique self notwithstanding, the truth 
remains that violence is done to its status as an individual, as an 
independent self consciousness. Self remains dominantly opaque, seen 
from the ‘outside’ so to speak, and in relationships with others. 
Consequently ‘social’ is the main category for understanding self, as 
indeed for all reality in African philosophy. It is the only authentic mode 
for the African to answer the all-important question in African philosophy, 
‘What or who is an African?’ (Okolo: 2003; 215). 
 
In conclusion Gyekye admits the importance of community in the individual’s life and 
conception in African thought. He however, thinks that Mbiti and Menkiti overstate the 
importance of the community in arriving at the concept of self. 
 
2.3 African Metaphysical Conception of Person 
This view generally differs from the communitarian view in that it seeks to understand 
the person as an independent entity that has certain characteristics that distinguish it from 
other living things. This view largely ignores matters such as social relations, community 
rights and obligations and moral achievement.  
 
2.3.1 Wiredu and Gyekye 
The eminent Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, depicts the Akan conception of the 
self as “traditionally [believing] that a man is made up of nipadua (body), okra (a life 
giving entity), and sunsum (that which gives a person’s personality its force)” (1995; 
132). 
 
These three attributes are the basic and most essential elements that are required for one 
to qualify as a person. Wiredu also adds that another important element which is 
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frequently mentioned is the mogya, which is the blood which is derived from one’s 
mother
12
 and is basis for clan identity. He also adds that there is something that is called 
ntoro, which is inherited from one’s father and becomes basis for membership into that 
clan. 
 
Wiredu cautions against attempts to draw similarities between these concepts and 
Western ones. He says the problem particularly arises when one considers the okra which 
is often translated as soul. He says in the West the soul is seen as an immaterial entity 
that occupies the body. This view is not necessarily true in the Akan conception. Wiredu 
argues that the Akans believe the soul to be a quasi-physical entity which is not 
necessarily visible to the naked eye but “in some ways it seems to be credited with para-
physical properties” (1995; 132). He says this is particularly evidenced by some highly 
gifted medicine men that sometimes are able to enter into communication with the okra. 
Further, he claims that those medicine men with highly developed eyes are able to see the 
okra. He also holds that a certain okra may be said to have an allergy to certain foods 
while other akra
13
 may not have that kind of allergy to the same food.   
 
He points to the practice that if the okra is offended offerings are made to it to pacify it. 
Wiredu says these offerings are not merely symbolical since the okra is conceived as a 
person’s double, as an individual’s double which exists separate from him. That it is 
distinct from the individual is evidenced by the fact that the Akan at times hold that the 
okra has failed to guide its individual.  
 
It is of course, a nice problem, which we cannot stop here to ponder, how 
the okra can be both the ‘principle’ in a person which makes him a living 
being and a separate entity which can go its own way if so moved. The 
point is simply that it is evident from this account that okra and soul are 
two nonidentical concepts (Wiredu: 1995; 133).  
 
                                                 
12
 The Akans, according to Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah are a matrilineal clan. 
13
 Plural for okra. 
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Whatever difficulties there are in considering the true nature of the okra, Wiredu argues 
that it should not be thought of as identical to the Western concept of the soul. He says 
the okra is categorically different from the mind while the soul is taken generally to be 
the same as the mind. He says “in English philosophical texts one frequently meets the 
expression ‘mind or soul’ where the ‘or’ means ‘in other words.’ The analogue of such 
usage in Akan would be the veriest babble” (ibid). He claims that the okra is a living 
entity while the mind is merely the capacity for thinking or just an outcome of that 
exercise. 
 
He argues that the sunsum is “that which is responsible for the total effect communicated 
by an individual’s personality” (ibid). This means that a person’s character disposition 
proceeds from his sunsum. He states that the sunsum is not identical with the mind but 
actually is a possessor of the mind. To him, the Akans do not regard the mind as one of 
the constituent elements of personhood.  
 
Gyekye agrees with Wiredu and argues that person is essentially constituted by three 




He says okra refers to the soul and is taken to be that which constitutes the innermost self 
and is the essence of the individual, it is her life. This okra is referred to as the living soul 
because it is identical with life and is seen as a spark of the divine in ‘man’. Gyekye, in 
sharp contrast to his fellow clansman, Wiredu, states that the okra is equivalent to the 
soul. “So conceived the okra can be considered as the equivalent of the concept of the 
soul in other metaphysical systems. Hence it is correct to translate okra into English as 
soul” (Gyekye: 1987; 85). 
 
Gyekye differs with Wiredu who sees the okra as quasi-physical. He argues that the 
operations of the okra do not occur in physical environments.  
 
                                                 
14
 Honam is the same as nipadua, it refers to a person’s body. 
 83 
It must be noted, however, that these phenomena do not take place in the 
ordinary spatial world; otherwise anyone would be able to see or 
communicate with the okra (soul). This must mean that what those with 
special abilities see or communicate with is something non-spatial. Thus, 
the fact that the okra can be seen by such people does not make it physical 
or quasi physical (whatever that expression means), since this act or mode 
of seeing is not at the physical or spatial level (Gyekye: 1987; 86). 
 
Unfortunately for us non-Akans we are not able to enter this debate since we are not 
competent in the language at all. The point, however is that both authors characterise the 
okra as an essential constituent of the person. The manner in which they characterise it is 
different through their own interpretations but that is to be expected in philosophical 
matters. 
 
Gyekye also adds that there is yet another element that is closely related to the okra and 
he calls this element the honhom, which means breath. He says the departure of breath is 
also the departure of the soul which means the end of life for the individual. He hastily 
adds that this idea is recent and alludes to the fact that it could have been brought by 
Christians.  
 
Gyekye agrees with Wiredu that the sunsum is not identical with the soul. He holds that it 
is the basis of a person’s personality. If we talk of a person as being courageous, kind, 
mean, evil etc, what we are essentially talking about is her sunsum. He says “I believe 
that whatever else that concept may mean it certainly involves the idea of a set of 
characteristics as evidenced in a person’s behaviour-thoughts, feelings, actions, etc” 
(Gyekye: 1987; 90). He claims that the sunsum cannot be a physical thing since qualities 
such as jealousy, courage, dignity are psychological and not physical. The only physical 
thing is the body which is evident to everyone and that can be seen by all who have eyes. 
He states that the Akans “hold a dualistic conception of a person; a person is constituted 
by two principle substances, one spiritual (immaterial) and the other physical (material)” 
(Gyekye: 1984; 205).  
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Appiah concurs with Wiredu and Gyekye saying a person is essentially made of three 
elements. He concludes that “according to Asante traditions, a person consists of a body 
(nipadua) made from the blood of the mother (the mogya); an individual spirit, the 
sunsum, which is the main bearer of one’s personality; and a third entity the okra” 
(Appiah: 2004; 28). 
 
This concept of person is silent on the sociality of the self or the social demands placed 
on an individual by the community. It points out three elements as pre-requisites for an 





 says that the Yoruba word for person is eniyan. Gbadesegin argues 
that the word has a normative and an ordinary meaning. For the Yoruba people, he says, 
greater emphasis is placed on the normative dimension. He says the structural 
components of the person in the Yoruba culture are essentially four and he characterises 
them thus:  
 
Among the terms that feature in discussions of the Yoruba concept of 
eniyan, the following are prominent: ara, okan, emi, ori, though there is a 
lot of confusion about what each of these means and what relationship 
exists among them. One way to avoid, or at least, minimise confusion is 
not to start with English equivalents of these terms, but rather to describe 
their usages among the Yoruba and to relate them to each other in terms of 
their functional interdependencies (Gbadegesin: 1991; 28). 
 
He says that the ara is the physical component of the person and is described in physical 
terms such as heavy, strong or light. He says in his language selfish people can also be 
described as people who are only concerned for their bodies. However, he says, in the 
thinking of the Yoruba it is quite clear to them that there is more to a person that her mere 
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 Gbadegesin is a Nigerian philosopher who reflects on the concept of person from a Yoruba perspective.  
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physical body. The body houses senses and it enables the person to get acquainted with 
the external world. 
 
He says internal organs are also taken as having some importance in the functioning of 
the person. “For instance, the intestine plays a role in the physical strength of a person. A 
weak person is described as having only one ifun (intestine) or none at all” (Gbadegesin: 
1991; 29). He also says the opolo (brain) is the lifewire of all logical reasoning. Those 
who misbehave are taken as having an opolo that malfunctions and the mad are taken as 
having a disrupted opolo. 
 
The second attribute, okan (heart) is taken as having a dual character. It is taken, firstly, 
as responsible for the circulation of blood in the body and secondly it is taken as the 
source of psychic and emotional reactions. It is responsible for the emotional states of the 
person. One who gets upset easily is taken as having no okan. He suggests that the okan 
is also the source of thought, similar to Wiredu’s supposition of the mind. This is where 
the postulation of a double nature for the heart appears to make sense.  
 
For it appears, from the examination of the language, that while okan [as 
physical heart] is recognised as responsible for blood circulation, it also 
has an invisible counterpart which is the seat of conscious activities. It 
would seem that this invisible counterpart is the equivalent of the mind in 
English (Gbadegesin: 1991; 32). 
 
In essence the heart is responsible for physical activities of pumping blood and keeping it 
in circulation as well as serving as the seat of all conscious activity. 
 
The third characteristic that he looks at is emi which is “construed as the active principle 
of life, the life-giving element put in place by the deity” (Gbadegesin: 1991; 33). He says 
sometimes the emi is also construed as the divine breath but is different from eemi-
physical breath, which is just evidence of continued presence of emi. 
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When the emi is recalled by the deity the individual ceases to exist. It is the active 
component of life and without it one dies. Gbadegesin says that the emi is spiritual and 
has an independent existence. He argues that the emi is spiritual because its source, the 
deity, is spiritual. He also claims that it is independent because its source is also 
independent. Unlike mere breath it can exist on its own. 
 
The fourth element that he considers is the ori, which he says has a dual character. He 
says it is seen as the physical head that is very vital in a physical character and is also the 
seat of the brain. Secondly it is also seen as a determinant of a person’s personality and 
destiny. “It is thus ori so chosen, with the destiny wound up in it, that determines the 
personality of the individual. And though, the ori is symbolised by the physical head, it s 
not identical with it. For the ori is construed as the inner – or spiritual head [ori-inu]” 
(Gbadegesin: 1991; 38). Not only does it determine someone’s destiny it also makes up 
the spiritual component of the person and also bears that person’s divinity which can be 
traced back to the creator. Gbadegesin says that these two elements can be placed into 
two groups; the “physico-material and the mental-spiritual.” Ara belongs to the physico-
material while emi belongs to the mental-spiritual. The ori and the okan retain both 
features.  
 
He then looks at the normative concept of person and concludes that the fullness of 
personhood is accomplished in the social arena. He holds that individual existence is 
linked to social existence. Any attempt to understand the person outside of his social 
status does not fully represent the concept of personhood. Linking his argument to 
individual destiny he concludes:  
 
Persons are what they are in virtue of what they are destined to be, their 
character and the communal influence on them. It is a combination of 
these elements that constitute human personality. The “I” is just a “WE” 
from another perspective, and persons are therefore not construed as 
atomic individuals. A person whose existence and personality is dependent 
on the community is expected in turn to contribute to the continued 
 87 
existence of the community. This is the normative dimension of the 
concept of Eniyan. The crown of personal life is to be useful to one’s 
community. The meaning of one’s life is therefore measured by one’s 
commitment to social ideals and communal existence. The question “What 
is your existence for?” [Kini o wa funi?] is not always posed. It is posed 
when a person has been judged to be useless to his/her community 
(Gbadegesin: 1991; 58). 
 
The height of personhood is expressed through selfless devotion in service and aid of 
others, Gbadegesin holds. Individualism and selfishness have no place in that scheme. 
Thus the metaphysical consideration is ultimately linked to the practical requirements of 
the society.  
 
This position is passionately seconded by Richard C. Onwuanibe who states that:  
 
The traditional African philosophy of the human person is more existential 
and practical than theoretical. It is based on the conviction that the 
metaphysical sphere is not abstractly divorced from concrete experience; 
for the physical and metaphysical are aspects of reality, and the transition 
from the one to the other is natural (Onwuanibe: 1984; 184). 
 
He says the philosophical question that is of significance in Ibo thought is whether the 
soul and the spirit are identifiable with the body. He holds that in the Ibo tradition, these 
two are not identifiable with the body although they are related to it. He argues that 
physicalism does not work since there is more to a person than physical aspects. He says 
that physicalism cannot account for other things such as achievements, aspirations and 
values.  
 
On the precise nature of person in Ibo thought he concludes:  
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In Ibo philosophical reflection, the self deriving from the soul and spirit 
indicates the personhood. To talk of human person makes sense only when 
to be human includes not only the physical aspects but also the 
transcendental aspect. Here the transcendental aspect includes the mental 
to a certain extent, the spiritual aspirations and values of man (Onwuanibe: 
1984; 184). 
 
In conclusion, both these philosophers hold that there are certain metaphysical 
characteristics that contribute to the essential make up of person. However they argue that 
without the social aspect the person so conceived cannot operate fully. Full personhood is 




This chapter discussed the two prominent views of person in African thought. The first 
view that is held by Tempels, Mbiti and Menkiti states that personhood in Africa is a 
social concept that is attained through communal relations that an individual involves 
herself in. If an individual maintains good communal relations with others and is in good 
standing with her community then she is a full person. If on the other hand she has poor 
relations with her fellow community members or is selfish she is seen as a non-person.  
Menkiti adds that for an individual to become a full person she has to exhibit moral worth 
and if she fails to exhibit minimal moral characteristics, the she would have failed at 
being a person. 
 
Gyekye has criticised this radical communitarianism and has proposed to replace it with 
his own version, that he calls moderate communitarianism. In that version he argues that 
the individual’s independence is recognised by the community as the individual is 
partially constituted by the community and her own distinct identity is respected.  
 
The second view of personhood in Africa is grounded in metaphysics. Generally this 
view as argued for by Appiah, Wiredu, Gyekye, Gbadegesin and Onwuanibe, holds that a 
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person is essentially made up of mainly three elements, which are the soul, the spirit and 
the body, with the head and blood being also added. However, these philosophers 
invariably return to the essence of the community in understanding the concept of 
personhood. They argue that a person can be fully understood and is animated through 
communal relations as well as attainment of moral worth. A person who operates outside 
her community, it is argued, is not a full person. 
 





























The previous chapter outlines the dominant views on the concept of person in African 
thinking. This chapter traces the political ideology that arises from the concept of person 
as discussed in chapter two. It outlines the political ideology that was developed by some 
of the founding presidents on the African continent based on their view of persons. These 
men had led their countries into freedom from colonial oppression. They were both 
theorists and politicians who had real power and sufficient influence in their respective 
countries to implement whatever political ideology they desired. I will confine my outline 
to the theoretical underpinnings that inform the political framework that was developed in 
newly independent Africa. I seek to present how the theory of person was used to justify 
African socialism.  
 
These political theories were in the main informed by what a person is taken to be in 
African thinking and how she ought to live her life in relation to her community as a 
whole. Although none of them sets out an explicit account of what constitutes 
personhood in Africa, it will become quite clear that they had a communalistic 
understanding of the self as outlined in the previous chapter. Their view is that a self 
cannot be seen apart of her community and that she finds meaning and fulfilment in the 
way the community lives.  
 
In essence, they argue a person’s association with her community is intractable in that the 
well being of her community is also her own well being. If her community is not faring 
well, then she also fails to fare well. It is not possible to talk of a person who is doing 
well while other people around her are not doing well. Hence the contention that there 
was a need to develop a political theory that would understand this cardinal view of 
society in Africa thus coining the term African socialism. 
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I will look at Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and finally Leopold 
Sedar Senghor of Senegal. The first two are representative of former Anglophone 
colonies while Senghor represents former Francophone colonies in Africa. Although 
there were other colonial powers on the African continent these two were ultimately the 
most dominant and their effects still remain on the continent in many respects. Nyerere, 
Nkrumah and Senghor’s writings present a response to the effects of colonialism and 
argue in favour of the implementation of a certain political system that they see as best 
suited to Africa. They denounce colonialism for bringing an alien political system, 
intrinsically linked to capitalism, which is in sharp contrast to the way that African 
traditional life was lived on the continent. Effects of colonialism, in their view, had 
polluted the traditional way of living and had introduced new values that were 
responsible for a variety of problems in the way that people lived. These problems mainly 
had to do with embracing capitalism and all other vices that were attendant to it. 
 
Through their assessment of traditional African societies they argue that African 
socialism is the desired political theory that should guide and govern newly freed African 
countries. They allowed certain differences and variations to exist between different 
countries according to their own particular situation. This system, in their view, would 
ensure the return and protection of the all important African value of egalitarianism 
among people in any given society. All people were important and viewed as equal and 





In his book, Consciencism, Nkrumah sets out his philosophy and its underlying 
principles. He starts out by arguing that philosophy is shaped by society. Each social 
milieu shapes the way people think and reflect on their society and surroundings. He says 
philosophy started by wondering about the existence of God and his nature. But with time 
it developed in response to evolving social epochs.   
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 Nkrumah was the founding president of independent Ghana, he ruled from 1957 until he was deposed in 
a military coup in 1962 and was forced to live in Conakry in Guinea. He died in 1972. 
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With the European renaissance, he says, when people started appreciating and gaining an 
awareness of their own personal freedom and dignity “philosophy responded with 
disquisitions on the nature of natural rights and connected ideas” (Nkrumah: 1964; 30). 
He says philosophy then attempted to provide certain principles of a political philosophy 
that would be consistent with the renaissance’s view of people (ibid). Further, he states 
that all that philosophy has ever been concerned with since the times of Thales has been 
finding out what basic concerns of life were at that given time. 
 
In the third chapter of his book he moves on to discuss the relationship between society 
and ideology. He argues that in every society there is an ideology that is dominant. “This 
dominant segment has its fundamental principles, its beliefs about the nature of man, and 
the type of society which must be created for man” (Nkrumah: 1964; 57). He says those 
principles aid in designing and controlling the kind of organisation that the dominant 
ideology employs. Certain principles, in his view, cannot be compromised or changed 
because they are what makes that ideology what it is. But more importantly the dominant 
ideology seeks to control the whole of society. Hence he argues that in socialist societies 
that “dominant segment coincides with the whole” (ibid). 
 
Further, Nkrumah argues, it is not possible for two different ideologies to exist side by 
side in one society. One has to be defeated so that the other can rule the order of the day. 
He says it is quite possible to have different social systems in societies that exist 
alongside each other but if oppressive classes remain in existence, there would never be 
any possibility of different ideologies existing alongside each other. 
 
He says although every society has one ideology, it is never possible to find that ideology 
fully articulated within that society. He draws an analogy with a situation whereby people 
know what the morally acceptable thing to do would be in a situation but cannot provide 
a reason to explain why they act in that way. He argues that this does not mean that there 
is no compelling reason to explain why people should or do behave in the way they do. It 
is there, it is just that people cannot articulate it.  
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An ideology, just like moral principles seeks to direct the actions of millions of people to 
one specific outcome. An ideology has a specific goal although in getting people to attain 
it, it can be largely implicit. 
 
 I have said an ideology seeks to bring a specific order into the total life of 
its society. To achieve this, it needs to employ a number of instruments. 
The ideology of a society displays itself in political theory, social theory 
and moral theory, and uses these as instruments. It establishes a particular 
range of political, social and moral behaviour such that unless behaviour 
of this sort fell within the established range, it would be incompatible with 
ideology (Nkrumah: 1964; 59). 
 
He says, for example, if a society is socialist it would not permit any political behaviour 
that would promote the thriving of capitalism. Any conduct to such effect in that given 
society would fall out of what is politically permissible. A socialist ideology would have 
definite parameters of what is permissible behaviour in its political theory.  
 
Ideology permeates all of life and it is reflected in the way in which the society tells of its 
history or its artworks. Most of ideology cannot be upheld through open cohesion or 
legislation that would govern how people conduct themselves. Nkrumah thinks that there 
is need for subtle social cohesion. This is because, he says, most of social conduct falls 
out of ranges that can be legislated or open cohesion. People are rather controlled by such 
subtle means as the approval of those who know them or the preacher at church.  
 
Each and every society has different means of non-statutory social cohesion and this 
difference depends on each society’s social and economic conditions. In Africa, Nkrumah 
says, emphasis will have to take account of colonialism and Africa’s victory in gaining 
independence.  
 
He contends that the African society is made up of three broad segments. “African 
society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second 
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segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final 
segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western 
Europe into Africa using colonialism and neo-colonialism as its primary vehicles” 
(Nkrumah: 1964; 68). In his view these three segments are ‘animated by competing 
ideologies’ which are at odds. He argues that there needs to emerge a single ideology that 
would take care of all other competing segments in society because there has to be unity 
in society to guarantee that it flourishes.  
 
Nkrumah is of the view that the most important segment that should play a dominant role 
in determining economic and political organisation on the African continent is the 
traditional way of life. The other two segments must be incorporated into the African 
traditional way of life. Nkrumah describes the traditional African ‘face’ as having an 
approach or mind-set about persons that can only be described as socialist. A person is 
viewed as having an inherent dignity and as a spiritual being. She is, right from the 
beginning, endowed with dignity and value that resides in her.  
 
He suggests that this traditional view of the person places certain political obligations in 
the African society. “This idea of the original value of man imposes duties of a socialist 
kind upon us. Herein lies the basis of African communalism. This theoretical basis 
expressed itself on the social level in terms of institutions such as the clan, underlining 
the initial equality of all and the responsibility of many for one” (Nkrumah: 1964; 69). 
 
Thus it is quite clear that Nkrumah uses the communitarian conception of person as 
outlined in the previous chapter to justify the political order he seeks to develop. What he 
calls ‘the original value of man’ can be seen as an interpretation of the communitarian 
concept of person that sees all people as equal and sharing in the same fate as a 
collective.  In Nkrumah’s view the theoretical view of persons, in the traditional setting, 
came to life by the way in which social institutions such as the clan operated. In his view 
the clan was organised in such a way that all individuals had a responsibility towards 
every individual. In essence this is reminiscent of the communitarian concept of person 
expressed by Tempels, Mbiti and Menkiti in the previous chapter. Nkrumah takes this 
 95 
view further by arguing that this communitarian conception of person led to the 
development of a certain political and economic order in traditional African societies. It 
is this view of person that informs Nkrumah’s political theory. 
 
Nkrumah argues that in the traditional African societies, there were no classes in the 
Marxist understanding of class stratification whereby some classes are superior to others 
and some classes are subjected to oppression and dominion by other classes. “In the 
traditional African society, no sectional interest could be regarded as supreme; nor did 
legislative and executive power aid the interest of any particular group. The welfare of 
the people was supreme” (ibid). 
 
Nkrumah says the arrival of colonialism changed the whole traditional setup; with the 
arrival of the colonial administrators who needed local assistance, a few African people 
received an education and became traders, professionals and unionists. He says the local 
people accepted the new European values as acceptable to African societies and started 
seeing themselves as something equivalent to the European middle class. In his view 
“neither economic nor political subjugation could be considered as being in tune with the 
traditional African egalitarian view of man” (Nkrumah: 1964; 70). 
 
Nkrumah argues that with independence regained there needs to be a new ideology 
forged. This ideology has to take into account the values of traditional Africa, the 
presence of Islam on the continent as well as the presence of the Euro Christian beliefs. 
He says that the African society is not the old society but one that has been expanded by 
foreign influences that are now permanently on the continent. For this reason “[A] new 
emergent ideology is therefore required, an ideology which can solidify in a 
philosophical statement, but at the same time an ideology which will not abandon the 
original humanist principles of Africa” (ibid).   
 
Thus Nkrumah rejects a class system on the grounds that it stands in contrast to the 
traditional egalitarian view of persons. On the contrary he seeks to develop political and 
economic system that would give full effect to that traditional view of persons. The 
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traditional egalitarian view of persons and the humanist principles that he refers to 
essentially represent a communitarian view of persons. 
 
Nkrumah argues that socialism has nothing in common with capitalism. He says 
capitalism developed from slavery and feudalism and this dissociates socialism from 
capitalism. Further, he argues, were socialism to have developed from capitalism, it 
would have needed to share the fundamental characteristic of capitalism which is 
exploitation. On the contrary socialism is opposed to this principle that drives capitalism. 
He also argues that the political ancestor of socialism is communalism.  
 
Socialism stands to communalism as capitalism stands to slavery. In 
socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in 
modern circumstances. Thus, whereas communalism in an untechnical 
society can be laissez faire, in a technical society where sophisticated 
means of production are at hand, if the underlying principles of 
communalism are not given centralised and correlated expression, class 
cleavages will arise, with economic disparities, and thereby with political 
inequalities. Socialism, therefore, can be and is the defence of the 
principles of communalism in a modern setting. Socialism is a form of 
social organisation which, guided by the principles underlying 
communism, adopts procedure and measures made necessary by 
demographic and technological developments (Nkrumah: 1964; 73). 
 
It is quite clear that Nkrumah believes that the African traditional way of life could work 
in modern Africa. His socialism rides on that traditional model of communality and 
egalitarianism which was part of the communitarian view of persons in chapter two. 
Nkrumah further qualifies the process involved in bringing communalism to modern day 
realities. He argues that from the traditional practice of communalism to socialism that 
passage is carried through what he calls reform. This means that the transformation is a 
natural response to modernity. However, where colonialism has interfered with this 
natural reform, then the passage becomes revolutionary because there would be need to 
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transform a non-communalistic society into a socialist one which is informed by 
communalistic values.  
 
Nkrumah not only believes that this passage, from communism to socialism in Africa, 
would have been natural but also that embracing capitalism is betraying fundamental 
principles of African societies. “In my autobiography, I said that capitalism might prove 
too complicated a system for a newly independent country. I wish to add to this the fact 
that the presuppositions and purposes of capitalism are contrary to those of African 
society. Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa” 
(Nkrumah: 1964; 74).  
 
Nkrumah explains that this African personality is one that determines the African attitude 
in international politics. In reference to what informs what Africa stands for, he says: 
“We stand for international peace and security in conformity with the United Nations 
Charter. This will enable us to assert our own African personality and to develop 
according to our own ways of life, our own customs, traditions and cultures. In asserting 
our African personality we shall be free to act in our individual and collective interests at 
any particular time” (Nkrumah: 1961; 128). 
 
It is clear that Nkrumah sees what he calls the African personality as the embodiment of 
all values that Africans stand for and must practice. It is not limited to the interaction 
between Africans only but extends to influence the way Africans behave when they 
interact with others who are not from the continent. This embodiment of the African 
personality must be pursued so that the African way of life can be given full expression 
and through its pursuit the Africans are able to genuinely display who they are and what 
they stand for.  
 
Nkrumah riles against capitalism because its nature is structured in such a manner that it 
denies many people what he calls genuine happiness. He says if happiness is defined 
within a social context; it will depend on the economic, political and cultural aspects, and 
that the individual is able to pursue his interests. But capitalism by its nature is a system 
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whereby a few are pitted against the many who are oppressed, it is therefore impossible 
for many people in that society to find true happiness because their aspirations are 
limited. The few oligarchs in the capitalist system give new definitions to what is 
legitimately attainable and they always exclude the many from attaining these aspirations 
(Nkrumah: 1964; 76).  
 
Nkrumah claims capitalism is unable to animate the values of the African traditional 
societies hence is not fitting for the newly independent countries of Africa. He sees its 
crucial problem as lying in the alienation of the labour of the workers. They cannot relate 
to what they produce and it is unjust, thus making it stand at odds with the traditional 
values of African societies (ibid).  
 
He argues that modern and free African countries would fare much better without such 
alien philosophical and political theories. He proposes that the newly independent 
African societies would do well under socialism. He says socialism is different from 
capitalism which exploits natural resources/nature in pursuit of profit. On the other hand, 
socialism masters nature with the goal of increasing the spiritual and material needs of 
the greatest number of people in society (ibid). Nkrumah then discusses the philosophical 
underpinnings of his African socialism:  
 
On the philosophical level, too, it is materialism, not idealism, that in one 
form or another will give the firmest conceptual basis to the restitution of 
Africa’s egalitarian and humanist principles. Idealism breeds an oligarchy, 
and its social implication, as drawn out in my second chapter, is obnoxious 
to African society. It is materialism, with its monistic and naturalistic 
account of nature, which will balk arbitrariness, inequality and injustice 
(ibid).   
 
Thus it is clear that Nkrumah sees egalitarianism and humanism as fundamentally 
important in modern and free African societies. The best way they can be restored, in his 
view, is by embracing socialism. He claims that his socialism seeks to eliminate problems 
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that arise with idealism such as inequality and injustice. This is allusion to the argument 
that in traditional African societies all were equal and injustice did not prevail. “In sum, 
the restitution of Africa’s humanist principles of society requires socialism. It is 
materialism that ensures the only effective transformation of nature, and socialism that 
derives the highest development from this transformation” (Nkrumah: 1964; 77). 
 
3.1.1 Consciencism 
Nkrumah describes consciencism as the philosophical standpoint that best describes 
African political philosophy. In reaching his position on what is imbued in consciencism 
he notes that the three segments that constitute African society are in tension and at 
variance. These segments as seen above are the Western Christian, the Islamic and the 
traditional African way of life. The tension is particularly raised by the fact that these 
other two segments, particularly the Christian Western, are animated by principles that 
are in stark contrast to the African traditional way of life. 
 
For Nkrumah the solution to this tension lies in accommodating the other two segments 
into the experiences of the traditional African societies. He says a connected body of 
thought must be developed that integrates the new society that would have been 
developed. However that unification and indeed the thought that integrates it must always 
take into account “elevated ideals underlying the traditional African societies” (Nkrumah: 
1964; 78). He says if this does not succeed it will lead to society being “racked by the 
most malignant schizophrenia” (ibid). 
 
He argues that the social revolution must be backed by an intellectual revolution that is 
aimed at the redemption of society. This philosophy must be grounded in the actual 
environment and conditions under which people live in Africa. The basis of this 
philosophy is the actual experience of the people and with the emancipation of the 
continent the people must also be emancipated. From this, he says, two aims emerge: 
“first, the restitution of the egalitarianism of human society, and second, the logistic 
mobilisation of all our resources towards the attainment of that restitution” (ibid). 
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Nkrumah says the philosophy behind this revolution is consciencism. It will be tasked 
with digesting the elements of the West and Islam to give them a true African identity. 
This true African identity is informed by humanist principles which are the basis of 
African traditional society. He says consciencism is the philosophical standpoint that is 
responsible for taking Africa forward from where it is by indicating how progress is to be 
forged out of the conflict of different principles. Philosophical consciencism is primarily 
concerned with how each individual is treated. “The cardinal principle of philosophical 
consciencism is to treat each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means. This is 
fundamental to all socialist or humanist conceptions of man” (Nkrumah: 1964; 95). He 
argues that if ethical rules are founded on principles of egalitarianism they will aim to be 
objective. Further, if these principles arise from the egalitarian idea about people they 
must be generalizable. Philosophical consciencism is in accord with all such principles 
and is in harmony with the traditional African society. Philosophical consciencism, he 
says, outlines a political theory and a social practice which seeks to give effect to the 
greatest ethical principle, that of egalitarianism. Nkrumah then explains how this 
egalitarian principle would work in practice with regard to the relationship between the 
individual and the community. 
 
By reason of its tenet, philosophical consciencism seeks to promote 
individual development, but in such a way that the conditions for the 
development of all become the conditions for the development of each; 
that is, in such a way that the individual development does not introduce 
such diversities as to destroy the egalitarian basis. The social political 
practice also seeks to co-ordinate social forces in such a way as to 
mobilise them logistically for the maximum development of society along 
true egalitarian lines (Nkrumah: 1964; 98). 
 
It is clear that Nkrumah is not only concerned about constructing political theories but is 
also keen to see them put in practice. Philosophical consciencism is to be translated into 
something practical on the social and political field and both the theory and practice are 
informed by the traditional egalitarian tenet of the African society. Nkrumah argues that 
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his philosophical consciencism is faced with problems of alien ideologies that result from 
colonial imperialism which hinder development and true equality.  
 
He therefore suggests a practical solution to all these challenges. He advocates the 
institution of a parliamentary democracy with a one-party state. He argues that such a 
system is positioned well to express the common national aspirations. He sees a multi 
party democracy as simply serving to perpetuate the struggle between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’. He also argues that, since the primary motivation behind colonialism was 
economic, it is imperative for newly liberated territories to eschew the idea of binding 
their economies to those of the ousted colonisers.  
 
Nkrumah concludes by arguing that when “socialism is true to its purpose, it seeks 
connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the people before their social 
evolution was ravaged by colonialism” (Nkrumah: 1964; 106). He says what it has to do 
is simply adapt to the modern environment so that it can come up with new methods of 
industrial and economic development that will serve the people. It must shun all the 
methods that promote the interests of capital.  
 
3.1.2 Socialism in Ghana 
In his book Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah outlines the practical realities that his country 
faces and what he proposes to do in order to implement the programme of socialism. He 
sketches out the effects colonialism has had on Africa and concludes that it is largely 
negative. The peoples of Africa, he says, were left largely impoverished and illiterate, 
unable to compete on the global economic stage.  
 
Nkrumah says the aim of his party in power is to eliminate all the social ills that his 
country faced. He sees meeting the challenges as a long term objective that could take a 
long time to be reached. To deal with these problems, there was need for a model of 
development or industrialisation. He argues that there can be no universal model of 
development or modernisation that suits all the countries in the world. The United States 
of America developed through use of vast tracts of land and slavery. Europe developed 
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its industries over a very long period of time and under different social conditions. He 
argues that the closest model for Ghana is China, India and Japan. However, he maintains 
that no pattern of industrialisation can ever serve as a perfect model for a country that is 
emerging from colonialism.  
 
Thus he has to develop a model that best suits Ghana’s history and where it is coming 
from. He says, in “Ghana we have embarked on the socialist path to progress. We want to 
see full employment, good housing and equal opportunity  for education and cultural 
advancement for all the people up to the highest level possible” (Nkrumah: 1963; 119). 
This system would ensure that prices of basic goods would not be above what workers 
earn, rentals would be affordable, welfare services would be open to all and education 
will be made available to all. 
 
He argues that socialism is best suited for Ghana because it does not allow the private 
ownership of means of production such as land and does not promote private pursuit of 
wealth. Such a system is best prepared to meet the needs of all members of society. He 
argued that Ghana had to be transformed to meet all the requirements of a true socialist 
state. The means of production had to be transferred to the people and there had to be 
large investments in agriculture, transforming subsistence farming into commodity 
producing entities that would provide food for the people but also create surplus that 
would be used for purposes of economic growth. He also reserved the right of his 
government to interfere in all economic activities in its quest to attain the socialist 
revolution he had envisaged. This view is informed by the traditional way of life which 
Nkrumah has styled as philosophical consciencism. To give effect to that traditional way 
of life in the modern setting means that there should be no private ownership of the 
means of production and the needs of all members of society should be met. Thus 
philosophical consciencism, informed by the traditional way of life, serves as the 
ideological basis of the political practice. 
 
Nkrumah called for increased productivity which would see the growth of real wealth, 
but this required both a long time and sacrifices, hence he called for immediate personal 
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sacrifices. He argued that the “socialist objective implies the universal good of the nation, 
and in the interest of that socialist objective it will be necessary for all of us to forgo 
some immediate for a greater benefit a bit later on. Speedier development out of 
surpluses or social services in the interest of the community confer more advantages upon 
a greater number of people than would increased wages for certain groups of workers’’ 
(Nkrumah:1963; 122). He thought with the rise of surpluses the economy would also 
expand to the benefit of all members of the society. This is all in keeping with the 
traditional way of life where the community ensured that all its members were 
sufficiently provided for on an equal basis.  
 
Nkrumah was firmly of the view that only socialists would be able and willing to build 
socialism, hence he implemented programmes that were meant to educate all the people 
from top government officials to ordinary workers as to what this programme was all 
about. His philosophical consciencism was both theoretical in its philosophical 





Nyerere was of the firm opinion that socialism was an attitude of the mind which was not 
limited to mere observation of certain rules or requirements within a system. He thought 
that socialism was like democracy in that respect. The attitude of socialism was not about 
a person striving on his own to achieve whatever he wanted in isolation but it was about 
caring for each other and ensuring that each one’s welfare was well catered for.  
 
He argues that this attitude of the mind is what distinguishes the socialist from the non-
socialist. This distinction has nothing to do with possessions but one’s attitude towards 
fellow human beings. Nyerere believes that one can be a millionaire and still remain a 
socialist. He believes that the existence of wealthy people in a given society does not 
reflect on the amount and nature of resources that society has. He argues that the 
production of millionaires is dependent on the way in which wealth is distributed in the 
society. 
                                                 
17
 Nyerere was the first president of independent Tanzania, he was in office from 1964 to 1984. 
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He argues that the attitude of the socialist mind in Africa is to be found in the way that 
traditional African societies were organised. The way in which the traditional society was 
organised sought to reflect a certain view about the nature of persons. This view was that 
a person does not exist alone but that she exists within a community. An individual is not 
an entity that stands alone but is part of the community. The community takes care of the 
individual and no-one seeks to exploit anyone within such a community. On the contrary 
the community takes care of all its members (Nyerere: 1968; 6). This is reminiscent of 
the communitarian view of person that was discussed by Tempels, Mbiti and Menkiti in 
chapter two. Nyerere seeks to develop a political and economic theory that would give 
full effect to the communitarian view of persons. In Nyerere’s view the traditional 
economic structures did not make any room for exploitation. He argues that in order for 
us to fully understand socialism we need to look at how traditional societies were 
organised in African societies. He claims that we shall find that traditional African 
communities were classless societies. 
 
Nyerere’s view is that in capitalist societies those who belong to the privileged classes 
spend their time doing nothing except leisurely things. He believes that the worker has to 
do all the work for them while they concern themselves with things that hardly count as 
work. He equates these people to extremely lazy people hence he calls them parasites.  
He argues that African societies did not have privileged classes that produced these 
parasites who would shy away from work.  
 
Nyerere is against one of the firm principles of capitalism which is pursuit and 
accumulation of wealth. He argues that this principle does not only violate socialist 
principles but is responsible for the growth and spread of corruption. Pursuit of wealth, he 
contended, is found only in capitalist societies.  
 
Nyerere argues that in both traditional and modern societies, the production of wealth 
requires three crucial things. He says the first thing is land, which is given to us by God. 
The land is used for agriculture to produce the food that is required to feed people and it 
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also has many things contained in it like mineral wealth and all that exists on it. This, 
Nyerere says, is used and shaped by people as they see fit for their own benefits and to 
meet all their needs. The important point to note here which Nyerere states is that land 
was given as a gift to the people by God. This means that no-one could own the land 
because it was seen as a gift given to all and no one in particular.  
 
The second important thing are tools that are used in either transforming natural 
resources or working the land to produce goods that ultimately become wealth. Nyerere 
says these tools belong to the worker who uses them. But he uses the word ‘belong’ in a 
very weak sense. It only means that the worker remains with the tools as long as he needs 
them. If he is done with them or is unable to work anymore the tools are passed on to 
someone else.  
 
The third factor is labour, which is the activity that people who work engage in. Anyone 
who performs a task is contributing towards the creation of wealth. Nyerere argues that in 
the traditional African society no one was exempt from work except in special 
circumstances only covering the infirm, the old and the very young. He says: 
 
In traditional African society everybody was a worker. There was no other 
way of earning a living for the community. Even the Elder, who appeared 
to be enjoying himself without doing any work and for whom everybody 
else appeared to be working, had, in fact, worked hard all his younger 
days. The wealth he now appeared to possess was not his, personally; it 
was only ‘his’ as the Elder of the group which had produced it. He was its 
guardian. The wealth itself gave him neither  power nor prestige. The 
respect paid to him by the young was his because he was older than they, 
and had served his community longer; and the ‘poor’ Elder enjoyed as 
much respect in our society as the ‘rich’ Elder (Nyerere: 1968; 4). 
 
In essence what this means is that no-one, in Nyerere’s view, in the traditional African 
society ever worked for her own benefit. Everyone worked for the benefit of all who 
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lived in her community. Those who were deemed to be wealthy were not really wealthy 
in their own right. They only held the wealth on behalf of the rest of the community. 
Elders were respected by virtue of their age and not what they had managed to 
accumulate in their working life. Nyerere is also clearly stating that no-one ever worked 
for one person in particular. Thus, the relationship of worker and employer never existed 
in the traditional society. Everyone worked for the benefit of all. No-one was employed 
by a particular person to work for the benefit of that particular individual.  
 
He says the most visible socialistic achievement of the traditional society was the security 
it gave to all its members. This means that all people who lived in a given community 
were sure to be safe and could depend on their communities in times of need or when 
they were faced with challenges. But, he argues, this was only possible because 
everybody in that society contributed towards the production of wealth in that society 
making everybody a worker. Nyerere points to the Swahili saying:  “Mgeni  siku mbili; 
siku ya tatu mpe jembe which means: ‘Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the 
third day give him a hoe’” (1968; 5). This is meant to reflect that everybody was a worker 
who contributed to the wealth of the society that he depended on when he needed security 
or when his personal circumstances had become abject. Nyerere puts it succinctly when 
he says: “Thus, working was part and parcel, the very basis and justification of this 
socialist achievement of which we are so justly proud” (ibid). 
 
Nyerere argues that socialism can only be practical when there is work. If there is no 
work socialism is not possible. It is the task of socialism to provide the individual with 
the means to work. This work is not for the benefit of the individual but for all. Neither is 
the work to be done for someone else. The worker as in employee “reflects a capitalist 
attitude of mind which was introduced into Africa with the coming of colonialism and is 
totally foreign to our own way of thinking” (Nyerere: 1968; 6). 
 
The notion of a labourer, Nyerere argues, did not exist in the traditional African society. 
It was brought in through colonialism which was responsible for ushering in capitalism. 
He says with the arrival of capitalism certain Africans developed desires to be wealthy 
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like the foreigners they were seeing who had brought capitalism. He opines that there is 
nothing wrong with the desire to be wealthy, but the problem starts when people desire to 
be wealthy so that they can dominate others. He has problems with those who have 
developed habits of exploitation so that they can accumulate prestige and power. These 
habits are foreign and at odds with the socialist society that he is advocating. 
 
Nyerere says in order to return to the traditional values of African society something 
needs to be done: “Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our 
former attitude of mind. In our traditional African society we were individuals within a 
community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We 
neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men” (ibid). This means that the 
individual was part of the community and participated in all it did and contributed to it 
with the expectation that the community will also look after her. This is a clear reference 
to the communitarian conception of the “I” being “We” or Mbiti’s idea that “I am 
because we are, and since we are therefore I am”. Nyerere’s idea is fully informed by the 
communitarian conception of person. 
 
Another crucial factor that Nyerere sees in his rejection of foreign imports is the idea of 
owning land. He says this must be rejected because it was brought in by the capitalists. 
He says the idea of making land marketable is completely foreign to African society. 
Landowners will determine the prices of their land and make huge profits without doing 
anything to deserve their earnings but spending time loitering. He says: “We must not 
allow the growth of parasites here in Tanganyika. The TANU
18
 Government must go 
back to the traditional African custom of land-holding” (Nyerere: 1968; 8). For him, this 
return to the traditional value would assist in seeing to the implementation of true 
socialism. 
 
Nyerere argues that it is the responsibility of all his people to uphold the socialist attitude 
of mind to ensure that it works as a system. He calls on all the people to resist the 
                                                 
18
 TANU stands for Tanganyika African National Union, which was the political party founded by Julius 
Nyerere in the then Tanganyika, modern day Tanzania, to fight for the liberation of that country. 
 108 
temptations of personal gain which might detract them from pursuing true socialism. 
Nyerere is opposed to accumulation of personal wealth, preferring that wealth should be 
held communally. He explains certain apparent differences in wealth that can be seen 
among people by referring to the traditional society. He notes that certain positions of 
leadership may come with certain privileges in material wealth for certain people. 
However, this does not mean that these people are now wealthy as individuals but just 
like the elder, who appeared to be wealthy, in the traditional society, the people in 
position of leadership do not own that wealth. They merely hold it in the interests of the 
whole community and when the community needs to use it they would relinquish it. “It is 
a tool entrusted to them for the benefit of the people they serve” (ibid).  
 
Wealth is not to be used by individuals as an insurance that will protect them in the future 
when they are not in positions of power. He argues that if people in leadership positions 
have been of service to the community, then the community will be able to take care of 
them when they leave office. He refers to the past to find justification for this position. 
“In tribal society, the individuals or the families within a tribe were ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ 
according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor” (Nyerere: 1968; 9). Thus Nyerere 
firmly believes that there is no need for individuals to accumulate wealth but that it 
should be held communally and shared accordingly. 
 
Nyerere believes that modern true socialists would not seek to exploit other people for 
their own benefit. Nyerere says while some workers, in the socialist society, will produce 
products that command a higher value in the market on one hand, and others will produce 
goods that have a very small value on the market, no worker is allowed to ask for a 
reward that reflects the value of the product that she has produced. On the contrary, he 
says, the true socialist will ask for a reward that is fair to his skill in relation to the wealth 
or poverty of her society. This means that the worker will take both her skill and the 
wealth or lack thereof of her society into account before she asks for her remuneration. 
This means that there are no market forces at work in such a society. No individual skill 
can be so highly priced and rewarded. Whilst all positions are not perfectly similar or 
equal, the difference in their reward should be kept at a minimum. This argument relies 
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on the communitarian view of individuals firstly being part of a whole and secondly 
sharing in the fate of that whole. 
 
3.2.1 Differences with European Socialism 
Nyerere contends that there is a fundamental difference between African Socialism and 
European socialism. This difference is essentially in how the latter came into existence 
which is in stark contrast to the former. “European socialism was born of the Agrarian 
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which followed it. The former created the 
‘landed’ and the ‘landless’ classes in society; the latter produced the modern capitalist 
and the industrial proletariat” (Nyerere: 1968; 11). 
 
In his view European socialism was born out of certain social and economic forces that 
prevailed at a particular time in the development of European societies. There were 
several economic and social revolutions that occurred in Europe with each ushering a 
different epoch. These revolutions would invariably plant seeds of conflict in society and 
they would lead to bloodied conflicts that would usher in a new dispensation. Nyerere 
says European socialism developed out of this pattern of social conflict.  
 
He argues that this wave of conflict and wars was not to be seen as bad but as actually 
good because they ushered in changes including the birth of socialism. Furthermore 
European socialism is deeply connected with capitalism because it traces its genesis from 
the failures and frustrations that capitalism brings about. “As prayer is to Christianity or 
to Islam, so civil war (which they call ‘class war’) is to the European version of 
socialism-a means inseparable from the end. Each becomes the basis of a whole way of 
life. The European socialist cannot think of his socialism without its father-capitalism” 
(ibid).  
 
Nyerere says African socialism did not have the benefit of both the Agrarian and 
Industrial revolutions. These revolutions were fuelled by class conflict and instead of 
ending those class differences they resulted in new societies that had intensified class 
differences.  African socialism did not begin with and was not expressed in class conflict. 
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Nyerere says the notion of caste/class and the differences between people that are 
attendant on such distinctions did not exist in African society. On the contrary African 
socialism is informed by the African concept of the person wherein the individual is seen 
as intimately connected and constituted by her fellow community members. 
 
Nyerere sees African socialism as finding its basis in the social network of the society. 
“The foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is the extended family. The true 
African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his 
natural enemies” (ibid). He says people in the traditional African society treat each other 
as if they were relations. Each individual in this society views all other people in that 
society as his relations who are part of a very wide family. This view is one that fits well 
with the communitarian views as we saw in the previous chapter. ‘Ujamaa’ is the name 
that identifies Nyerere’s brand of African socialism. “Ujamaa, then, or ‘Familyhood’, 
describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society 
on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire 
socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict 
between man and man” (Nyerere:1968; 12). 
 
Thus the traditional notion of family which is seen as extending beyond one’s immediate 
relatives to include one’s clan and other people who live in the society forms the 
foundations of socialism. Nyerere says there is no need for a conversion to either 
socialism or democracy because both systems were always present in African societies. 
The traditional outlook on life was always socialist whereby every individual looked out 
for the other and was more interested in the common good than pursuing personal 
aspiration, particularly at the cost of other people. 
 
Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the 
recognition of ‘society’ as an extension of the basic family unit. But it can 
no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the 
tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation. For no true African socialist can look at a 
line drawn on a map and say, ‘The people on this side of that line are my 
 111 
brothers, but those who happen to live on the other side of it have no claim 
on me’; every individual on this continent is his brother (ibid). 
 
Thus Nyerere believes that African socialism is a political programme that will extend 
itself to create close relationships of relatedness on the African continent. Nyerere firmly 
believes that socialism is a belief system that can be attained if all people believe in it. He 
sees the possibility of socialism thriving in Africa as real since Africans have the 
privilege of the presence of socialism in the traditional setting. All that is needed is to 
adjust it to fit with modernity.  
 
Nyerere also insists that socialism is there for the service of people. Its justification and 
purpose is to be of service to the people. It does not discriminate against one group of 
people in favour of another but treats all people as equal and is grounded in the African 
view of the person. “The basis of socialism is a belief in the oneness of man and the 
common historical destiny of mankind. Its basis, in other words, is human equality. 
Acceptance of this principle is absolutely fundamental to socialism. The justification of 
socialism is man; not the state, not the flag” (Nyerere: 1968; 257). 
 
3.2.2 Socialism in Practice 
Nyerere observes that there are many definitions that have been given as to what true 
socialism is. To him writings that exist on socialism help in developing one’s 
understanding of the different facets of socialism or may discuss certain practical avenues 
from certain standpoints. Nyerere does not see socialism as a vague concept. He says it is 
possible to come up with a “useful definition of the basic assumption and purposes of 
socialism” (Nyerere: 1968; 302).  And he says, from this definition and statement of 
purposes of socialism, practical principles will follow. These practical principles will 
then be applied in real situations that people live in.  
 
“For socialism, the basic purpose is the well-being of the people, and the basic 
assumption is an acceptance of human equality. For socialism there must be a belief that 
every individual man and woman, whatever colour, shape, race, creed, religion, or sex is 
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an equal member of society with equal rights in the society and equal duties to it” 
(Nyerere: 1968; 303). He argues that anyone who does not accept this basic principle, 
even though accepting many socialist principles and policies, can never be a true 
socialist.  
 
This, in his view, does not make socialism utopian. He says socialism is fully aware of 
the fact that people have different abilities and there are differences in society. He says 
this doctrine accepts people as they are and calls for their inequalities to be employed in 
the service of other people and towards equality. “Socialism is, in fact, the application of 
the principle of human equality to the social, economic, and political organisation of 
society” (Nyerere: 1968; 303).  
 
He says socialism in this formulation recognises that people have different abilities and 
contribute differently to the society. Some people will have physical strength to do hard 
tasks while others will be weak. Some people might be foolish while others are 
intelligent. Some people might be clumsy with their hands while others may be very 
dexterous. But all will have at least some kind of contribution to make to the common 
good. There is no-one, within this political scheme, who can be dismissed as contributing 
absolutely nothing or retaining no worth. Socialism also realises that people are both 
selfish and social. It is for this reason that the “[s]ocialist doctrine then demands the 
deliberate organisation of society in such a manner that it is impossible-or at least very 
difficult-for individual desires to be pursued at the cost of other people, or for individual 
strength to be used for exploitation of others” (ibid). This is an allusion to the 
communitarian concept of person that requires that community members act in certain 
ways towards each other and in their relationships – in this case a non-exploitative 
manner. 
 
He says society should be organised in such a way that people are prevented from 
exploiting one another and social institutions should be organised so that people’s needs 
and their progress can be collectively secured. One way of preventing exploitation is to 
ensure that the rule of law prevails and that all are treated as equal before the law. He 
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notes that injustice may prevail because of the fallibility of human beings. However, 
socialism offers the best possible scenario for the achievement of true justice. The second 
major way in which people are exploited is through ownership of private property. The 
problem, for Nyerere, arises when one person controls the means of production and 
another depends on those means for her own livelihood. He suggests that if a society is 
made up of equal citizens then each and every one of them must own her own means of 
production. If the whole society has an interest in what is eventually produced then the 
means of production must be held in common ownership by the whole group. 
 
3.3 Leopold Sedar Senghor19 
In his book On African Socialism, Senghor argues for a distinct African socialism and 
explicates its basis in contrast to Western socialism. He starts by justifying the struggle 
launched by Africans against colonialism. He says the justification lies in the fact that 
colonialism creates a political dependence of one people on another. The attainment of 
independence will lead to freedom. In the absence of freedom, the ‘personality’20 of the 
people will not flourish.  
 
He says that the first mistake, in the struggle against colonialism, was that the methods 
that were used in the fight against domination had been borrowed from the European 
proletariat. The European proletariat had claimed that the struggle against colonialism 
and their own struggle were the same. However, Senghor argues that the struggle for 
independence in Africa and the European proletariat’s struggle are not the same.  
 
In fact, the European proletarians are held in dependent status as 
individuals grouped in a class, not as a race or a people. As for us, we 
have been colonised, to be sure as underdeveloped, defenceless 
individuals, but also as Negroes or Arab-Berbers-in other words, as people 
of a different race and different culture. This was the basic argument of the 
coloniser. We were “primitive” and ugly to boot; it was necessary to 
                                                 
19
 Leopold Sedar Senghor was the first president of Senegal. He was in office from 1960 untill 1980. He is 
widely regarded as a very influential intellectual, he died in 2001. 
20
 Senghor uses this word to refer to the key characteristics that make up a people’s culture. 
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expose us to progress, “to the light of civilisation.” Naturally, progress and 
civilisation could only be European (Senghor: 1964; 68). 
 
For Senghor the proletariat in Europe are held as a class as opposed to being a racial 
group, which was the case for the Africans. Since the Africans were held as a different 
racial group they were supposed to be civilised as civilisation only belonged to the 
Europeans (Senghor: 1964; 68). The solidarity between the proletariat and the colonised 
people misrepresents the true nature and effects of colonialism. In his view, all Europeans 
benefited from colonialism. 
 
Further, Senghor disputes the claim that it is only European civilisation that can lay claim 
to universal civilisation. He believes that all forms of civilisations are capable of 
developing into universal civilisations. He is of the view that no civilisation can claim to 
have any superiority over the other on the basis that it is universal. The only credit he 
grants to European civilisation is that it was able to diffuse its own civilisation throughout 
the world. Senghor is clearly convinced that colonialism stifles the cultural progress and 
expression of the colonised people. This is particularly achieved by the way in which the 
colonisers seek to impose their own culture on the colonised people in the name of 
civilising their newly found subjects. The justification for the struggle for freedom lay in 
the quest of the oppressed to be totally free of alienating and stifling oppression. In their 
struggle to gain freedom they must not employ foreign tools or associate with other 
foreign people who might claim that they are in solidarity with them because the fight 
against colonialism is much more than class struggles that are characteristic of European 
societies. 
 
3.3.1 Rejection of Marx, Engels and Western Thinking 
Senghor argues that Marx and Engels’ thought cannot be accepted in its current form in 
the African context. He argues that there are three reasons that compel him to refuse 
accepting their theory. “The first is that the knowledge of Marx and Engels was 
conditioned by their era, by rather limited progress of science and philosophy” (1964; 
69). Secondly their method of dialectics, although not new, was given new life by Marx 
 115 
yet still remains abstract. “Even with Marx and Engels, European dialectics remains 
abstract, fairly close to logic, for it retained the latter’s categories and concepts, 
inductions and deductions. It is still deterministic, and this is partly why twentieth 
century thinkers have developed a new method
21
” (Senghor: 1964; 70). He says the 
particular problem with European thinking in Marx and Engels’ time was that it tended to 
put a distance between the knower and the object of knowledge. This epoch had also 
developed many specialisations with the aim of developing objectivity. For Senghor this 
tendency impoverished the knowledge that was produced by distancing the knower from 
the object that is to be known. Hence, he says, the Europeans dropped the project and 
developed other systems such as phenomenology and existentialism.  
 
The third reason why Marx and Engels cannot be accepted, in Senghor’s view, lies in the 
fact that there is ‘Negro-African’ knowledge that Africans have inherited from their 
ancestors. He says the African does not interact with an object at a distance, he does not 
analyse it without growing close to it. “Thus the Negro-African sympathises, abandons 
his personality to become identified with the Other, dies to be reborn in the other. He 
does not assimilate; he is assimilated. He lives a common life with the Other; he lives in a 
symbiosis” (Senghor: 1964; 73).  
 
This surrender to the object, he claims, is guided by reason. Although this may appear 
contradictory it can be explained by the difference in the way Europeans and Africans 
reason. “European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilisation; Negro-African 
reasoning is intuitive by participation” (Senghor: 1964; 74). Senghor further discusses the 
differences that he sees as existing between European reasoning and African reasoning:   
 
The African, introversive, seems also to abandon himself to the object by 
the very fact of his emotion. In reality, he imposes himself on the object. 
For he seizes it intuitively: in an analogous image which, as Jacques 
Berque says of the symbol (quoting Gurvitch) cannot provide such exact 
                                                 
21
 The new philosophical method(s) he mentions, based on scientific advances, are phenomenology, 
existentialism and Teilhardism.  
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information as logical speech, or rather, discursive analysis. In short, while 
a great many Europeans and Americans, especially the French and Anglo-
Saxons, think with their head, by concepts and schemas, logically 
connected, Mediterraneans and Africans, or specifically, Arabs and 
Negroes, think with their soul-I would even say with their 
heart…(Senghor: 1971; 44).     
 
Thus, for Senghor there is a difference in which Africans and Europeans come to gain 
knowledge. He says this is the ‘Negro-African’ way which has been passed on from the 
ancestors and it should not be discarded simply because the Europeans have requested 
that it be thrown away. Senghor holds that this does not mean that the Africans are not 
capable of discursive reasoning. It only means that they have chosen to emphasise the 
emotional part as opposed to the discursive part of rationality. Senghor argues that the 
traditional way of knowledge must be maintained and the Western European ways of 
knowledge such as logic and Marxian dialectics must be integrated into it. He argues that 
African knowledge is traditionally dialectic and does not concern itself with principles 
such as non-contradiction.  
 
3.3.2 African Humanism 
For true progress to be charted which goes beyond  dialectical materialism Senghor is of 
the opinion that the present European method must be fused with the traditional African 
method. He says Marxian humanism had certain strengths that it brought to the fore. It 
elaborated, through the use of concrete social facts, the realities that people lived under in 
mid 19
th
 century Europe. It demonstrated the priority of economic factors and the raging 
class struggle that was attendant to that period. Senghor also credits it for offering a 
detailed analysis of alienation.  
 
However, Senghor says the weakness that is to be found in Marxian humanism is that it 
fails to carry the economic analysis any further. He accuses Marx of having put a great 
deal of emphasis on determinism and materialism at the expense of ethics. He says 
Marx’s theory ought to have concerned itself with issues about people and their freedom.  
 117 
 
Its weakness lies above all in the fact that, as Marx proceeded in his 
writing of Capital, he increasingly stressed materialism and determinism , 
praxis and means, to the detriment of dialectics and ethics-in a word, to 
the detriment of man and his freedom. I shall no longer say as I did in my 
Report, to the detriment of philosophical thought; for, rejecting the spirit 
of his Philosophical Works, Marx surreptitiously and paradoxically 
reintroduced metaphysics in the conclusion. But it is a terribly inhuman 
metaphysics, an atheistic metaphysics in which mind is sacrificed to 
matter, freedom to the determined, man to things” (Senghor: 1964; 76).  
 
He then seeks to find an African response to this deterministic and dehumanised 
humanism that has been developed by Marx. Senghor is of the view that it would be a 
betrayal of Marxian dialectics if Africans were to use his ideas without changing them. 
He says that other countries such as Israel and China should serve as examples to African 
countries in that they have found their own version of socialism that fits their own Asian 
realities. He argues that the same must prevail in Africa. African countries must look at 
their realities and develop a socialist plan that is in accord with the realities that surround 
them.  
 
West African realities are those of underdeveloped countries-peasant 
countries here, cattle countries there-once feudalistic, but traditionally 
classless and with no wage earning sector. They are community countries 
where the group holds priority over the individual; they are especially 
religious countries, unselfish countries, where money is not king. Though 
dialectical materialism can help in analysing our  societies, it cannot 
fully interpret them (Senghor: 1964; 77). 
 
Two things emerge from Senghor’s analysis of the Western African countries. Firstly, 
these countries are classless. The concept of class as found in the West does not exist in 
these countries. This means that Marxian dialectic with its emphasis on class struggle 
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would not apply. Secondly these countries do not have a sophisticated or advanced 
monetary economy that could be analysed using the terms that Marx employed in 
discussing 19
th
 century Europe. On the contrary these countries are communal in their 
outlook. The group takes precedence over the individual; hence their social structures are 
communitarian by outlook. Although Senghor does not explicitly claim that this is the 
concept of person that is extant in African philosophy it is quite clear that his thinking 
about the nature of persons in Africa is on par with the communitarians as I outlined in 
chapter two. Firstly, just like the communitarians, he argues that former colonies in West 
Africa are ‘community countries’. From this, just like Menkiti, Senghor argues that in 
these African countries the community takes precedence over the individual. It is 
precisely because of this communitarian outlook of African societies and the concept of 
person espoused in these societies that he seeks to develop a political theory that does not 
betray African humanism. He argues: 
 
Therefore, we would betray Marx by applying his method like a veneer to 
West African realities We would betray him even more if we were to 
apply but not integrate European political, economic, social and cultural 
organisations here, whether that of West or East, of liberal 
parliamentarianism or “peoples’ democracy.” This would strangely betray 
Man, as well as Negro-African – I mean Negro-Berber- humanism 
(Senghor: 1964; 78). 
 
This humanism is one he sees as comprising the essential characteristics of the life of 
Africans and how they live as well as the values that they espouse. Essentially this 
humanism is communitarian in nature as I outlined in the second chapter. It embraces the 
concept of persons that sees them as individuals who share in the same fate and their 
status as persons is essentially determined by their communities. At times he refers to this 
humanism as Negritude. He sees “Negritude as the sum total of the qualities possessed by 
all black men everywhere” (Vaillant: 1990; 244). Hence Senghor firmly believes that 
whatever material improvement there could be, it should be incorporated into the 
traditional values of the ‘Negro African’ humanism. He sees no point in raising the 
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people’s standard of living without also raising the standard of their culture. He calls on 
his people to engage meaningfully in cultural activities that give them their identity. He is 
impressed with an example he finds with a certain people of the Sudan. He says these 
people had a single rain season and they worked only four months of the year. The 
remaining eight months they engaged in “cultural activities-living in communion, by and 
within the community with other men, their brothers, more precisely with the solidarity 
forces of the entire universe: the living and the dead, men and animals, plants and 
pebbles” (Senghor: 1964; 80). This view echoes Tempels, Mbiti and Menkiti’s position 
that conceives the living as not only being in communion with each other but also with 
the dead. 
 
Senghor says in returning to cultural roots, the new methods that have been brought by 
the West should not be ignored. He calls on the people to stop blaming all their ills on 
colonialism in cases where they could take responsibility. He urges that a new look at 
colonialism will yield a proper understanding of the dynamics involved in the birth of 
colonialism. He says colonialism is a fact of history, the conquerors may bring 
destruction but they ultimately bring seeds that will yield some new ideas and progress. 
He says the colonisation of the world by Europe was a product of the renaissance 
whereby the landed gentry’s influence was usurped by the monarchy and the emergence 
of the bourgeoisie in the cities. He says the driving ideas behind the renaissance were 
atheistic, mercantile and destructive of the old order. He sees the renaissance as having 
done more than exported people and their trades. “But it exported not only merchants and 
soldiers; with professors, physicians, engineers, administrators, and missionaries, it also 
exported ideas and techniques. It not only destroyed, it built; it not only killed, it cured 
and educated; it gave birth to a new world, an entire world of our brothers, men of other 
races and continents” (ibid: 80).  
 
Not only did colonialism connect people in different parts of the world, in Senghor’s 
view, it also brought certain advances that African people on their own could not have 
produced. He argues that although it was a painful process it was a necessary evil. 
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However, he says, the task of Africans is now to ‘Negrofy’ all the values and religions 
that were brought by colonialism.  
 
For us, socialism is a method to be tested in contact with African realities. 
It is basically a question, after choosing lucidly, of assimilating our 
choices. To assimilate is to transform foods that are foreign to us, to make 
them our flesh and blood-in a word, to Negrofy and Berberize them. This 
brings us back to Negro-Berber humanism; we must integrate the Negro 
Berber in his material determinations by transcending them in the name of 
certain spiritual values (Senghor: 1964; 84). 
 
Thus Senghor embraces socialism but insists that this socialism must be informed by 
what he calls Negro-Berber humanism. That Negro-Berber humanism is essentially 
communitarian in nature. It has a specific view of the concept of person which is a 
communitarian view and in Senghor’s view the communitarian concept of the person 
ought to shape the political theory. 
 
3.3.3 Practical Socialism  
Senghor says having outlined what cultural independence really entails, he would now 
turn to discuss what has to be done in order to realise West African humanism. He says 
what he is looking at now is the concrete predicament of constructing a new ‘Negro-
African’ or ‘Negro-Berber’ nation.  
 
He argues that a nation is different from a fatherland in that a fatherland is based on 
natural determinants such as race, culture etc. He sees his country as made up of very 
diverse races, different religions and languages and cultures. Hence the need to develop a 
nation that would embrace and accommodate all these differences. “What makes the 
Nation, is a common will for a life in common” (Senghor: 1964; 84).  Thus the only 
requirement for the nation to come into being is simply that all must desire for a life that 
is common in that particular nation. 
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Senghor blames colonialism for creating artificial boundaries and separating people in 
ways that are anathema to how he sees the African person. He argues that establishing a 
federation would be a practical response to this problem. However, this should be done 
with self-determination as the guiding principle and states should be free to choose 
whether to join such a federation or not. He says some of the practical problems that 
would confront such an arrangement are to be found in the legacy of colonialism. 
Territorialism has developed because of prolonged periods of isolation and forced 
segregation. Language and cultural differences could also present problems of co-
operation between different states. 
 
But this does not deter him from suggesting a system that he sees as best suited and 
practical for the functioning of the federation. He conceives government organisation to 
be as follows: 
The majority party will have the political conception and direction.The 
federal government and the federal assembly will direct foreign affairs. 
Whence the necessity for a strongly centralised party. The assemblies and 
governments of the federated states will control local affairs. The one is 
hardly less essential than the other, for reasons of principle and practice. 
Democracy requires us to start from the foundation, the masses; the 
popular will must first be expressed by the base, and the responsibilities, 
both economic and political, must be exercised there (Senghor: 1964; 86). 
 
Senghor is of the firm view that this will bring all the people together and they will strive 
for the same goal. He argues that although there may be differences among the people, 
implementing such a system would alleviate those differences. He argues that the 
opposition within such a system must also pursue the same goal as the majority party. He 
is against the idea of the opposition developing and pursuing its own agenda that does not 
accord with the aspiration of the majority party. He says this would lead to undue groups 
that are antagonistic towards each other. He says the role of the opposition is to be the 
conscience of those in government and the party that has the majority rule.  
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His firm belief in the success of this project lies in the fact that he sees African societies 
as essentially community societies. He says they are different from other socialist 
countries in the West because those countries are collectivist societies that ultimately 
place emphasis on the individual. The individual and the satisfaction of her needs are 
what matters in those societies. That is not the situation in Africa. He makes the case for 
the communitarian view of person clear when he argues that: 
 
Negro-African society puts more stress on the group than on the 
individual, more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the 
individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy. 
Ours is a community society. This does not mean that it ignores the 
individual, or that collectivist society ignores solidarity, but the latter 
bases this solidarity on the activities of individuals, whereas the 
community society bases it on the general activity of the group (Senghor: 
1964; 93-94). 
 
Senghor argues that the community society does not ignore the person but is capable of 
neglecting the individual. He says in the West the individual is the being who is 
independent and who is able to pursue whatever she desires freely. He says a member of 
a community society can also pursue what she desires but that will be in union with the 
community’s aspirations.  
 
He also believes that African societies do not have any social classes as found in the 
West. Instead, what exists in Africa are social groups and although it may appear as if 
there are differences of a class nature, it is easy to deal with them. In Senegal he sees 
three groups, the first being those who belong to the liberal professions such as doctors 
and lawyers, the second is of wage earners such as government workers and the third is 
made up of labourers such as peasants, shepherds and fishermen. He argues that although 
these groups appear like classes they really aren’t because of two reasons. He says these 
groups are not highly differentiated as in Europe because of underdevelopment and it is 
easy for a person to move from the second or third group to the first. Secondly, those who 
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are in the liberal profession such as medical practitioners are mainly employed by the 
government. This makes it easy for government to control and determine what financial 
rewards they get. This would minimise the differences between the groups.  
 
Senghor strongly advocates that the socialist programme must be workable in practice. 
He sees it as “essentially the transformation of economic relations between men, and the 
transformation of economic structures themselves” (Senghor: 1964; 102). He clearly sees 
economic relations among people as very important as they determine the station of 
people in their societies. He advocates that as they seek to implement this programme it 
would require that they be open about it and depart from dogmatism of Marxism but 
embrace new methods of learning and develop an investigative mind. To him this was the 
most feasible programme to adopt, thus he writes: “If, at the close of World War II, we 
chose socialism as a political doctrine it was because, to make our anticolonialist struggle 
effective, we needed a practical method that would be the application of a certain theory. 
For socialism is at the same time theory and practice” (Senghor: 1964; 107). 
 
He says socialism goes beyond just governing the economic aspect of people’s lives but 
goes to the core of governing the total aspects of people’s lives and how they lead their 
lives both materially and spiritually. It is essentially about how people carry out their 
intimate relationships and how they interact as a society and with other societies. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an outline of African socialism as a political philosophy that was 
advocated by some of independent Africa’s early leaders. They all relied on traditional 
African social and political structures to justify their desire to pursue socialism. Those 
social and political structures assumed a certain view of the person. Invariably they held 
that an individual was submerged in the community, the community was prior to the 
individual and whatever the individual did-it had to be in the interests of the community. 
 
Nkrumah argued that the presence of two foreign traditions in Ghana, the Islamic and 
Western Christian, brought by colonialism, had to be dealt with through incorporating 
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them into the African traditional way of life. He argued that the traditional outlook on life 
in African societies had always been communalist and that the ancestor of socialism is 
communalism. The principle that animated the traditional communalist African society 
was egalitarianism. He argued that socialism had to find expression by looking at the 
living conditions of the African people and responding to them. He wanted the restitution 
of egalitarianism as well as mobilisation of all available resources to realise that goal. 
The traditional communal view of society and persons in that society informed his theory. 
He branded his African socialism consciencism and he rejected Marx and despised both 
colonialism and capitalism. 
 
Nyerere argues that socialism is an attitude of the mind as opposed to strict adherence to 
a certain political order. He brands his socialism ujamaa-which means familyhood. He 
relies on the traditional set up of African society to justify his theory. He argues that 
Africans must return to the attitude of mind of true socialism by looking at the traditional 
society. In that society an individual existed within the community. She was not an entity 
that stood alone and apart from the community. She took care of the community and the 
community took care of her. When she suffered, she suffered with the community, when 
she rejoiced, she rejoiced with community. He rejects European socialism and argues that 
African socialism is deeply rooted in the ideals of the traditional extended family. 
 
Senghor calls his brand of socialism Negritude. One key characteristic that he notes is 
that black people do not think by using logic but through the use of their hearts. He 
argues that socialism is the proper response to colonialism. He sees it as informed by the 
traditional societies that were found all over Africa before the arrival of colonialism. 
These societies, in his view, were essentially communalistic. The individual lived in a 
community and co-operated with the community. Senghor claimed that the individual 
could not claim her own independent being; she could only do so in union with her fellow 
beings in her community. 
 
It is quite clear that these leaders and thinkers were adherents of one form or another of 
communitarianism. This views the traditional African community as embodying the 
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value of a person not only living in a community but finding her identity through other 































Chapter Four: Critique of Communitarian Concept of Person 
 
4. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to offer a critical and evaluative analysis of the communitarian 
conception of personhood in African thinking as discussed in chapter two. The early 
fathers of independence, as discussed in chapter three, used the idea of personhood as 
conceived by the communitarian doctrine as a justification for their versions of African 
socialism. The fathers of independence argued, as we saw in chapter three, that their 
version of African communalism was informed by the traditional African societies’ view 
of life including the view of what persons were and how they lived their lives within their 
communal setting. 
 
This chapter will look at two strands of communitarianism and which of their aspects 
provide the appeal and justification for African socialism that was advocated by the early 
leaders of independent Africa. Following Kwame Gyekye’s distinction, I will critically 
examine the differences between moderate and radical communitarianism. The first 
objective is to establish whether the differences, as suggested by Gyekye, between these 
two forms of communitarianism are real. If the differences are real this chapter will also 
seek to establish which of these two forms of communitarianism genuinely represents 
African thought and way of life. Secondly, the chapter seeks to subject both forms of 
communitarianism to a critical analysis with an attempt to establish the philosophical 
justification of their respective positions.  
 
 The central appeal by Africa’s early independence leaders was that African socialism 
was essentially African in its formulation because it embraced the notions of personhood 
and community that were dominant in African societies. They argued that the conception 
of person and the political and social organization of society that proceeded from such a 
view justified African socialism. This places the communitarian view at the centre of two 
important conceptual issues in African thinking. The first being the nature of persons in 
African thought and the second being the resultant political theory. These concepts were 
seen as uniquely African and their authenticity was justification for their defence and 
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pursuit. In defence of the communitarian view of personhood it sufficed to say that it was 
African, and in pursuance of socialism it also sufficed to say that the communitarian 
aspect of African life compelled its states and governments to adopt socialism as the 
guiding political and economic principle. 
 
The early fathers of independence discussed in chapter three such as Nkrumah, Senghor 
and Nyerere were connected to the communitarian view of personhood in African 
philosophy. Didier Kaphagawani argues that this view is outlined in the writings of 
Tempels and finds ample support in Mbiti’s writings. It seems uncontroversial to state 
that the communitarian version of personhood finds radical expression in Mbiti’s 
unflinching view of the primacy of the community.  
 
While Tempels’ central concept was vital force, his thesis became explicitly 
communitarian through his observation that the increase and decrease of force is 
dependent on the social relation that each individual has with others, that is the society at 
large. Force can increase and diminish in direct proportion to the quality of that 
interaction. The Bantu are different from the westerners, according to Tempels, in the 
way they live. This way of life is communitarian in nature. Mbiti stresses the unity and 
indivisibility of the community. He locates the existence and welfare of the individual 
within a broader frame of the well-being of the community. The individual’s being is 
dependent on and essentially tied to the community’s being.  
 
Menkiti takes the communitarian view further by claiming that for an individual in the 
traditional set-up to be recognized as a person she ought to have a certain moral worth 
exhibited through moral achievement by abiding with communal dictates. Failure to 
abide with those communal dictates will constitute failure to achieve personhood.  
 
Gyekye argues that radical communitarianism as espoused by Mbiti and Menkiti is 
erroneous in respect of the fact that it fails to appreciate the individual in its unrestricted 
emphasis on the community. The failure to recognize the individual, according to 
Gyekye, is unrepresentative of African thinking and philosophically indefensible. He 
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proposes moderate communitarianism as representative of true African thinking by 
appealing to proverbs, as we saw in the second chapter, which are held to show that there 
was a place for the individual in the traditional Akan frame of thinking. Further he argues 
that his version is desirable because it will recognize and defend individual rights as 
opposed to Mbiti and Menkiti’s versions of communitarianism which ride roughshod on 
individual rights. Gyekye singles out Menkiti’s moral achievement and rites of social 
incorporation, as requirements for acquiring personhood, for sharp criticism. He argues 
that the moral requirement is beset with all sorts of confusions and incoherencies while 
the social incorporation requirement fails to shed any further light on the matter.   
 
The best place to start the discussion will be to refer to the metaphysical underpinnings 
that inform communitarian philosophers. The metaphysical explanation of the 
communitarian view of person renders clear the philosophical basis of this concept. It 
moves a step further from the mere claim that communitarianism is the authentic African 
view of persons by articulating its philosophical outlook. 
 
4.1 African Metaphysics and Persons 
Teffo and Roux (1998), in their exposition of what constitutes African metaphysics, start 
by warning that there are dangers of generalizing when talking about an African 
metaphysics because of the vastness of the continent which engender differences between 
different ethnic groups. They note that what is true of certain parts of Africa need not 
necessarily be true in other parts. However, they hold that the views they deal with on 
African metaphysics are present in large parts of the continent and can serve as 
representative of metaphysical thinking in Africa. 
 
Teffo and Roux hold that any discourse on metaphysics will generally be concerned 
about non-physical entities. The metaphysical discourse, in their opinion, goes beyond 
limitations of time and space. They also claim that “the bulk of the subject matter of 
African metaphysics falls under the category that is traditionally described in Western 
metaphysics as “supernatural” ’’ (1998; 137). However, they argue that although African 
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metaphysics is concerned with what is understood as the supernatural, dualisms like 
matter and spirit or natural and unnatural do not feature in African thinking.  
 
To render their point clear they discuss causality in African thinking. They state that 
causality’s basic concern is with what they term primary causes. These primary causes 
are not found in the physical realm but can be manifested in the physical realm
22
. The 
point is that the spiritual world manifests itself in the physical and it is the primary cause, 
probably, of all significant events that happen therein. Even if an event can be explained 
in terms of physical causation, the actual cause, which is the primary cause, lies in the 
spiritual world. Further Teffo and Roux argue that metaphysics, in its theoretical 
formulation, is essentially expressed in social terms and practical ways of living as 
espoused by the communitarian ethic and politics. “The account of causality points at 
another picture of African metaphysical thinking: it is social in nature. In fact, as will 
become clear in the discussion, it is difficult to distinguish metaphysics, social theory, 
and morality in African thinking because all philosophizing is communitarian in nature” 
(Teffo and Roux: 1998; 139). The crucial mark of African philosophy, from the 
foregoing, is that all branches are anchored in communitarian thinking. Whatever its 
concerns may be, they have to find ultimate expression and articulation in communitarian 
thinking which is both a moral and political representation of the African people.  
 
This view is supported by Godwin Sogolo who, in his analysis of conceptual issues in 
African thought, argues that the view of a person is influenced by communal 
considerations. This view, according to Sogolo, is distinctly African. ““The African 
conception”---as distinct from the “universal concept of” exemplified by the Aristotelian 
use---refers to a set of beliefs or picture of man in the form of empirical generalizations. 
This is the sense in which we speak of a people’s conception of man and such 
conceptions are as varied as there are human communities” (1993; 190). 
 
                                                 
22
 In African thinking the spiritual realm, particularly the world of ancestors, is always in communication 
and interaction with the physical. Most things that go wrong on the physical plane find an explanation and 
solution in the spiritual realm. This point is made clear by Mogobe Ramose’s discussion of mental illness 
(2002; 78-79). 
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Thus Sogolo is of the view that the conception of personhood will differ from one 
community to another and the one that Africans hold is different from an Aristotelian, 
universalised, concept. However, he argues that whatever that concept is, it must be close 
to the reality of the generalized view of what constitutes human nature. But in the African 
scheme of things he insists that this view of personhood must still be couched in the 
communitarian view. “Once the conception of man is understood, not in the sense of 
some universal characteristics (essences) which all men possess but as a way in which 
man is perceived by a given community, then our main emphasis will be on man’s 
psychology, his relation to the other living beings and his role among other men” (ibid). 
 
Sogolo does appear to acknowledge a non-derivative place for the individual but the 
ultimate expression of that individuality is seen from the perspective of the roles that an 
individual plays in her society and her relations to others. Sogolo holds that “[T]he 
conception of man in relation to role-playing in society is mainly about what man is as an 
individual. How is the African conceived as an individual and what is his place in the 
community” (1993; 191). The conception of the individual, then, is essentially a matter of 
the roles she plays in her society and what place she occupies in her community.  
 
Rosalind Shaw (2000) also lends credence to this line of argument with her view that the 
conception of person is influenced by the general social atmosphere that happens to exist 
at that particular time. In her discussion of the Temne people of Sierra Leonne, Shaw 
says that they have developed the notion of “tok af, lef af
23
” This notion of secrecy and 
refusal to divulge everything about oneself, Shaw claims, is essentially characteristic of 
people who are oppressed by authorities and have no recourse to any means to gain their 
freedom. She states that in order not to be entirely vulnerable the oppressed people begin 
to hide many things about themselves from others. This is born not out of a natural or 
psychological suspicion of fellow human beings, she says, but arises out of the ever 
shifting alliances that were present in the history of Sierra Leonne’s violent past. This 
violent history, according to Shaw, is traced to a 400 year slave trade and British 
colonialism. Thus the Temne, ever suspicious, place a high value on secrecy, in their 
                                                 
23
 This is a Kreole proverb which means take half, leave half which was also the title of her essay. 
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conception of personhood, even though they realize that they are communal beings. “As 
well as being a means of defence against others, secrecy is integral to the construction of 
selfhood and personhood” (Shaw: 2000; 40). Shaw’s point, just like Teffo and Roux as 
well as Sogolo, is that empirical generalisations that are lived out in real communities are 
definitive of personhood. My aim in this chapter is to offer a critique to the justifiability 
of these empirical generalisations. 
 
4.2 A Critique of Tempels’ Force Thesis 
Tempels, as discussed in the second chapter, is convinced that there is an ontological 
difference between the Bantu and Westerners. He granted the Bantu the ability to think 
and argues that they had systems that were logically coherent if closely examined. 
However, he held that the Bantu were not able to give a systematic exposition of their 
beliefs and needed help in systematically explaining their beliefs. He thought it to be the 
duty of Westerners to give that systematic exposition arguing: “It is our task to trace out 
the elements of this thought, classify them and to systematise them according to the 
ordered systems and intellectual disciplines of the Western world” (Tempels: 1959; 15-
16). 
 
Tempels set out to render what the Bantu ontological system was. He argues that force, 
within the Bantu scheme of thought, is vital. Force is essentially being. When the Bantu 
speak of force, they are speaking of being. Force is the all enduring and all defining 
aspect of Bantu life. In his own words he says; “I believe that we should most faithfully 
render the Bantu thought in European language by saying that Bantu speak, act, live as if, 
for them, beings were forces. Force is not for them an adventitious, accidental reality. 
Force is even more than a necessary attribute of beings: Force is the nature of being, 
force is being, being is force
24
” (Tempels: 1959; 35). 
 
In his view increase and decrease of force affects one’s life positively or negatively 
respectively. Not all people retain the same kind and amount of force. Those who 
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 Emphasis his. 
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command little force are not real people whereas those with plenitude of force are seen as 
real persons who enjoy the respect of others. 
 
Despite all his good intentions and attempts to render as perspicuous as possible Bantu 
ontology and the idea of force that he alleges to be so central in Bantu philosophy, 
Tempels’ account of force is confusing at the very least and misleading at most. Tempels 
claims that for the Bantu being is force and force is being. On his account this can be 
taken to mean that these two concepts are inseparable. They are one and the same thing, 
force means being and any talk of being is necessarily talk of force. But, at the very least, 
in many African languages it is possible to talk exclusively about each of these concepts 
and it is even quite possible that they are not related at all.  
 
Didier Kaphagawani finds Tempels’ position objectionable and problematic because it 
confines the Bantu understanding and usage of the concept of force by correlating it to 
being. “But this position raises quick questions. First, if being is defined in terms of 
force-that is, if the Bantu think of the ordinary idea of force (as capacity for action) as 
substance-then we need an explanation of how the Bantu think and talk of action, of 
performance” (Kaphagawani: 2000; 69-70).  
 
I concur with Kaphagawani’s interpretation of the meaning of force and how it is used in 
African understanding. When people talk about force they are simply referring to 
something that has a capacity to bring about a certain change or a different state of affairs 
or that actually brings about such a change. Force is not essentially mysterious or an all 
determining concept that determines life and all living within the African scheme. 
Tempels’ notions of ‘vital force’ and ‘increase of force’, which are crucial to his account 
of Bantu ontology, read too much into the actual usage of the term. Indeed Temples 
needs to show how the Bantu talk differently about simple performance of mundane 
activities.  
 
Kaphagawani takes this issue further when he notes that African people talk about other 
people as having or lacking potential to execute various duties. These people are taken to 
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lack the necessary physical force to do something, which is normally a physical task. 
When people talk, they make reference to many things such as animals, timber and 
medicines as either weak or strong. In most cases, Kaphagawani says, this reference is 
about someone or something producing effect or resisting external forces that are being 
applied on the object or the person. 
 
Force is seen  
 
…as capacity of an agent rather than as substance itself. Tempels’s thesis 
thus portrays the Bantu as extraordinary in their conceptual and linguistic 
representations of reality, and his thesis indicates that their concepts lie 
outside the normal and common sense, as defined by their corresponding 
Western examples. Using an old but controversial theory about the 
relationship between thought and language, Tempels aimed to show that 
Bantu thought in perverse ways, as, in his view, was evidenced by the 
perversity of their language (ibid).  
  
This observation is true as Tempels makes an explicit acknowledgement at the beginning 
of his work that there is a difference between the Bantu ontology and Western ontology. 
He urges his readership, Belgian missionaries, colonial administrators and other Belgians 
interested in Bantu ontology, not to approach Bantu ontology as they would approach 
Western ontology. Kaphagawani accuses Tempels of harbouring an aim that intended to 
show that African thinking was radically different from Western thinking. For 
Kaphagawani this was not just a mere intention at that level of demonstrating the 
differences but Tempels’s agenda was intended at showing the inferiority of Bantu 
thinking.  
 
It is difficult to defend Tempels on this charge because he does not help matters himself 
when he states, in a footnote that explains being and force, that:  
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It can rightly be said that the Bantu regard being as exclusively or 
essentially a “principle of activity”. This term is borrowed from our
25
 
scientific and therefore more philosophical terminology. One must on that 
account be careful not to understand it in relation to our static concepts of 
being, but in accordance with Bantu thought wherein this same principle is 
regarded as realising itself more or less in itself (Tempels: 1959; 35). 
 
It is quite clear that Tempels in his own words insists on the existence of the difference of 
the conceptual formulation of being between the Westerners and the Bantu. Being for the 
Bantu is about activity. It is not immediately clear what this activity is precisely supposed 
to be and what constitutes it. Tempels may respond that the activity he is referring to is to 
be found in communal relations where good communal relations result in the positive 
outcome of increase of force for the individual and the community at large. But the 
problem is that he has not established the scheme has to be seen in terms of force. He 
merely asserts that is the case. There are no philosophical grounds for Tempels to afford 
force such a special status in the Bantu ontology. 
 
Secondly, Kaphagawani accuses Tempels of distorting an African language through his 
deployment of metaphysical references to simple statements. By using the force thesis to 
represent African ontology, Tempels gives force a special function in the language which 
is beyond ordinary use of the word. Evidence of this distortion, to my mind, is found 
where Tempels lends a metaphysical construal of force to simple statements that refer to 
a man’s importance in society (1959; 67). He argues that the force thesis is an ontological 
explanation for the use of such terms as ‘muntu mutupu’ to refer to a man of middling 
importance who is devoid of any real importance, ‘muntu mukulumpe’ to refer to a 
person of real importance who has a role to play in his society and ‘ke muntu po’ to refer 
to a person who behaves unworthily, or a person who is not regarded as a person 
 
For Kaphagawani this is unacceptable as it makes the Bantu language quite peculiar and 
unusual in its general usage which defies any simplicity. “Cannot the Bantu talk like 
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ordinary, everyday people who pass information between themselves in matters that use 
simple ways of setting aside the skepticism and surprise of their listeners?” (2000; 70).  
 
The above point is linked to Tempels’s commitment to finding a difference between the 
Bantu and Westerners both in their conceptual formulation as well as their language 
usage. It is not clear what could have motivated Tempels to find that difference but it 
appears as if the desire to establish that difference led him to some bizarre conclusions 
about the nature of force and its proper position in the African conceptual framework.  
 
Tempels’s use of force as the primary ontological determinant of personhood is not 
without controversy and for the reasons stated above it is hard to accept his position. 
Firstly it appears to distort the African scheme of things and secondly his thesis runs into 
difficulties as to exactly what this force is supposed to be and what function it plays in 
the African conception of personhood. 
 
4.3 A Critique of Mbiti 
Kaphagawani argues that the idea that there is a difference between African and Western 
modes of thought as expressed by Tempels is rooted in the thinking of what he calls 
“leading African ideologues” such as Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, and Kaunda. “To 
these leaders, African communalism presented a desirable alternative to the Western 
framework of individualism, which, in their view, was the underlying premise of 
exploitative and conflictual Western capitalism. Communalism was thus not only a 
metaphysical principle of social existence but also a sort of critique of the social order, 
one derived from the European enlightenment” (Kaphagawani: 2000; 73). 
 
This desire to find a difference informed all of communitarian thinking and activity. The 
metaphysical conception of person was not only restricted to abstract philosophical 
considerations but was immediately linked and related to practical communal ways of 
living. This provides the justification and popularisation of the political program. 
Kaphagawani argues that all communitarian scholars chose to emphasise the differences 
that existed between the African and Western conceptions of the self not as a matter of 
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mere difference but as a fulfilment of an explicit political goal. “The concepts of the self 
adopted by these scholars are chosen strictly with this goal in mind: they are not 
concerned with what concept best captures the manifold experiences of the self but with 
what concept best allows them to both promote difference and derive ontological values 
of the vital forces as well as communalism26” (Kaphagawani: 2000; 74). 
 
Kaphagawani is convinced that Mbiti was an enthusiastic disciple of Tempels who was 
eager to show that African modes of thought were different from their Western 
counterparts. “Mbiti’s defence of communalism thus traces its roots deep into both 
cultural and intellectual histories of the preceding times. Since the time of his own 
writing, several others have toed this line in search of an African difference and 
uniqueness” (ibid; 73). 
 
So the charge here is that all African communitarianism, including that of Mbiti, is rooted 
in the desire to find a difference. It is fair to read Kaphagawani’s criticism as implying 
that the need to find and adumbrate this difference was deeply political rather than simply 
metaphysical. The agenda for Tempels was to show Africans as different but cast in a 
lowly light, whereas for the early independent African leaders it was meant to be an 
alternative to Western evils and the inhumanity of colonialism and capitalism.  
 
On the philosophical level, Kaphagawani is skeptical of the way in which Mbiti 
explicates his position. Kaphagawani thinks Mbiti is fallaciously collecting support for 
the all enduring importance of the community in African thinking. Kaphagawani argues 
that “it should be conceded that in putting this thesis in a form reminiscent of the 
Cartesian cogito argument, namely that in Africa we are therefore I am, Mbiti aims at 
underscoring the extent to which communal life is esteemed in Africa” (Kaphagawani: 
1999; 173). 
 
                                                 
26
 Kaphagawani argues that Tempels saw the African “I” as ineffable because of its lack of concrete 
location either in mental or physical which made it pathological. The communitarians on the other hand 
argue that the “I” is not strictly fixed but appears and disappears in different linguistic and ontological 
function of different participants. But its great aim is at the promotion of the general common good as 
opposed to a fixed defining quality. 
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The important point being made here is that Mbiti’s thesis takes the Cartesian form in 
affirming a different requirement to not only emphasise the importance of the community 
but also to insist on the difference between the Western mode of thought and the African 
mode. The formula suggests a philosophical flaw in the Western mode. The formula also 
puts the African mode of thought on par with the Western mode through a similar 
expression. The contrasting requirement of personhood is expressed by insisting on the 
communal aspect as the all embracing notion that is definitive of what constitutes a 
person. The community is constitutive of each and every member and each individual’s 
existence is affected by the fate of the rest. 
 
This comparison with the cogito highlights an important issue. Mbiti’s position appears 
to be merely stated and not argued for. It is not self-evident that the conclusion that Mbiti 
reaches above follows from his premises. He merely states that the community is of 
crucial importance in the conceptualization of persons. He does not show how it is 
conceptually necessary that different individuals are collapsed into a collective of identity 
through claiming that whatever happens to one individual happens to the rest of the 
community. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, whose language is my first language 
and whose culture is my cultural outlook, they have a proverb that says “Nhamo 
yemumwe hairambirwi sadza”. This proverb literally means that when someone is faced 
with some problem there is no reason for other people to refuse eating their meals. This 
shows that there is a difference between individual and communal concerns. If an 
individual is faced with problems of her own, her fellows might not share in her fate or be 
as concerned as she is. Further, it is not clear what this claim that whatever happens to 
one individual happens to the rest of the group really entails. There appear to be no 
reasons behind Mbiti’s conclusion about the primacy of the community and why it should 
be such an all determining fact of personhood and why everyone is to be taken as sharing 
in the fate of everyone else. Mbiti has not done that work to show that there is indeed that 
collective identity.  
 
Kaphagawani makes this point neatly, and it is worth quoting him at length; 
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… to assert African communalism is not in any way to imply the denial of 
recognition of individual human beings qua individuals. African 
communalism in fact takes cognizance of ontological pluralism; and to 
assert, as Mbiti does, that we are, presumes prior recognition of the 
individuality of those making up the we. For although it is mathematically 
possible to imagine a set which happens to be empty, it seems impossible 
to imagine the existence of an empty human society. And to claim, 
“whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group”, and 
vice versa, is no doubt to forget the difference between individuals on the 
one hand, and sets of individuals on the other (ibid). 
 
Thus Kaphagawani is critical of Mbiti’s assertion that the community takes precedence 
over the individual. In fact, he thinks within Mbiti’s scheme, the individual is recognised, 
presumably, by referring to the ‘we’ that makes up the group.  
 
I think Kaphagawani is quite correct in pointing out that what makes up human societies 
are sets of human individuals. The individuals still retain their individual status although 
they are participants in a human society. That participation in and membership of a 
community does not deprive the individual of her individual make-up. The individual’s 
participation in communal activities may serve to meet or fulfil some or all of her social 
needs. Whatever these social needs may be, they do not have to be all-consuming. Her 
social side, fulfilled through communal collaboration with others, can be said to be just 
one of her many sides and need not necessarily be seen as constitutive of her personhood. 
Thus Mbiti’s assertion that whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole 
group is overstated. Mbiti’s assertion can only be acceptable if it is taken to mean that 
people sympathise with each other, feel each other’s pain and generally are sensitive to 
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 Kaphagawani offers some Chewa (one of the native languages of Malawi) proverbs that recognise  the 
individual’s own fate, predicament and destiny. 
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Thus Mbiti’s communitarian position is faced with three difficulties which it is difficult 
to rescue it from. In the first as Kaphagawani has noted, Mbiti, following Tempels, 
insists, without justification, on the difference that exists between Western conceptions of 
persons and the African communitarian version. The only apparent reasons are 
(irrelevant) political ones. Secondly, the assertion that the community takes precedence 
over the individual is not accompanied by premises that lead to such a conclusion. 
Thirdly, the communitarian project as defended by Mbiti fails to take sufficient 
cognisance of the separateness of individuals. Its attempt to hold them as an inseparable 
collective does not succeed. 
 
4.4 A Critique of Menkiti  
Gyekye argues for his version of moderate communitarianism through criticising 
Menkiti’s radical insistence on the primacy of the community and the importance of 
moral worth in defining personhood. He argues that this version of communitarianism 
fails to take into account the distinct existence of each individual, her worth and talents as 
well as individual rights. 
 
 He concedes that an individual is a social being who is born into a society made up of 
people that she interacts with but this does not mean that she is stripped of all her 
individual attributes and capabilities. He says radical communitarianism fails to take the 
individual’s rights and talents seriously. Gyekye finds Menkiti to be making only one 
philosophically interesting contribution on the matter of personhood in African thinking. 
Gyekye argues that “In his analysis, Menkiti
28
 makes a least three characterisations of 
personhood. But, in my view, only one characterisation is of philosophical interest or 
relevance; it is also the one that does not seem to involve itself in a morass of confusions 
and incoherences. This characterisation adumbrates a moral conception of personhood, 
and I find it interesting” (Gyekye: 1997; 48). 
 
Gyekye rejects Menkiti’s assertion that one becomes more of a person through a process 
of socialisation where in order for one to become a member of a society she has to go 
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 Menkiti’s position is fully discussed in the second chapter. 
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through various rites of incorporation. Gyekye does not see how going through rites of 
incorporation involve morality. Although, he concedes, young people are instructed about 
their moral roles in society and told about the importance of observing these moral 
dictates in society, it is not clear to Gyekye how morality as a determinant can be made 
real at the stage of rituals and incorporation.  
 
His point is that there is a difference between morality as a lived-out determinant of 
whether one is a person or not and the mere process of going through rituals. Menkiti 
appears to have assumed that going through rituals directly results in the emergence or 
growth of moral responsibility in the individual who is being incorporated into the 
society but it is left unclear as to how this might occur. An individual’s capacity does not 
arise as a result of certain rituals being performed on her. 
 
Menkiti also claims that the attainment of personhood is of a processual nature. He says 
one becomes a full person with time and as she gets older. Gyekye finds this additional 
requirement problematic and argues that: ‘‘The notions of “full personhood” and “more 
of a person” are as bizarre as they are incoherent. How does one know exactly when a 
person becomes a “full” person, whatever this word means as applied to a person? And, 
when, and how does a person become “more of a person”?” (1997; 49). Gyekye says that 
Menkiti’s response will be that full personhood is attained when a person is old and, at 
that stage, she would have attained excellencies that are considered essential in the 
definition of a person or acquisition of personhood.  
 
Gyekye holds that if we were to assume that the attainment of these excellencies would 
represent the success of the individual in her moral life, showing that she had fully abided 
by moral virtues, tying this attainment to growing old would raise one major difficulty. 
The difficulty, according to Gyekye, lies in considering elderly people as necessarily 
moral or, at least, as having the natural outlook of practising moral virtues. “For, surely 
there are many elderly people who are known to be wicked, ungenerous, unsympathetic: 
whose lives, in short, generally do not reflect any moral maturity to excellence. In terms 
of a moral conception of personhood, such elderly people may not qualify as persons” 
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(ibid). Essentially Gyekye accuses Menkiti of holding a position that is internally 
incoherent. 
 
I think a couple of criticisms can be developed against Menkiti here. The first has to deal 
with whether African societies do actually deny some people personhood. In other words, 
are individuals who consistently show themselves to be evil and stand no chance of moral 
achievement considered to be non-persons. Secondly, if these individuals were indeed 
considered as non-persons – would their being denied the status of personhood make any 
sense? Further, Menkiti does not discuss what these excellenices are as does Paris who 
argues there are six fundamental virtues in African societies which are beneficence, 
forbearance, practical wisdom, improvisation, forgiveness and justice (Paris: 2004; 19-
62). Virtues and moral conduct are issues that are not easily agreed on. Each society has 
its own views and code of what is moral and virtuous. These views may compete or be at 
odds with the views of other societies. But, even more interesting, is the fact that even 
within the same society one finds that there is likely to be more than one opinion of what 
is morally worthy in almost every situation.  
 
There is yet another philosophical difficulty that Menkiti’s position raises. He argues that 
moral worth comes with age which leads to the attainment of personhood. This raises a 
difficulty about the status of the young. Here the consideration is not about the young 
members of society who are still babies but the young ones such as teenagers and those 
who might not have gone through rituals of incorporation. What is their status, 
ontologically? I think Menkiti needs to carefully and clearly spell out what each criterion 
counts as in the attainment of personhood. Menkiti may respond by asserting either that 
they are not persons, or, they are not persons as yet. 
 
 The response that seeks to give the young personhood at a later stage is problematic in 
that it unjustifiably conflates issues that bear little relation to each other. Collapsing an 
ontological question into one that deals with moral achievement, ageing and rituals 
appears bizarre at the very least. There is no ontological difference between the young 
adults who have not performed all the rituals and young adults who have not. Menkiti 
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would want to hold that the adults who have fulfilled all ritual requirements have become 
more of persons than those who have not. I think this is an arbitrary distinction which 
should not be used on such weighty issues as determining personhood. The real 
challenge, for Menkiti, lies in his claim that personhood is something that is gradually 
attained. The problem lies in that he does not clearly spell out what that ‘gradual 
attainment’ really involves in its entirety. The two points that he relies on, moral 
achievement and carrying out all rites of incorporation, are problematic as I have 
attempted to outline above. Since these two points are not without controversy there is 
still need for Menkiti to outline what precisely is involved in the process of gradually 
attaining personhood. Further there is no reason to believe that attaining adulthood is to 
be equated with the attainment of personhood. The point is even supported by 
Kaphagawani who argues that although in communalist societies the elderly are given an 
esteemed position in terms of epistemology, this must not mean that the youth are not 
regarded as persons. 
 
Rather, like in every orderly distribution of roles in a system of 
production, this privilege is given to individuals who show and sustain the 
ability to perform the roles apportioned to them by the social system. No 
one is held a priori to be an expert in any domain of knowledge merely on 
the ground of his age. Everyone must prove his worth by the measure of 
an established norm. And furthermore, the Chewa believe that old 
knowledge quickly loses its worth and validity
29
 unless it is constantly 
renewed and rejuvenated (Kaphagawani: 2000; 75).   
 
Thus Kaphagawani’s point is that the elders occupy an epistemological position that 
appears to be privileged over the young because this is a mere distribution of roles. There 
is nothing inherent in being old that qualifies an individual to possess certain knowledge. 
She possesses that knowledge because she is playing a certain role in society and she is 
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 Kaphagawani offers two proverbs which contrast each other. The first one says: Mau wa akuluakulu 
akagonera which means that the elders’s words are sweet after a year. The second one says: Tsobola 
wakale sawawa which means that old pepper is never hot forever (Kaphagawani: 2000; 75). This means 
that what used to be of importance in previous dispensations does not necessarily continue to be so. 
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expected to have certain attributes besides her age to play that role. The same also holds 
as regards moral excellencies, whatever they may conceived to be. They represent a kind 
of role playing that the elders must occupy in society. One may think of them as keepers 
of morality who will pass it on to the younger generation but that should not make them 
ontologically superior by virtue of age. While it may be true that personhood is 
something that may be attained gradually; Menkiti’s account has failed to clearly 
articulate what constitutes that gradual attainment. His reliance on moral achievement 
and rites of incorporation is not without problems.  
 
Menkiti’s account of personhood is unclear and perhaps even incoherent. He fails to 
outline what gradual attainment of personhood could be and he conflates issues of 
ontology with other matters that do not obviously bear on matters of identity.  
 
4.5 A Critique of Gyekye 
As we saw in chapter one, Gyekye argues for his moderate communitarianism through 
criticising what he calls radical communitarianism with particular reference to Menkiti. 
Building on what he sees as a failed account of personhood by Menkiti, Gyekye argues 
that there is a distinction between human beings as individuals and persons. He holds that 
an individual human being can fail at being a person. According to Gyekye although one 
may not be granted the status of personhood she still remains a human being because we 
do not call her a tree or a beast. Gyekye holds that “There is no implication, however, that 
an individual considered “not a person” loses her right as a human being or that she loses 
her citizenship or that she ceases to be an object of moral concern from the point of view 
of other people’s treatment of her. Only that she is not a morally worthy individual” 
(1997; 50). 
 
To make his point more lucid, on the distinction between an individual and person, he 
argues that a person who removes herself from her community and lives a life that is 
detached from her community, is taken to be an irresponsible moral agent (ibid). This 
moral agent, in Gyekye’s terminology, would have failed at personhood altogether but 
still remains an individual who is a human being. Gyekye, while holding that children are 
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human beings and members of the community, just like Menkiti, argues that they are only 
persons potentially until they can exercise their moral capacity. It is perhaps more 
illuminating to quote Gyekye at length to ascertain his precise position on the nature of 
personhood. He argues:  
 
Now, the moral significance of denying personhood to a human being on 
the grounds that his actions are known to be dissonant with certain 
fundamental norms or that he fails to exhibit certain virtues in his 
behaviour is extremely interesting for communitarians. Personhood, in this 
model of humanity, is not innate but is earned in the ethical arena: it is an 
individual’s moral achievement that earns him the status of a person. 
Every individual is capable of becoming a person inasmuch as he is 
capable of doing good and should therefore be treated (potentially) as a 
morally responsible agent” (Gyekye: 1997; 51-52). 
 
Gyekye’s position is not really different from Menkiti’s position. His claim that he is 
advocating a distinct version of communitarianism is not successful. For a start, Gyekye 
purports to establish a difference between an individual and a person. This difference is 
supposed to explain what happens to persons who fail in the moral arena thus, 
supposedly, rendering Gyekye’s view preferable to that of Menkiti. Although Menkiti 
does not say what happens to those who fail at morality and consequently personhood, 
there is nothing in his account of persons that prevents him from also saying that there are 
individuals and persons. He can maintain the same distinction as Gyekye has made. On 
that score Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism does not have a superior appeal to what 
he has called radical communitarianism. 
 
Secondly, as seen in the quote above, Gyekye explicitly commits his definition of persons 
to moral achievement in the same way that Menkiti does. Menkiti claims that personhood 
is not a static quality that is acquired at birth but is acquired as one gets older and 
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becomes morally responsible. Gyekye concedes that in the communitarian
30
 conception 
personhood is not innate but acquired in the moral arena. This puts him on par with 
Menkiti as both are claiming the criticality of moral achievement in the determination of 
personhood. Gyekye’s claim that those who do not meet the moral requirement are not 
persons but still remain humans is not useful at all because the central question is dealing 
with the definition of persons and not humans. It is in ascribing that status of personhood 
that he aligns himself with Menkiti on the importance of moral worth. In his own words 
he opines:  
 
Thus a moral conception of personhood is held in African thought; 
personhood is defined in terms of moral achievement. Personhood 
conceived in terms of moral achievement will be most relevant to the 
communitarian framework that holds the ethic of responsibility in high 
esteem: the ethic that stresses sensitivity to the interests and well-being of 
other members of the community, though not necessarily to the detriment 
of individual rights… (Gyekye: 1997; 52)  
 
Gyekye is also of the opinion that his version of communitarianism will be sensitive to 
the talents and differences of individuals. Although he pays homage to moral worth in the 
determination of personhood, he believes that there is a room for the recognition of 
individual rights within his moderate version of communitarianism. Gyekye disagrees 
with Menkiti when he states that the community cannot be the sole determinant of 
personhood. He is of the view that if personhood is determined solely by relations to the 
community, individual rights will not be recognised within that community. He adds that 
his difference with Menkiti on this point is philosophical and not hermeneutical. 
Gyekye’s view on humans is that although they are social by nature they are other things 
as well. He says; “I have in mind such essential attributes of the person as rationality, 
having a moral sense and capacity for virtue and, hence, for evaluating and making moral 
judgements: all this means that the individual is capable of choice. If we do not choose to 
                                                 
30
 He is not explicit on what type of communitarianism is he referring to. I take it that the communitarian 
model he is talking of also includes his own version of moderate communitarianism.  
 146 
be social-because we are social by nature-neither do we choose to be intelligent or 
rational beings with a moral sense (or, capacity for virtue)” (1997; 53). Further he holds 
that an individual’s mental features are not a creation of the community although the 
community discovers and nurtures them. The community then, in Gyekye’s view, only 
plays a partial role in the formation of the individual as well as providing the forum for 
the individual to realise all her goals and dreams. To show that the community is only 
partially constitutive in the formation of the individual, Gyekye argues that the 
community cannot set unchangeable values for the individual because people can and do 
change their values. He also thinks that the capacity for self assertion shows that an 
individual has her own rational will and can follow her own goals and dreams. He argues 
that this is not the case with radical communitarianism. 
 
Extreme or unrestricted communitarianism fails to give adequate 
recognition to the creativity, inventiveness, imagination, and idealistic 
proclivities of some human individuals in matters relating to the 
production of ideas and the experience of visions. The powers of 
inventiveness, imagination, and so on are not entirely a function of the 
communal structure; they are instead a function of natural talents or 
endowments, even though they can only be nurtured and exercised in a 
cultural community (Gyekye: 1997; 59). 
 
I do not think that Gyekye’s argument succeeds. He merely assumes that what he terms 
unrestricted communitarianism will stifle individual talent and originality. He does not 
show what precise element in the radical communitarian scheme would be responsible for 
that. He also does not show what particular element in his moderate version will be 
responsible for promoting individual creativity and talent. He just states that this is going 
to be the case. It is difficult to see how his version of communitarianism would promote 
individual talent when he holds that personhood, in all communitarian thinking, is 
attained when one has shown herself to be a person of certain moral standing. If that is 
the key requirement then everything else must be harnessed in pursuit of the attainment 
of that requirement. A person who is talented in whatever way does not constitute a threat 
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to her communitarian community as long as she abides by moral dictates. The community 
has no reason to feel threatened by her unless her genius is directed at causing some 
disturbance in one way or the other. Gyekye is unwarrantedly suspicious of radical 
communitarianism and imputes to it structures of oppression which it otherwise does not 
inherently have. He does not show how his version would also avoid the same structures 
if they indeed were extant in the radical school.  
 
It is not entirely clear what Gyekye means when he says radical communitarianism fails 
to give ‘adequate recognition’ to the individual’s creativity and imagination. It is not 
clear what kind of recognition he has in mind and how the community is supposed to 
show its members that it is not giving them recognition for their creativity and 
imagination. The individual who has such creative powers which can be used to further 
the interests of the community is always recognised as outstanding and the community 
will turn to that individual whenever there is need for her inventiveness. Oruka in an 
interview with Akoko points out that the communalist set-up is one of co-operation as 
opposed to sharing property or wealth. Those who have more of any form of material 
goods would avail them for use by the poor. Oruka notes that people are born with 
different abilities; some people are more powerful than others and are able to work hard, 
produce more and acquire lots of possessions. But he holds that this ability must be used 
for the benefit of other members of the society when he argues: “However, it is my 
opinion that because a person is born with superior powers, [there] is all the more reason 
why that person ought to place his extra or superior powers at the service of his less well-
off neighbour. Given his superior powers, he can produce more food to feed others so 
that all may live together in happiness” (Akoko: 1995; 39). 
 
From the above it is clear that within any communitarian setting, those who have superior 
gifts ranging from the ability to produce food to any superior power any individual can 
possess are welcome to make their contribution in society. The only thing that Gyekye is 
correct about is that although all talents are individual endowments, they find their 
expression and fulfilment in a cultural community. There is no reason for him to hold that 
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his own version of communitarianism is better equipped to recognise individual 
inventiveness. 
 
Gyekye believes that his moderate version is equipped to recognise individual rights. 
Gyekye notes that as rights primarily belong to the individual and since radical 
communitarianism has no regard for the individual it cannot have regard for rights. On 
the other hand he argues that there are several reasons to support the idea that there will 
be a regard for rights within moderate communitarianism. Firstly, he argues, rights will 
be discussed in the community forums because they represent self assertion and 
autonomy. Secondly, he thinks that in that communal setting the question of rights cannot 
be reduced to nought because the people in those communities would have reflected on 
the nature of persons or would have derived respect for humans from some theistic 
doctrine. Thirdly, he holds that it is impossible for communitarian societies to ignore 
rights both conceptually and practically. He holds that although rights belong to the 
individual their exercise benefits the wider community. The community benefits through 
each member’s exercise of her unique talents and abilities which contribute to the cultural 
enhancement and general success of the community (Gyekye: 1997; 62-64). 
 
Having held this position, which appears fair enough, Gyekye then offers a startling 
rendition of how his moderate communitarian society really views rights when he says:  
 
With all this said, however, it must be granted that moderate 
communitarianism cannot be expected to be obsessed with rights. The 
reason, which is not far to seek, derives from the logic of the 
communitarian theory itself: it assumes a great concern for values, for the 
good of the wider society as such. The communitarian society, perhaps 
like any other type of human society, deeply cherishes the social values of 
peace, harmony, stability, solidarity, and mutual reciprocities and 
sympathies (1997; 65). 
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This is a contradiction within his account. He wants to affirm the importance of rights 
and the fact that moderate communitarianism is equipped with the necessary structure to 
recognise them. But at the same time he, in a very puzzling manner, tells us that the very 
same moderate communitarian society cannot allow itself to be obsessed with rights. I 
think it is fair to inquire as to what Gyekye’s moderate version will be obsessed with. 
Gyekye says it will prize harmony, peace, stability and solidarity. If that is the case I 
suggest that there is no difference between the radical communitarian and Gyekye. They 
are both not obsessed with rights and they value harmony, peace, stability and solidarity. 
Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is on that score the same as radical 
communitarianism. He merely claims that his version will recognise individual rights. 
The radical communitarian can also make the same claim as Gyekye.   
 
But Gyekye does not end there, he proceeds to either reveal the true radical 
communitarian in him, or more spectacularly to reveal the similarity of his theory with 
Menkiti’s own when he says:  
 
Individual rights, the exercise of which is meaningful only within the 
context of human society, must therefore be matched with social 
responsibilities. In the absence of the display of sensitivity to such 
responsibilities, the community will have to take the steps necessary to 
maintain its integrity and stability. The steps are likely to involve 
abridging individual rights, which, thus, will be regarded by the moderate 
communitarian as not absolute, though important (Gyekye: 1997; 65). 
 
Gyekye then goes to argue that the exercise of rights must be within an appropriate social 
context and that it is legitimate that concern be raised about that social context. It is not 
clear what those conditions would be. However, what is clear is that these two positions 
approach each other when contrasted with the view that the notion of a right is something 
inalienable or not abridgeable. Gyekye is on par with Menkiti here because he has also 
effectively given rights a secondary importance as Menkiti does. It must be remembered 
that Menkiti does not completely reject the importance of rights. He merely sates that 
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whatever the importance of human rights could be, it is secondary to the importance of 
the community. In all important respects the views match each other. 
 
When the interests of the community and that of the individual are at stake, it is clear on 
this account that the individual will emerge as the loser. Her rights will be abridged to 
preserve the interests of the community. On this account Gyekye is guilty of advocating 
for a society that has no respect for rights, a society that has no respect for the 
inventiveness of individuals (which he claims to respect) and a society that is 
conservative.  
 
Gyekye does not also tell us which rights can be abridged and which rights are 
incorrigible. He refrains from categorising or mentioning what rights individuals have 
and when those rights can be violated. Rights can be categorised in order of importance 
with some rights taking precedence over others. But it is one thing to say that rights need 
to be balanced with each other. But if they are all subject to being waived-then in what 
sense are these rights at all? It appears as if Gyekye does not take the notion of rights 
seriously. 
 
4.6 Inevitability of the Communitarian view 
As we saw in chapter two, there is another school of thought that conceives the person in 
African thinking from a metaphysical point of view. However, the communitarian view 
appears to be dominant and this dominance, as Kaphagawani has argued above, was 
promoted by politicians who had their own purposes and goals for promoting it. The 
scholars who support this strand, according to Kaphagawani are also driven by the need 
to show that Africans are different. 
 
It appears as if the communitarian account of the self is motivated by the twin desires of 
emphasising African difference as well as finding justification for communalist or 
socialist political systems. Appiah provides insight into the nature of the theory of person 
that people hold when he says: “Naturally, a theory of the person is hard to isolate from 
the general views of a people about the world - social, natural, and supernatural - in 
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which they live” (2004; 26). This is markedly the case with the communitarian account of 
personhood. It is heavily influenced by the importance that is given to the community and 
relationality that it accords to African thinking. The philosophical problems that arise are 
clear in Gyekye’s account. While claiming that there is indeed a place for rights in his 
theory he immediately turns around and is prepared to allow those rights to be waived in 
favour of the community.  
 
Another striking example is Gbadegesin. In his account of a theory of destiny, he is at 
pains to communalise such a personal and individual reality. He argues that an 
individual’s destiny is connected to the destiny of other people starting with his 
immediate family and extending to the whole community. Although destiny and the life 
of an individual may be separated from the community, it will not make sense and cannot 
be fully grasped outside the community. This is because destiny joins the individual to 
the rest of the community and the community provides its members with meaning. But he 
is alert to the self-serving interpretation of this concept that is deployed by politicians 
when he says: “This insight about the interconnectedness of destinies may be a reflection 
of the traditional mode of living among the Yoruba and may provide an intellectual 
rationale for the political appeal to the notion of common destiny when it suits political 
leaders” (Gbadegesin: 2004; 60). 
 
Thus it is clear that there is a common orientation in conceptual formulations is oriented 
towards the communitarian doctrine as Teffo and Roux suggested at the beginning of this 
chapter. While this may be the case, it does not mean that there are no faults inherent in 
this thinking both at the philosophical and practical level. On the philosophical level there 
are the difficulties I have discussed above and on the practical level the concept is open to 
abuse as Gbadegesin notes.  
 
Sometimes the claim of the inescapability of communal considerations arises even when 
a metaphysical conception of the person is being attempted. This is evident in the work of 
Adeofe whose conception of the person is primarily metaphysical through his 
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identification of persons as having a body, mind/soul and something he calls an inner 
head. However he tries to balance the social aspect and the metaphysical when he says:  
 
Any credible theory of personal identity must be metaphysically and 
socially stable, and the two forms of stability must be interconnected. By 
“stability,” I simply mean the ability to deliver consistent judgements. 
Metaphysical stability helps to explain the unity of the self, so to speak, 
that makes personal identity possible. Social stability helps to explain our 
socialised existence-our belief systems, social character, and projects of 
value that seem to make our lives meaningful. A theory of personal 
identity is likely to be stable in some form or another, but the challenge is 
to be stable in both forms in the same context at the same time with 
respect to the same determinations (Adeofe: 2004; 80-81). 
 
Ramose makes the same point when he describes the relationship between person as 
metaphysically construed and as socially construed. He argues that there is a difference 
between what he calls a holonistic and individualistic conception of the person. The 
individualistic conception of personhood accords primary importance to the individual in 
the conception of persons whilst giving partial recognition to the community. On the 
other hand the holonistic conception understands personhood in terms of wholeness. This 
wholeness refers to the individual’s community and the kind of influence that it 
ultimately has on her. He sees both the individual and her community as intricately 
interwoven when he says: “This means that there is a mutual foundedness between the 
greater environing wholeness in the sense of both the encompassing physical and the 
metaphysical universe together with the human universe in the sense of community, are 
the ontological as well as the epistemological foundation of human individuality” 
(Ramose: 2002; 65). I am of the view that mixing ontological issues with epistemological 




Further Ramose argues that human individuality on its own is not a sufficient condition 
for personhood. “In order to be a person the human individual must, according to 
traditional African thought, go through various community prescribed stages, and be part 
of certain ceremonies and rituals” (ibid). Whatever these stages and rituals are, they are 
the ones that perform the task of transforming one from an individual to a person. Once 
again the same objections raised against Menkiti, above, apply to Ramose’s account. 
 
Achebe grants individuality to the person but curtails it when he considers the importance 
of the community. He says the idea of individuality can be traced to Christian thinking 
which sees every individual as a creation of God thus making each individual worthy. 
The Igbo, he says, claim that each individual is not only a unique creation but also that 
every individual was created by a unique creator. But interestingly he opines that: “All 
this might lead one to think that among the Igbo, the individual would be supreme, totally 
free, and existentially alone. But the Igbo are unlikely to concede to the individual an 
absolution they deny even to the chi.31 The obvious curtailment of a man’s power to walk 
alone and do as he will is provided by another potent force-the will of his community” 
(1998; 70). The individual is not an entity that is so fiercely independent that she can do 
whatever she wants. In her constitution and whatever she does her community will be 
beside her or always present in whatever she does or becomes. Here Achebe confuses 
issues of autonomy with identity and this confusion emerges because he is obsessed with 
defending the view that the community is constitutive of the individual. 
 
Okot p’Bitek also perpetuates the problem. He opines that the human individual is tied by 
chains and these chains are things that an individual owes her society. He believes that 
even in death the individual is tied to her community when he argues: “Man is not born 
free. He cannot be free. He is incapable of being free. For only by being in chains can he 
be and remain “human.” What constitutes these chains? Man has a bundle of rights and 
privileges that society owes him. In African belief, even death does not free him. If he 
had been an important member of society while he lived, his ghost continues to be 
                                                 
31
 Achebe says there are two translations to the word. One translation can mean god, guardian angel, 
personal spirit, soul or spirit double. The second translation can mean day or daylight. 
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revered and fed: and he is in turn expected to guide and protect the living” (p’Bitek: 
1998; 73). Thus not only is the individual constituted by her community and committed 
to it; she is also not free from it. She is shackled by it and it appears as if on p’Bitek’s 
account these rights are not only for the benefit of the individual but for the benefit of the 
community.  
 
From the foregoing the effect of the community is all pervasive in African 
philosophising. Its effects are far-reaching and are taken to be responsible for explaining 
the physical world as well as the conceptual formulation of persons and how they are to 
behave in the physical world. However, this emphasis on the community raises a number 
of serious concerns which I seek to discuss in the section immediately below. 
 
4.7 A Challenge to the Communitarian Inevitability 
The all-encompassing acceptance of the importance and priority as well as determining 
powers of the community in questions that seek to address the nature of personhood has 
difficulties of its own. Kaphagawani, as we saw above, rightly points out that in some 
cases, particularly with Tempels and Mbiti, the motivation to stress the importance of the 
community up to a point of exaggeration is driven by the desire to emphasise the 
differences between Africans and Westerners. If communitarianism is only interested in 
articulating the African difference it may expose itself to the same problems as 
ethnophilosophy-as we saw in chapter one. Communitarianism may become another 
version of ethnophilosophy if it restricts itself to merely articulating what African people 
believe or what the African reality, however conceived, is.   
 
The biggest problem as was hinted above is that considerations about the concept of 
person in African thinking have one enduring philosophical weakness. The problem is 
that there is a conflation of conceptual and theoretical concerns with empirical activities 
that happen within African communities. This reduction of everything into communalism 
is taken to be definitive of traditional African societies and thinking, but this is a 
suspicious position. As Appiah notes “[M]any African societies have as much in common 
with traditional societies that are not African as they do with each other” (1998; 115). It 
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is hardly contentious to claim that traditional societies are likely to retain certain features 
that are in accord with their times and ways of living. One of the inevitable results of 
traditional social set-ups is that they are closely knit, mostly rural, communities whose 
survival and flourishing depends on close co-operation. In traditional set-ups the social 
structures and practices of people are realistic strategies of survival rather than reflections 
of a metaphysics. Thus the claim that communitarianism is something that is distinctly 
African is exaggerated. Further, there is a huge gap between traditional practices and 
metaphysical truths. Traditional practices in themselves do not necessarily constitute 
metaphysics. 
 
The second and more difficult philosophical problem relates to the manner in which 
communitarianism is presented authoritatively as a traditional African conceptual 
requirement. The manner in which it is presented is done in such a way that it is to be 
taken as beyond question. The problem with communitarianism is that it is not argued for 
on its own but its success is rooted on its own appeal to its authority as the authentic 
conceptual and practical way of all things African. It assumes itself in order to prove 
itself. Appiah hints at the same point when he issues his worry about African philosophy 
and appeals to authority. He says:  
 
Certainly the elders of many African societies discuss questions about 
right and wrong, life and death, the person and immortality. They even 
discuss the question whether an argument is a good argument or a 
consideration a weighty consideration. And this at least is the beginning of 
philosophy as reflective activity. But often difficult problems are set aside 
by appealing to “what the ancestors have said” in a way that is reminiscent 
of argument from authority in the Middle Ages in Europe (Appiah: 1998; 
115). 
 
In my view this appeal the authority of what the ancestors have pronounced on 
philosophical issues is a live problem in African thinking and it manifests itself in many 
ways that tend to find an immediate answer without attempting to adequately interrogate 
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specific problems. In the issue of personhood above as well as in chapter two, those who 
proffer an explanation of persons in metaphysical terms at times without sufficient 
argument feel obliged to justify those accounts through links to communal success. 
 
A clear explication of the importance of the community or its metaphysical significance 
is sacrificed for its claimed African authenticity and its unquestionable self-derived 
authority. A thick communal account of person is then given even though it is quite 
possible to question both the motives behind the origins as well as the philosophical 
success of the account as this chapter has attempted to do.  
 
The communal account of person can be seen merely as an explication of the sociality of 
persons and how they need each other in their daily living. The affirmations they derive 
from their own interactions and in their moral values and achievements do not in any way 
determine the status of personhood. It is a testament of communality which varies 
according to how traditional a given community is. Highly traditional communities are 
likely to have community members who are undifferentiated, who will share the same 
values and share the same life. Modern communities are likely to create more 
individualised orientations. There is nothing distinctly un-African about modernising and 
losing communal aspirations. There is also nothing African in traditional Aboriginal 
communities who share the same values of community.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted a critique of the communitarian conceptualisation of person in 
African thinking. Following Gyekye’s distinction between moderate and radical 
communitarianism, I started by examining Tempels’ force thesis and Mbiti’s claim that is 
in opposition to the Cartesian view of person and ended with an evaluation of Menkiti. It 
is my argument that all these three accounts are beset with serious problems. Tempels’ 
force thesis mystifies that force to a point of a blatant exaggeration as clearly shown by 
Kaphagawani. Mbiti fails to see the reality of the existence of an individual as a separate 
entity from her community. It is not constitutively possible that we are all one. Menkiti 
radicalises the importance of community and moral achievement to a point that fails to 
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explain what happens to those members of the community who are downright evil. He 
also fails to give an account of what is moral or virtuous within his communitarian 
model. 
 
Gyekye claims that his version of moderate communitarianism is different from radical 
communitarianism and argues that it takes the issues of individual rights seriously. 
Although successful in his criticism of Menkiti, Gyekye’s positive account is not 
different from Menkiti at all. He fatally concedes that all communitarian schemes will not 
be obsessed with individual rights. But the downfall of his project is his readiness to 
abridge individual rights in order to maintain the interest of the society. He also fails to 
give an account of what those rights may be and under what circumstances they could be 
abridged. 
 
There appears to be an inevitable return to communitarian views in all of philosophising 
in African thinking. This communitarian orientation is fraught with serious problems 
particularly that of unjustifiably collapsing different philosophical questions such as of 




















This chapter attempts a critique of the African socialism that was discussed in chapter 
three. The early fathers of independence held that African socialism was the natural 
political regime that Africa had to follow because it was deeply embedded in the 
traditional understanding of persons and the traditional way of life in Africa. Hence 
chapter two discusses the concept of person while the third chapter looks at African 
socialism which is conceived out of the concept of person as well as the alleged 
traditional political and social organisation. While the fourth chapter attempted a critique 
of the communitarian conception of person within African thinking this chapter seeks to 
analyse and critique African socialism that is said to be born out of African 
communitarianism. Firstly, I seek to evaluate the claim that African socialism is 
authentically African. Secondly I seek to evaluate whether such a system is good in itself 
and for Africa.  
 
The proponents of African socialism, as we saw in chapter three, hold that this political 
system is natural and original to Africa. They cite the political organisation of traditional 
society before the arrival of colonialism as evidence of the naturalness of socialism to 
Africa. They insist that their theories have nothing to do either with capitalism or with 
Western socialism. To them, African socialism is grounded in the nature of persons in 
Africa and the communitarian way of life. The African leaders discussed always 
distanced themselves from Marxism and Western communism for a variety of reasons, 
key among them being that in traditional Africa there were generally no class distinctions 
and those societies had very little disparity of power between the rulers and the subjects 
(Mazrui: 1986; 75). It was this egalitarianism and the fellowship in village life, according 
to Mazrui, that led Julius Nyerere to develop his brand of socialism. 
 
It was the existence of classes and the differences between those classes which informed 
capitalism and led to the birth of communism in the West. Oyekan Owomoyela argues 
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that Marxism is not applicable to Africa because it rose to challenge an oligarchic and 
feudal system which privileged a small propertied class and kept the majority under 
oppression. “In contrast, African social systems before the arrival of Europeans 
anticipated, in many ways, the communistic ideals to which Marxism even today still 
openly aspires” (Owomoyela: 2001; 83). This view clearly supports the position held by 
African leaders as we saw in chapter three. That position is that Marxism and Western 
communism have no influence on African socialism as African socialism’s roots are 
found in traditional African ideas and societies. 
 
A crucial feature of traditional society that is held to distinguish African socialism from 
Marxism and Western socialism is the consultative nature of decision making that was 
prevalent in African societies. Thus B.E. Oguah notes that for the Fanti people, the 
“chief’s rule is not an autocracy but a consultative system of government. He has to 
consult his councillors on all decisions affecting the society” (1984; 223). This 
consultation ensured that everyone was involved in decision making on issues that 
affected the whole society. This deliberation was not only meant to find common ground. 
A.H Wingo argues that “palaver was also an inroads search for answers to real disputes, 
real conflict of interests, real public problems” (2001; 158). The consultative discussions 
were not merely meant to serve as avenues for finding common ground and standing but 
also to iron out whatever differences, sometimes serious, existed among different 
members of the same society.  
 
Marlene van Niekerk points out that the first leaders of independent Africa came up with 
African socialism because they had practical concerns and wanted to restore what had 
been disrupted by colonialism. She says an “example of this would be the way in which 
Nyerere’s concept of “Ujamaa” (“familyhood”) finds application in the Tanzanian 
educational system where the school is developed as a self-supporting family” (van 
Niekerk: 1998; 80). To Nyerere, for example, the corrective to colonialism and its 
alienating ideology was to return to the central importance of the family in traditional 
Africa and try and animate it to inform all facets of independent Tanzania. The popularity 
of socialism was widespread as indicated by George Ayittey when he writes:  
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The proliferation of socialist ideologies that emerged in Africa ranged 
from the “Ujamaa” (familyhood or socialism in Swahili) of Julius Nyerere 
of Tanzania; to the vague amalgam of Marxism, Christian socialism, 
humanitarianism, and “Negritude” of Leopold Senghor of Senegal; to the 
humanism of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; to the scientific socialism of 
Marien N’Govabi of Congo (Brazzaville); to the Arab-Islamic socialism 
of Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya; to the “Nkrumaism” (consciencism) of 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; to the “Mobutuism” of Mobutu Sese Seko of 
Zaire (Ayittey: 2005; 61). 
 
Undoubtedly, as we saw in the third chapter, the popularity of African socialism is due to 
the effects of colonialism and the desire of African leaders to return to the authentic 
African way of both social and political organisation. However, the failure of their 
political, social and economic regimes which were driven by socialism was quite 
thorough and very public. This chapter will avoid the empirical questions of the failures 
of these leaders and their programmes. Instead I will seek to confine myself to the 
philosophical claims that are made in each leader’s case for their differing versions of 
African socialism. It should be acknowledged at this stage that it is not always easy to 
separate issues of empirical fact from the theoretical pronunciations.  
 
I will confine my critique to the three leaders whom I discussed in the second chapter; 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Leopold Sedar Senghor of 
Senegal. Thus I will seek to question the basis of Ujamaa/familyhood, consciencism and 
negritude. I will treat each leader and his theory separately, but first I will attend to a 
general criticism that appears to apply to all three. 
 
5.1 General Critique of African Socialism 
The first problem that African socialism generally suffers relates to its status as 
philosophical enterprise or philosophical enquiry. African socialism is informed by the 
communitarian view of persons in African thought. This is taken as something special 
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and distinctive about Africans that makes them stand out from the rest of humanity. 
Armed with the communitarian view of persons in African thinking, the leaders then 
develop a philosophy that is sensitive to the communitarian outlook. The problem here is 
that these thinkers take traditional African societies to be uniquely distinct from all other 
societies. But as Appiah has noted African societies have as much in common with 
traditional societies that are not African as they do with each other (1998; 115). This 
means that all traditional societies, be they African or not, share certain common 
characteristics in virtue of them being traditional societies. 
 
It can be said that those unique and key characteristics that are taken to be constitutive of 
what is authentically African could just as well be characteristic of pre-industrialised 
societies that largely depend on land for their survival and live in small communities 
where personal relations are important and where they all share the same fate. They may 
need each other’s positive contribution to the well being of society and may need to be 
encouraged to co-operate as opposed to competing against each other simply because it 
would be against their interests as a collective and as individuals. This is just a factual 
claim about small pre-industrialised societies that depend on subsistence farming or some 
other less developed mode of production. Because of the unsophisticated and similar 
lifestyle that is prevalent in these societies it is inevitable that their political organisation 
would also be as simple as the traditional African socialism. It is a political system that 
basically caters for small and non-complex societies, societies where it is possible for the 
chief to play many roles such as being the ruler, the intercessor for the people, the judge 
and possibly the father figure to all members of his society. 
 
It is not implausible to suggest that even the ideas and thoughts of the people in these 
societies tend to be generally unsophisticated and to be a function of the pre-development 
stage that the society is in. This can be shown by the manner in which ideas in these 
communities are generally superstitious or seek to explain all things that happen to 
humanity in terms of the anger or happiness of some ancestral spirits. Kwasi Wiredu 
laments the work of Western anthropologists who have taken traditional thought in Africa 
to be representative of African thinking in general. “However, instead of seeing the basic 
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non-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought as typifying traditional 
thought in general, Western anthropologists and others besides have mistakenly tended to 
take them as defining a peculiarly African way of thinking with unfortunate effects” 
(Wiredu: 1980; 39).  He laments the attitude that is prevalent in some circles tending to 
speak of African philosophy as if it were essentially traditional. He says this attitude 
negates the efforts of modern Africans whose philosophy has taken into account all the 
developments that have happened in logic, mathematics, sciences and humanities. He 
says there are various causes that have combined to promote this attitude. “African 
nationalists in search of an African identity, Afro-Americans in search of their African 
roots and foreigners in search of exotic diversion-all demand an African philosophy 
fundamentally different from Western philosophy, even if it means familiar witches’ 
brew” (Wiredu: 1980; 46). The problem here clearly is that need to discover something 
so different about African thinking which stands the danger of going the “witches’ brew” 
route.  
 
 I wish to argue that this is particularly the case with African socialism. The claim, so 
strongly stated by its proponents, that it is not inspired by Marxism or Western 
communism is at least misleading. For a start, if this concept was so thoroughly African it 
surely would have a name of its own in one of the many and rich languages that are found 
on the continent. It would not be “ujamaa” or familyhood as Nyerere would like us 
believe. It would not be the dubious “Negritude” as Senghor has it or Nkrumah’s 
Nkrumaism or even worse consciencism. If socialism in Africa had always been there 
and was most perfect here on this continent then there ought to be at least one proper 
African term that precisely calls socialism by its name not by proxies such as Nyerere’s 
familyhood, Nkrumah’s consciencism and Senghor’s negritude. It is not entirely far-
fetched to suggest that Africans who lived in that traditional Africa had no knowledge or 
the slightest tendency to think of themselves as socialists of any shade.  
 
Kofi Busia makes an interesting observation but draws an outrageous conclusion when he 
states that: “African socialism is a compound of several ingredients. It is compounded of 
reactions to colonialism, capitalism, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, combined with the search 
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for economic development, national sovereignty, democratic freedom and 
internationalism, and for roots in African tradition and culture” (1967; 75). Busia’s view 
on African socialism starts by making it clear that it is a mixture of several things which 
do not necessarily appear to be complementary. Those ingredients do not even have the 
same origin. It is therefore mind boggling to have such an assortment which includes 
reactions to capitalism and colonialism finding its roots in African tradition and culture. 
Busia’s characterisation of African socialism is correct in that it acknowledges the 
influence of other factors such as Marxism and reactions against colonialism and 
capitalism. However, the widespread overriding desire to root it in African traditional 
social organisation is highly suspect, conceptually, because traditional societies did not 
have the opportunity to confront colonialism and capitalism in all their ugliness and 
complexity. That was left to the nationalists with Nkrumah in the lead of liberating his 
country in the middle of the 20
th
 century. The motive, as Wiredu has pointed above, of 
the early fathers of independence, in coining and implementing African socialism, had 
more to do with their own need to affirm an African identity and African values as 
opposed to resuscitating an old political system. 
 
Two final criticisms that deal with a very practical concern, born out of the claims made 
on behalf of African socialism by these leaders, must be stated even if briefly. These 
points of concern also apply to all other African leaders who at various stages sought to 
impose a one party state on their people. The three leaders that this thesis is looking at, 
alongside many other African leaders, at various stages of their political careers, argued 
that the idea of a one party state was natural to Africans because it could be found in the 
traditional set-up of African societies. But the truth of the matter is that the traditional 
exercise of power did not favour any consolidation of power in the form of a one party 
state that is run by a closed cabal of politicians who seek to amass power for themselves. 
Instead, as Busia notes, in the traditional Ashanti system of Ghana no king or chief could 
ever be autocratic. People were allowed to make their opinions known and the chief’s 
primary task was to dispense justice. “Neither authoritarianism nor the one-party State 
can be traced to traditional political systems like these. Arguments to justify the one-party 
State or authoritarianism cannot be based on the ground of tradition” (Busia: 1995; 213). 
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One party states serve to suppress any dissenting voices and cement the power of the 
rulers. There was nothing traditional about these rising in Africa. Ayittey argues that 
although the chief was both a powerful institution and person, the system was such that 
he never used that power to advance his own interests but merely led the consultative 
processes and respected all the institutions that surrounded him and did all that he had 
been instructed to do by these very same institutions. “In theory, the African chief 
wielded vast powers-which led many observers to characterise him as autocratic. But in 
day to day administration and legislation, the chief rarely made policy. He only led-an 
important distinction. Chiefs and kings were not above the law and had to obey 
customary laws and taboos” (Ayittey: 1999; 88).   
 
The second criticism is that given the opportunity to exercise power, after the end of 
colonialism, African leaders generally did not effect real changes to return Africa to its 
roots. The early leaders of newly independent Africa could have made these changes but 
they did not. On the contrary Frantz Fanon observes that “the nationalist parties copy 
their methods from those of Western political parties; and also, for the most part … they 
do not direct their propaganda towards the rural masses” (1965; 88). Given real power to 
effect change they did not use that power for the benefit of citizens on the continent. 
Ayittey makes a pertinent observation when he states that; “After independence, African 
leaders and elites did not establish political systems that bore any resemblance to 
indigenous systems. It is true that they inherited an authoritarian colonial state at 
independence. However, they could have dismantled it and returned Africa to its roots. 
They did neither” (1999; 92). This is a serious indictment, yet true. The African leaders 
untruthfully claimed that they were returning independent Africa to its traditional roots 
through their varied versions of African socialism. Instead, they embarked on all sorts of 
acts that largely brought disrepute to themselves and the continent at large. It is 
worthwhile to quote Ayittey at length: 
 
History shows that most of the nationalists who took over the controls of 
their countries’ economies failed in their efforts to generate development, 
disgraced themselves, and ruined millions of African lives in the process. 
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Tarnishing their own record of courageous struggle for independence, 
most of these nationalists fell, with monotonous regularity, from grace to 
grass to the grave. The case of Nkrumah was perhaps the most pathetic. 
He was overthrown in 1966 while headed for Hanoi, where he said he 
intended to find a solution to the Vietnam War. Ghanaians furiously tore 
down the statue he built for himself, charged him with extortion and 
corruption, and sent his photograph to 60 Interpol member countries 
(Ayittey: 1991; 163).  
 
Indeed it was a sad end to the founding father of independent Africa, but probably one 
that could not be regretted and that was deserved. Appiah succinctly characterises the 
grim situation that was awaiting Africa during this period characterised by a swift end to 
all celebrations welcoming freedom replaced with the reality of Africa’s problems. “By 
1966, when the first of our many post-independence coups exiled Nkrumah, the real, if 
limited enthusiasm there once had been, had largely evaporated: and the complications 
began to take up our attention” (Appiah: 1992; 260). Thus African socialism not only 
failed to take Africa to its traditional roots (whatever they were), neither did it succeed in 
bringing dignity to the Africans. The politicians had missed on an opportunity to take 
Africa back to its very traditions that they so much cherished. 
 
I will now proceed to offer a critique of each of the three forms of African socialism 
discussed in the third chapter. I will start with Nyerere’s version that he identifies as 
ujamaa or familyhood, and then I will offer a critique of Nkrumah’s consciencism and 
end with Senghor’s negritude. The main thrust of my argument is that Nyerere essentially 
fails to develop his traditionalistic conception of African society to a sufficiently 
sophisticated theory that can adequately respond to the needs of a modern society or 
stimulate the economies of such societies. I argue that his belief that the traditional modes 
of living that animated traditional societies could be retrieved and applied to modern 
societies was simplistic. Further, following Gyekye, I will argue that Nyerere seriously 
misrepresents traditional societies in his treatment of public and private ownership and 
that his emphasis on work, as if African societies were the hardest working of all, is 
 166 
misleading. Following Paulin Hountondji, I argue that Nkrumah’s consciencism is 
informed by a misguided apprehension of what he thinks is the universal mark of African 
metaphysics. Finally I will argue that negritude, as a philosophy, does not succeed in its 
primary goal of affirming the strengths of the African or black person because it 
embraces the very same characteristics that were deployed by those who were either 
outright racists or merely doubted the mental capabilities of the African. 
 
5.2 A Critique of Nyerere 
In chapter three we saw that Nyerere was a firm believer that socialism was actually an 
attitude of mind and that Africans needed either to be re-educated or to educate 
themselves to return to that attitude of mind. Secondly, he argues that in traditional 
African society everybody was a worker whose contribution was to the greater good and 
benefit of society as opposed to being a wage labourer. Thirdly, he argues that there was 
no private ownership of the means of production such as tools or land. Further he holds 
that socialism is there for the service of the people and does not seek to exploit anyone. 
Socialism, according to Nyerere, prizes equality. He argues that the cardinal point of 
socialism which should be accepted by everyone is the recognition that all people are 
equal. In his view although people have different abilities and will contribute differently 
to society they must ultimately be treated as having the same worth.  
 
In my view there are at least two philosophically interesting claims that emerge from 
Nyerere’s declarations on African socialism. The first has to do with socialism being an 
attitude of the mind that existed in the traditional societies and one that can be easily re-
taught to Africans and could be quickly re-established. The second has to deal with the 
nature of communitarianism in the traditional setting and how it relates to African 
socialism as practised in modern independent Africa. 
 
Nyerere’s claim that socialism is an attitude of the mind that existed in the past and that 
can be easily retrieved and learnt for the benefit of the African is faced with an 
ontological difficulty in that it seeks to identify the African mind with a certain outlook 
that is essentially not given to propensities of greed, self-interest and a general need to 
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acquire things for oneself. It strongly appears to be the case that Nyerere insists on this 
attitude of the mind to justify the social organisation of traditional societies as 
communitarian and what he sees as the political consequence of this order-African 
socialism. In other words, for Nyerere, the justification of African socialism is 
communitarianism, and the justification for communitarianism is the attitude of the mind 
of the individuals in the traditional African societies.  
 
Nyerere does not give us an explanation of what it is that causes the mind to be so 
oriented towards the community. He merely insists that in the traditional society that is 
how things were. This mind, because of the tenets of ujamaa which teach that society is 
structured along the lines of family relations, will seek to benefit all members of society, 
Nyerere would insist. Besides this circularity, Nyerere does not give a special feature in 
the traditional society or in any history of the existence of Africans which is responsible 
for that attitude of mind. I am not persuaded that Africans either in the past, in the present 
or in the future by nature of just being Africans, even if they were communitarian, would 
shun all things that have to do with capitalism as a matter of constitutive inclination. 
Nyerere seems to suggest that this is possible and those Africans who fail to do so fail at 
African socialism-which is essentially African; meaning that they have failed at African 
communitarianism-which means that they have ultimately failed at being Africans, 
whatever the implications of this failure may be. Even present day admirers of Nyerere 
such as Munyaradzi Felix Murove (2005; 165-169) and Symphorien Ntibangirirwa 
(1999; 89-92), enchanted by Nyerere, endorse his African socialism and humanism both 
in the traditional and modern setting without caring to account for that special feature that 
Africans possess-which predisposes them to such a state of the mind.  
 
If Nyerere were to show that this attitude of the mind was true of Africans of the past, I 
cannot help but observe that it would have been a rather futile peculiarity of those 
Africans and their societies. Such a mental outlook that persistently seeks to promote the 
good of society with the individual never seeking to acquire anything for herself, or even 
sometimes minimally looking for ways to advance oneself would have disastrous 
consequences for individuals.  
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If there was such an attitude, the society could not prosper or function. The prosperity of 
society and general communal advancement depend on individual initiative. Such an 
attitude of the mind, as envisaged by Nyerere, does not benefit the community or the 
individual. Such an attitude is defeatist as it creates docile conformity that would actually 
lead to an unintended consequence since all forms of initiative are either severely 
underdeveloped, because of the mind creating such an attitude, or are severely neglected 
because such an attitude has been created in the mind. I suppose it is not altogether too 
liberal an interpretation to suggest that in such a society initiative and taking individual 
responsibility would be shunned and discouraged either overtly or inadvertently by social 
institutions such as the family and all other institutions responsible for the socialisation of 
the young members of society, with the result that by the time they become adults they 
are acutely aware of the importance of being the same and not seek any initiative. It is far 
more probable that such a mentality did not exist among Africans in traditional societies. 
Contrary to Nyerere’s suggestion, it is probable that people in traditional societies, at 
times, exhibited acquisitive characteristics, greed and sought to advance their individual 
causes ahead of communal needs.  
 
Gyekye argues that the problems that arise for African socialism stem from the fact that 
ideologues tried to anchor justification for their ideologies in communitarianism. A 
criticism that he raises that aptly applies to Nyerere’s interpretation of communitarian 
societies is the way he tries to find justification for his political theory by claiming that 
African mentality was not acquisitive. Gyekye holds “that the African character is not 
devoid of acquisitive and materialistic elements, as the advocates of African socialism 
would want to imply” (1997; 146). 
 
For example, Gyekye suggests that on the issue of land it was possible in African society 
for people to talk of ancestral land. This ancestral land would belong to a certain family 
or certain families by virtue of them being linked to the same ancestors. Since the mode 
of production was primarily the land, people would work on that land as families or a 
family that had received that land through a line of ancestors.  He holds that the attitude 
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towards the distribution of land, as opposed to being a regimented matter for the 
community at large, was actually liberal. “Since livelihood depends very much on the 
exploitation of the land in an agricultural economy, this liberality is most appropriate” 
(Gyekye: 1997; 147).  
 
It is quite clear then on Gyekye’s account that it was possible for land to be held by 
certain sections of the community to the exclusion of other members of that community. 
If there was a possibility, which is very likely, of certain land being held as ancestral 
land, then those who were descendants of the said ancestors would have exclusive claim 
to the use or maintenance of that land. This would mean that not all land was held in-
common as Nyerere suggests but that there was the possibility, if not reality, of some 
private ownership of the land.  
 
Gyekye takes the point further by accusing the nationalists of having taken the humanist 
features of African traditional social and moral thought and turning them to African 
socialism. Richard Bell suggests that African humanism is different from classic Western 
humanism in that the latter emphasises the promotion of individual virtues and the 
exercise of rational self-control. 
 
African humanism, on the other hand, is rooted in traditional values of 
mutual respect for one’s fellow kinsman and a sense of position and place 
in the larger order of things: one’s social order, and natural order, and the 
cosmic order. African humanism is rooted in lived dependencies. Where 
life’s means are relatively minimal and natural resources are scarce, the 
individual person must depend on his or her larger community (Bell: 
2002; 40).  
 
As noted above, the development of what has been characterised as African thinking 
which is supposed to be representative of the whole continent is in actual fact a simple 
characteristic of communities that have limited resource whose members depend on each 
other for their own survival and who develop an ethic that is consistent with their 
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situation. This ethic is one that is best suited to govern such societies at their specific 
stations. This should not necessarily be read as the African mentality. As Gyekye fittingly 
puts it;  
 
Communalism, which is a doctrine about social organisation and relations, 
is an offshoot of the Akan concept of humanism. It is perhaps indisputable 
that social institutions embody a philosophical perspective about human 
nature and social relationships. One way in which the Akan concept of 
humanism is made explicit is in its social organisation. Ensuring the 
welfare and interests of each member of society-the essential meaning of 
Akan humanism-can hardly be accomplished outside the communal 
system (Gyekye: 1987; 154-155). 
 
I think the salient point that Gyekye is making is that the doctrine of humanism that 
existed in traditional African societies was characterised by a need to give an account of 
how one was to relate to her community at large with an aim of fostering the well-being 
of all community members. These were essentially economic and survival relations in 
small scale communities wherein all community members needed each other for their 
survival. The humanism expressed in the manner in which the society is organised will 
only say more about the economic and survival needs of that society than any higher or 
peculiar moral attitude.    
 
The second and most crucial difficulty that arises from Nyerere’s work relates to his 
attempt to forge a close relation between traditional African communitarianism and 
African socialism. To my mind such a close correlation has to be rejected because it 
attempts to, as a matter of logical necessity, claim that communitarianism inevitably leads 
to African socialism. This is not quite the case as the two systems are coined in totally 
different environments and the practical factors that give rise the conceptualisation of 
both systems are not the same. As I suggested above, African socialism is a mixture of 
ingredients that include responses to colonialism and capitalism, influences of Marxism 
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and Western socialism whereas traditional communitarianism is not concerned with these 
factors. Gyekye renders the point lucid when he argues that: 
 
The alleged relation of identity between the two systems can logically be 
denied on the grounds that not everything that can be asserted of 
communalism can be asserted of socialism, and vice versa. I would 
contend that communalism is essentially a socioethical doctrine, not 
particularly-or perhaps narrowly-economic, whereas socialism, which was 
understood by the African political leaders as Marxism socialism, is 
fundamentally economic, concerned as a matter of testament, with the 
relations or modes of production (Gyekye: 1997; 148). 
 
This analysis particularly applies to Nyerere who insistently points out that traditional 
African societies where the African mentality thrived unfettered were not capitalistic and 
all the evil relations of capitalism such as oppression of one class by another and wage 
labour were non existent. It is clear that Nyerere is concerned with developing a certain 
mode of production, or economic order that contrasts with capitalism. In his attempt to 
develop that mode of production, he rejects Western communism and invents a certain 
mode of production for the traditional African society. He reads this mode of production 
into traditional African societies and claims that it has always been known as African 
socialism and is representative of the African mentality. African communitarianism, 
which is taken to be the foundation of African socialism, did not concern itself with what 
modes of production should govern society and what kind of productive relations are 
least exploitative or avoid exploitation altogether. Instead, communitarianism concerned 
itself with questions of the best possible ways of maintaining co-operative and 
harmonious relations between members of society and with questions of what kind of 
relationship existed, or ought to have existed, between the individual and her society.  
 
Gyekye also notes the differences that exist between the notions of public ownership in 
traditional communalist societies and modern socialist states, like Nyerere’s Tanzania. 
While in traditional societies the individual can use the land that has been deemed to be 
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public land or land that is owned by everyone, the same cannot happen in socialist states. 
The individual in a socialist state is not allowed access and use of the land that has been 
designated as state land, which the state claims to be holding in trust of all citizens. For 
Gyekye this distinction has a serious bearing on the individual’s rights (ibid). I opine that 
it would be fair to infer that Gyekye’s telling point is that African socialism as advocated 
by Nyerere is not a true version of traditional communitarianism because it fails to 
protect the rights of the individual. Nyerere points out that in African traditional societies 
everybody was expected to work, the right to work in those societies was extended to 
every individual who could work. This included allowing individuals access to land to 
work on and earn their livelihood. It was only the invalids, the very young and the elderly 
who were not expected to work. However, in socialist states, the right to work on any 
piece of land that is controlled by the state or in any state enterprise is not always 
guaranteed for anyone who wants to work there as was the case in the traditional setting. 
This means that this aspect of the right to work, to have an expectation of getting work 
and the actual acquisition of land to work on by the individual in the traditional society 
cannot be easily transferred to Nyerere’s socialist Tanzania. Traditional communitarian 
societies may be conceived as radically different from modern socialist states.   
 
Benezet Bujo also addresses the question of the possibility of individual property 
ownership in traditional African societies. He is reluctant to admit the possibility of 
individual ownership of property noting that in the “final analysis, the individual 
administers property in the name of the community. As it is not permissible to privatise 
life for oneself, one is not permitted to use property at one’s own discretion, since 
property cannot be separated from the life force” (1990; 150). It must be noted as well 
that the individual is not totally disempowered to a point of having no initiative or 
influence in what can happen to property such as land that is held in common. The central 
theme here is that there should be wide consultation and this can be at the behest of the 
individual. Bujo admits as much when he further notes that one “of the consequences of 
this attitude towards property is that in some areas in Africa, the individual should first 
consult the relatives before disposing of property for another purpose than the usual one” 
(ibid). Whatever these usual purposes could be, the suggestion is that the individual has 
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more freedom, than Nyerere allows, in terms of how property, including land and tools, 
may be used or disposed. That alone, at least, shows that Nyerere’s view on traditional 
communitarianism is either misinformed or deliberately engineered with the purpose of 
being used as an anchor of African socialism. 
 
Further, Gyekye argues that nationalist leaders ignored the spirit of private enterprise and 
individuality that existed in African societies (1997; 149). In Gyekye’s view the 
nationalist leaders’ failure to take into account these two aspects undermines the 
authenticity of their version of socialism as representative of the true African tradition. 
From a historical perspective, Gyekye argues, private enterprise existed in the sense that 
if a lineage had to find itself faced with a very heavy debt, it could always resort to 
mortgaging its land and the mortgagee would hold it as private property. On the 
conceptual level he draws a distinction between public and private land arguing that if 
land could be held by the family, then it could not be accessed by everybody else, 
whereas if it belonged to the public, then anyone could have access to it. Thus, in his 
view, two forms of ownership existed in traditional societies. One was ownership by 
individuals and families and the other was ownership by the public. The former, he says, 
is equivalent to corporate ownership and the latter is akin to state ownership. “The 
conclusion, then, is that sociocultural as well as conceptual analysis indicates the 
existence of the idea and practice of private ownership as an outstanding feature of 
economic management in the traditional African culture” (Gyekye: 1997; 151). 
 
However, for Gyekye, the real failure for the African leaders was their interpretation of 
traditional communitarianism as entirely an economic system when in actual fact; 
 
It is a doctrine about social relations as well as moral attitudes: about what 
sorts of relationships should hold between individuals in a society and 
about the need to take into account the interests of the wider society not 
only in designing socio-political institutions and in evolving behaviour 
patterns for individuals in their responses to the needs and welfare of other 
members of society (ibid) 
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For Gyekye there is no necessary connection between these two systems as they are 
primarily occupied with different concerns. In my view, that connection that was sought 
by the early leaders of independent Africa was a forced connection that carries no logical 
necessity. It also lacks any empirical connection with the past and the leaders themselves 
failed to animate those essential characteristics of tradition when given a chance. Nyerere 
became an advocate of a one party state which has no justification in traditional society. 
Nyerere’s claim that the conceptual origins of his ujamaa are to be found in the 
traditional societies of Africa is not only unfounded but appears to be animated by other 
motives that have nothing to do with what transpired in the authentic African conceptual 
scheme of communalism. 
                                                                                                                                                         
Perhaps Mazrui gives us the best representation of Nyerere’s ideas and the effect his 
romanticisation of the village had on Africa when he notes that: 
 
It was Julius Nyerere, founder President of Tanzania, who once said that 
while great powers are trying to get to the moon, we are trying to get to 
the village. Well, the great powers have been to the moon and back, and 
are now even communicating with the stars. But in Africa we are still 
trying to reach the village. What’s more, the village is getting even more 
remote, receding with worsening communications even further into the 
distance (Mazrui: 1986; 2002). 
 
Thus on the one hand Nyerere’s conceptualisation of his version of African socialism and 
his attempt to ground it in African traditional societies is problematic. On the other hand, 
his practical concern and ideals about village life in newly independent Africa is nothing 
but a form of utopianism. 
 
5.3 A Critique of Nkrumah 
As we saw in the third chapter, Nkrumah argues that every society has a dominant 
ideology, although implicit, that seeks to direct people’s lives. He holds that Africa is 
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animated by three segments which are the traditional way of life, the Islamic and the 
Christian way of life. Islam and Christianity, in his view, are alien to the African culture 
and need to be conditioned by the African traditional way of life. He riles against 
capitalism seeing it as foreign to Africa and having been imposed forcefully on the 
African people through colonialism. He argues that the African personality through its 
humanism tended towards communalism. He argues that this was the case in traditional 
societies and had colonialism not interfered with Africa, the transition from 
communalism to socialism would have been natural. But once capitalism interfered, the 
transition to socialism had to be revolutionary. He coins the term consciencism to 
describe his political philosophy. In Nkrumah’s view consciencism would digest the 
Western influences on African society and give rise to a true African identity. 
Consciencism, Nkrumah argues, is in accord with the traditional African society and has 
egalitarianism as its basis.  
 
Nkrumah was not only concerned with developing socialism in Ghana but was interested 
in the unity of the whole continent. He dedicated much energy to this cause and even 
wrote a book entitled Africa Must Unite where he sets out his views on the importance of 
a united Africa. Bankole Timothy suggests that there was some deceit on Nkrumah’s 
part. “Nkrumah’s image of himself which he portrayed to the masses was deceptive. For 
example, he gave the impression of complete dedication to the cause of Ghana and 
Ghanaians when in, in fact, his ambition was to become leader of a Union of Africa” 
(Timothy: 1981; 241). The suggestion is that Nkrumah’s formulation of African 
socialism was targeted at giving an account of one Africa that had one thought and one 
that ought to have been governed in the same way with a central government possibly led 
by him.  
 
It is important to note that Nkrumah, in his early work, particularly his 1964 edition of his 
book Consciencism, grounded socialism in African traditional society. His doctrine was 
known as Nkrumaism to his party adherents who had a specific agenda. These party 
adherents were anti-socialists and they coined the term to cover up the socialism in 
Nkrumah’s ideology (Hountondji: 1996; 133). In his 1970 edition of the same book 
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Nkrumah spectacularly denounced African socialism and chose to advocate scientific 
socialism (Rooney: 1988; 183). It was this change that leads Ayittey to believe that 
Nkrumah was indecisive about the socialist ideology he wanted to follow (1991; 165).  
 
However, Hountondji sees these changes in a positive light. He says there are different 
levels in Nkrumah’s work. Hountondji argues that after Consciencism, Nkrumah’s 
writings show that his work was not closed but an ongoing project. Nkrumah’s early 
writings, according to Hountondji, were a euphoric attack on colonialism while his later 
work was a painstaking critique of neo-colonialism. “So the problems changed, and there 
was a remarkable dislocation of the system, I should say almost a destruction of the 
system, (a dismantling, a de-construction). Nkrumah, faced with new questions, found 
himself compelled in his answers to contradict theses which had seemed solidly secure in 
the original system” (Hountondji: 1996; 134). Hountondji cites three examples which 
exemplify Nkrumah’s displacement.    
 
The first example that Hountondji cites is one of violence. In his early work Nkrumah 
had advocated peaceful resistance which he had called positive action. This positive 
action was a mixture of Gandhi’s non-violence as well as taking legal recourse to bring 
justice. However, later Nkrumah advocated violence as an avenue of change because he 
was convinced that imperialists were engaged in a conspiracy to control the third world 
and impoverish it (Hountondji: 1996; 135). The second change had to do with Nkrumah’s 
views on class struggle. Before 1964 Nkrumah did not see class struggle as something 
that could occur in African societies. Instead, he believed that the egalitarianism and non-
exploitative communalism that was found in traditional African societies could have 
continued as socialism in modern Africa. Later, however, he notes that capitalism has 
resulted in class struggle on the global scale and that Africa is not exempt from that 
struggle. Secondly, he notes that class struggle is brought into Africa from the outside. 
So, according to Hountondji, Nkrumah’s new emphasis is no longer about the absence of 
class struggle in “traditional Africa but rather on the importance, gravity and 
irreducibility of class struggle in modern Africa” (ibid: 137). This, in Hountondji’s view, 
leads Nkrumah to reject both Nyerere and Senghor’s African socialism by demonstrating 
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that Africa is subject to the same laws as the rest of the world. The third example that 
Hountondji cites concerns Nkrumah’s changing views on African unity. While Nkrumah 
had previously advocated the unity of the continent, he changed this opinion and chose to 
support the co-ordination of the efforts of different liberation movements that were 
fighting for freedom on the continent as opposed to a wholesale collaboration at the 
continental level. This change, Hountondji believes, was caused by the presence of 
puppet regimes on the continent that effectively hindered the progress of Nkrumah’s goal 
of African unity. Thus Hountondji renders a very charitable reading of Nkrumah’s 
changes when he holds that: “What these three examples show is that Nkrumah’s work is 
not a closed system but open, attentive, pertinent and subject to constant revision. His 
thought was far more alive, restless and demanding than the abstract, dogmatic faith 
called ‘Nkrumaism’” (ibid; 139).  
 
In this way, Hountondji sees a certain continuity and constant revision and living up to 
new challenges in Nkrumah’s thinking. It is not a closed dogmatic system as Nkrumah’s 
party supporters would have believed but one that is constantly aware and in touch with 
the new challenges that are emerging for Africa’s struggle for independence. However, 
Hountondji’s reading of Nkrumah does not turn him into an admirer of Nkrumah or his 
supporter. 
 
Hountondji starts by noting that Nkrumah’s 1970 version of Consciencism had changed 
in some ways that were not particularly helpful for Nkrumah’s project. Some of the 
changes that Nkrumah made, in Hountondji’s view, destroyed the original coherence of 
his message in 1964. For example, Hountondji notes that in his 1970 edition Nkrumah 
deleted the following paragraph: “In my autobiography, I said that capitalism might 
prove too complicated a system for a newly independent country. I wish to add to this the 
fact that the presuppositions and purposes of capitalism are contrary to those of African 
society. Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa” 
(Nkrumah: 1964; 74). Hountondji argues that the paragraph that Nkrumah deleted in his 
later version of Consciencism was a long held belief that socialism was linked to the 
traditional African society and it served, in the original version, to deal with the objection 
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that if Africa was becoming socialist; then it was delivering itself to another Western 
power. In 1964, Nkrumah merely asserts that communalism is faintly remembered as 
having existed in African traditional communities. Instead, in 1970, Nkrumah introduces 
a new paragraph that discusses the conditions for a socialist revolution. This for 
Hountondji is a strange revision which destroys the coherence of the original text.  
 
The paragraph that Nkrumah deleted gave a solid grounding both for the theory of person 
in African thinking by alluding to a certain African personality which gave birth to the 
naturalness of African socialism. “This little paragraph therefore played a crucial 
strategic role in the original text. The fact that he later suppressed it suggests that 
Nkrumah had lost some of his confidence in the rationale of his project, perhaps because 
he now realised that ‘the assumptions and designs…of African society’ were really a 
highly fanciful hypothesis” (Hountondji: 1996; 146). Hountondji then argues that 
Nkrumah was fully aware of the existence of classes in African societies and those who 
claim that Nkrumah admitted no class differences in African societies have not read his 
work after 1964. 
 
I am not convinced by Hountondji’s reading of Nkrumah and his conclusion, particularly 
that Nkrumah admits of class differences in Africa. In my view the changes that 
Nkrumah effects, as we saw above, are simply a kind of cosmetic surgery whose 
motivation is not properly provided. Nkrumah, in his 1970 version of Consciencism, 
condemns African socialism and endorses scientific socialism without providing an 
explanation for his sudden change. It would have been preferable for Nkrumah to state 
whether this change had been brought by openness to the realities that were unfolding 
before him or were informed by other factors such as disillusionment at having failed to 
attain his African unity dream: without that Hountondji’s reading is at best speculative. 
Hountondji claims that it was possible that Nkrumah saw the fancifulness of the designs 
of an African society which led him to drop his project. But this does not seem to be the 
case since Nkrumah’s changes are not wholesale but appear to be grafts, that even by 
Hountondji’s admission, kill the coherence of the earlier version. So, Nkrumah’s change 
does not appear to be comprehensive since Nkrumah does not explicitly dissociate 
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himself with his previous views but merely updates and discards a couple of paragraphs. 
The theory of consciencism remains largely unaffected. In fact Nkrumah’s attempt to 
universalise the problems of capitalism and make them appear as if they apply to Africa 
with the same kind of effect as they have applied elsewhere particularly in relation to 
class struggles creates another problem for him. All these problems would be adequately 
dealt with by his new version of scientific socialism. What Nkrumah fails to appreciate is 
that capitalism, as a matter of reality, will never apply in the same manner in a country 
that is highly industrialised and a former coloniser as it will in a country that is not highly 
industrialised and that was formerly colonised. The creation of classes and the intensity 
of the differences between these classes would not be the same. The grievances of the 
oppressed classes in these societies (although they might overlap) would not be the same 
and to reduce different societies’ encounters with colonialism to class differences would 
be extremely simplistic. The same point is made by Tsenay Serequerbehan when he notes 
that:  
 
… to talk of “scientific socialism” in a singular and undifferentiated way - 
as Nkrumah does - is to superimpose European ideas and conceptions (in 
the guise of “objective” theory) on the African situation. In other words, 
the historical and cultural specificity of Africa and of the struggle for 
Africans is obliterated and covered over. And this is done in the name of a 
“universal” and “value - free” “science of history” - historical materialism 
- on which the scientism of socialism is grounded (Serequerbehan: 1994; 
34). 
 
Hountondji questions the meaning of the title of the book itself, but finds the sub-title, 
“Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation and Development, with Particular 
Reference to the African Revolution”, to be even more obscure than the title itself. 
Hountondji wonders what the singular reference to the African revolution could be. He 
asks if it could be liberation from the colonisers, or if it could refer to a social revolution 
which is changing its means of production to the advantage of the proletariat. Hountondji 
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argues that development is a movement and wonders what stages of development 
Nkrumah’s consciencism will have to go through.  
 
Hountondji is right in at least pointing out this initial difficulty in the meaning of the title 
and what it wants to convey. But the problem is much deeper than that. Nkrumah’s 
writing on consciencism is fraught with problems of ambiguity and obfuscation, 
particularly in relation to what consciencism is. As we saw in chapter three, he identifies 
it as the philosophical standpoint that best describes African political philosophy. In 
particular consciencism is supposed to deal with the tensions that arise as a result of the 
presence of Islam and Christianity on the continent which must be accommodated in the 
African tradition. Further he holds that there is a need for a social revolution which must 
be backed by an intellectual revolution which seeks to redeem society. This intellectual 
revolution/philosophy, according to Nkrumah, must be grounded in the actual 
environment in which people live. He then says the philosophy behind this revolution is 
known as consciencism which is responsible for taking Africa forward. Apparently, 
according to Nkrumah, this consciencism does not insist on being fixed on any ethical 
rules, as ethical rules are problematic since they are reflective of their own times. He then 
claims that consciencism has only one cardinal principle and that is every person must be 
treated as an end in itself. Finally, he adds that consciencism is founded on principles of 
egalitarianism and is in accord with the traditional African society.  
 
It is quite evident that Nkrumah’s claims are not only numerous but may also be said not 
to be related. For example, it seems very unlikely (as we have seen in the previous 
chapter) that traditional communitarian societies would insist on what sounds like the 
Kantian principle of treating each person as an end not as a means as Nkrumah does. So 
his fusion of the African traditional communalism, which consciencism is in accord with, 
together with a Kantian principle could be misleading. Nkrumah also points to the fact 
that consciencism is not concerned with ethical principles since they are constrained by 
their times. The problem that Nkrumah’s project immediately encounters is that there is 
an inherent tension in his position. On the one hand he holds that there is a well known 
and fixed African ethic of communitarianism that is to found in the traditional societies of 
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Africa. He attempts to animate that ethic so it could inform the two other realities on the 
continent which are; the Islamic reality and the Western Christian reality. However, on 
the other hand, he holds that consciencism is not concerned with ethical rules as they are 
reflective of their time. I do not think that it is possible for Nkrumah to hold both these 
positions. I think the principles of the traditional Africa’s communitarian ethic are fixed 
and are known to aspire towards a certain organisation of society. I do not think that they 
will allow the ethic they are supposed to animate, which is consciencism, to be an ethic of 
relativism.  
 
Another serious problem is Nkrumah’s attempts to link philosophy with ideology. This 
link is apparent in the subtitle of his book as we saw above and it leads Hountondji to ask 
a very important question about this link. “Are the two terms synonymous? Do we have 
here a mere repetition, a pleonasm, or is some distinction intended? Is philosophy the 
same thing as ideology, or are they different? And if they are different, what is the 
relation between the two terms, and what ought it be?” (Hountondji: 1996; 147). But 
Nkrumah is quite explicit in his embrace of philosophy as a servant of ideology when he 
holds that “philosophy admits of being an instrument of ideology” (1970; 56).  
 
This admission leads Hountondji to observe that; “Philosophy, for him, exists merely to 
translate spontaneous ideological theses into a more refined language, to elucidate, 
enunciate and justify, after the event, the decisions of the ideological instance. This 
conception of philosophy explains the whole project of Consciencism” (1996; 148). I 
agree with Hountondji’s view that Nkrumah uses philosophy to justify or proffer 
explanations for his ideological views. Not only does Nkrumah truncate the whole 
purpose of philosophy to justifying ideologies but he also fails, as Hountondji points out, 
to see that his ideology was one of the competing ideologies among many other possible 
ideologies. Hountondji accuses Nkrumah of committing the error of trying to put forward 
a single ideology that represents all Africans. The result is that “Nkrumah in fact links up 
with the vast majority of African anthropologists and accepts the classical ethnological 
ideology. In this way he neglects the pluralism of pre-colonial African culture forcing an 
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artificial unity upon what is really irreducibly diverse, and hence impoverished - the 
classic African tradition” (ibid).  
 
Hountondji further notes that this is a very serious oversimplification which is also 
manifested in the way in which Nkrumah claims that Africa is faced with three realities, 
Christian, Islamic and African tradition, which are in conflict but have to be resolved 
through the intervention of the African tradition. Hountondji argues that Nkrumah firstly 
takes the Western and Islamic cultures as simply waiting to be incorporated into the 
African reality. He does not treat these two cultures as serious cultures that can stand on 
their own but as appendages of the African culture. Secondly, Hountondji thinks that 
Nkrumah is an enemy of diversity by his desire to see the other aspects of African reality 
subsumed under the African tradition. Hountondji sees consciencism as a philosophy of 
consciousness which seeks to re-articulate the lost African consciousness through 
merging three different ideologies into a single system of thought. Hountondji says the 
greatest weakness of consciencism is Nkrumah’s assumption that Africa needs a 
collective philosophy (ibid; 149). 
 
Finally, Hountondji attacks Nkrumah for attempting to base his doctrine on what he calls 
a materialist metaphysic which professes the priority of matter over mind. “Politically, it 
adopts the central demand of nationalist ideology by reaffirming the right of self-
determination for all peoples on the one hand and calls for the construction of socialism 
in a liberated Africa on the other. The most interesting point, however is the author’s 
assertion that the three panels of the triptych (metaphysical, ethical and political) are 
closely linked and inseparable” (Hountondji: 1996; 153). He argues that Nkrumah 
attempts to present a philosophy that appears to have different facets that are all 
interlinked. Thus he presents the relationship between metaphysics and politics not 
merely as one of juxtaposition but logical necessity. “In other words, every political 
stance is ultimately founded on a metaphysical stance and, conversely, every 




I think Hountondji’s objections to Nkrumah’s project are formidable. I think the greatest 
weakness in Nkrumah’s account is his attempt to develop a certain African philosophical 
system that he calls consciencism. His philosophical system has a specific metaphysics 
which gives rise to an ethical and political system. The problem with his metaphysics lies 
in its attempt to generalise certain features to all African people. His ethical system, 
which is supposed to be informed by the metaphysics, seems to hold a position that 
admits serious tension between the traditional communitarianism which is its foundation 
and its new articulation as consciencism. Finally he proposes a political system that 
proceeds, as a matter of necessity, from the metaphysics and ethics. The success of his 
project is limited by his attempt to develop a logically necessary relationship between 
metaphysics, ethics and politics. Nkrumah’s position is also naive as it simply holds that 
the Islamic and Western Christian tradition can be easily subsumed into an African 
traditional communitarian system which will constitute consciencism.  
 
5.4 A Critique of Senghor 
In the third chapter we saw how Senghor explicates his own version of African socialism 
while rejecting Western socialism. One of the main reasons to which he appealed in 
rejecting Western socialism lay in the way that he conceived how Africans come to gain 
knowledge. He argues that while Europeans discursively and dispassionately gain their 
knowledge the African becomes one with the object. He argues that the Western way of 
gaining knowledge must be assimilated into the African way of thinking. One of the 
crucial bases of his version of African socialism was the non-existence of classes in 
traditional African societies. Further he calls his brand of African socialism “negritude”. 
This negritude is supposed to be representative of the character of black people, such as 
how they come to gain knowledge and how they live in their communities - embracing 
communalism and shunning capitalism and exploitation. The key characteristic of 
Senghor’s theory is his claim that Africans are different; certain key characteristics give 
rise to that negritude, and those characteristics are decisive in negritude being 
transformed into African socialism. 
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The term negritude itself does not originate from Africa. Wole Soyinka notes that 
although Senghor was the most articulate and lyrical poet in this area, the expression 
itself was invented by the Martiniquan Aime Cesaire. Soyinka traces the origins of the 
negritude movement to the African American poets famous for the Harlem renaissance 
such as Langston Hughes, Countee Cullen, Sterling Hayden, Claude Mackay and Paul 
Vesey. G. Moore supports this view of the origins of the Negritude movement when he 
writes; 
 
The opening shots in the campaign to create a new African literature were 
fired not by Africans, but by black writers from the Carribean. The loudest 
and most resounding of these was probably Aime Cesiare’s familiar cry: 
Hurray for those who never invented anything 
for those who never explored anything 
for those who never conquered anything 
hurray for joy 
hurray for love 
hurray for the pain of the incarnate tear (Moore: 1961; viii). 
 
This manner of thinking which celebrated the simplicity of the African as one who has 
never invented anything, never explored, never conquered and one who stands for joy 
and love would have driven Senghor to also affirm that the African is not one who is 
interested in discursive and analytical knowledge but one who becomes attached to the 
object that she is to know.  
 
Mazrui argues that part of the history of racism has been the comparisons of intellectual 
performance between different race groups. Mazrui notes that in the modern period of 
history, the black person has been on the periphery of scientific and technological 
achievement. The question then for Mazrui is; what is being celebrated? While some 
people try to trace all achievements as originating from Africa like shorthand and algebra 
and stress how Egypt influenced Greek thought, other people are looking for an 
alternative response, Mazrui claims, that does not celebrate any African achievement. 
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“An alternative response to black scientific marginality is not only to affirm it but also to 
take pride in it. Black countries ruled by France produced a whole movement called 
negritude, which revelled in the virtues of a non-technical civilisation” (Mazrui: 1990; 
134). Thus Cesaire’s poem opens up the celebration of non-scientific achievement. 
Earlier on Mazrui had opined that; “But for Leopold Senghor, former president of 
Senegal and the most distinguished proponent of Negritude within Africa, the great 
genius of Africa lay not in European concepts of rationality, but in indigenous capacities 
for intuition; not in the principles of scientific method and objectivity, but in the wisdom 
of custom and instinct; not in cold analytical reason but in warm responsive emotion” 
(Mazrui: 1986; 73-74). 
 
Thus the issue is not only a celebration of having no achievement in the field of sciences 
and analytical reasoning. The defining feature of Africans becomes their ability to be 
warm and emotional and respond to all they encounter with such warm emotion. So the 
African does not only refuse to seek to go beyond that emotion but treats it as constitutive 
and definitive of who she is as an African. Essentially she is one who is able to 
empathise, to feel for the other and be one with the other, as if almost to become the 
other. But this celebration does not only end with the recognition that black people have 
not achieved anything in the sciences, it is extended to the struggle for independence and 
it is taken as defining of the African character. 
 
Bell correctly characterises the relationship between independence, African humanism 
and negritude when he says; “Owing, in part, to the background of the concept of 
negritude, African humanism is identified with movements of national independence and 
with the development of collective African identity. The more political side of African 
humanism is also referred to as African socialism” (Bell: 2002; 37). Negritude, in Africa, 
is associated with the struggle for independence and African socialism. In particular the 
advocates of negritude seek to affirm the beauty of those African aspects that would have 
been seen as markers of African inferiority. 
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Abiola Irele makes the same point when he observes that there is a certain unity that 
characterises all of African thought in the various forms of ideology that are expressed in 
Africa. “This unity resides in the effort to bring the African mind to a new coincidence 
with its true foundation in a new African universe, to define as it were a founding myth as 
the basis of our action and collective existence in modern times. Herein lies what 
constitutes, in my opinion, the continuing relevance of concepts such as Negritude and 
African personality” (Irele: 1981; 113). Irele believes that this revival of such concepts is 
necessary because it is owed to black people because of the painful history they have 
gone through. For Irele, this is not a matter of casting a romantic glance at a past that is 
no longer fully functional.  “It is a question of our regaining the historical initiative of 
which we were deprived as a people, and with it an originality of thought and of action, 
with a meaning for ourselves in the first place and ultimately for the world with which we 
are today ineluctably involved in a common adventure” (ibid).  
 
Thus, for Irele, concepts such as negritude and African personality play an important role 
in recovering the history of black people and affirming their place in their current 
existence. This is in keeping with Frantz Fanon’s observation on the reactions of black 
people to colonialism. “It is the white man who creates the Negro. But it is the Negro 
who creates negritude” (Fanon: 1989; 47). Thus for Fanon although being a Negro is a 
negative creation that happens in situations of oppression and racism, the response of the 
black person in creating his own negritude is a good thing as it is self affirmation. 
“Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to 
place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on 
which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilisation 
that he did  not know and that imposed itself on him” (Fanon: 2006; 128-129). Thus to 
Fanon the effects of racism are such that the black person finds her entire history scorned 
and rejected and she has to come to terms with the fact that she is viewed as inferior and 
her reaction must be to seek her own affirmation. 
 
Although Senghor’s thesis of Negritude may sound strangely affirming to those Africans 
on the continent and elsewhere it is faced with an immediate weakness which is supposed 
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to be its power of affirmation. Negritude assumes that everywhere black people have the 
same spirit. It assumes that everywhere black people are characterised by a refusal to 
engage anything they might need to know in a discursive, rational and distantly cold 
manner without being overly emotional or seeking to become one with the object of 
investigation. Although Negritude arises, particularly in the thought of Senghor, as a 
critique of colonialism, its claim that it represents an African personality cannot be taken 
seriously. All other methods and discourses of criticising colonialism do not necessarily 
share, at their very centre, this strange view of African people as all warm and emotional. 
D.A. Masolo makes a pertinent point when he observes that: “The practice of 
postcolonial critiques exposes the diversity and pluralism of African identities, thus 
undermining the tenets of Pan-African ideology and the culturalism of Western 
ethnology. The thesis in this approach is that the practice of philosophy is often culture-
relative in many more ways than is readily accepted” (1997; 296). The attempts by the 
adherents of negritude to categorise black people as belonging to the same genre of 
feeling types fails, just like the nationalists, because there is cultural relativity which they 
have to contend with. African or black people are not generic feelers who are governed 
by a lot of emotion and who are generally eager to celebrate their lack of scientific 
achievement. As we have seen above, according to Mazrui, some black people have 
chosen to claim that all modern achievement, ranging from algebra to Greek thought is 
traced to Africans. 
 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze renders the differences that exist between black people, despite 
their shared conditions, clear when he argues that:  
 
“The African experience,” however, has never really been a monolith, on 
the continent or abroad. From Amo to Nkrumah to Du Bois, from Equiano 
to Locke to Senghor; continental and Diaspora modern Africans found a 
“language”- largely based upon their awareness of a collective 
entanglement with the history of the modern West, and their 
objectification and “thingification” (Verdinglichung) by this West – and 
so have also always individually and collectively struggled in multifaceted 
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and pluralistic ways against the oppressive tendencies within European 
capitalist cultures, and the illegitimate colonial structures that crush  
Africa’s initiatives on the continent (Eze: 1997; 15). 
 
It is thus clear that there are a number of possible responses to colonialism both on the 
continent and in the Diaspora and negritude is just one of them. It does not enjoy the 
status of being representative of all that African people are and this is in tension with a 
central tenet of negritude itself. But besides this crucial point, there is at least one 
interesting philosophical claim made by negritude which I think can easily be dealt with. 
Negritude claims that Africans are warm and come to knowledge through becoming one 
with the object that they seek to know. This by implication means that this is how 
Africans are constituted and they cannot do anything about it. The oddness of this claim 
is that it appears to be some kind of discrimination that is based on the sole fact that 
Africans’ warmness or their coming to know something is by intuition simply because 
they are black people. It looks as if the claim here is that Africans cannot help themselves 
but fail at discursive and analytical thinking. Since they are such renowned failures at 
analytical thinking, the proponents would have us take comfort in celebrating the fact that 
we have never invented anything. This fact and celebration should be received without a 
single complaint because it has been noted and stated by Africans or black people such as 
Cesaire and Senghor.  
 
Interestingly when Tempels, the white Belgian missionary, states that the African is 
essentially characterised by force and her relations are about the increase of vital force, 
no less a person than Cesaire pronounces a very sharp criticism on Tempels for placing 
ontology at the fore. “Since Bantu thought is ontological, the Bantu only ask for 
satisfaction of an ontological nature. Decent wages! Comfortable housing! Food!” 
(Cesaire: 1972; 38-39). Quite clearly Cesaire is not impressed with Tempels 
characterising Bantu life as essentially being understood in terms of the ontology of 
force. Later on his criticism on Tempels is even more biting when he says; “In short, you 
tip your hat to the Bantu life force, you give a wink to the immortal Bantu soul. And 
that’s all it costs you! You have to admit you’re getting off cheap” (ibid). The same sense 
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of indignity that Cesaire feels about the way in which Tempels’ force thesis charcterises 
black people, is the indignity that I feel when Cesaire, in his poetic lines above, asks us to 
celebrate having invented nothing and having never explored anything. It is a great 
indignity for a people to be reduced to joyful lovers who shed incarnate tears, and nothing 
more, even if that reduction is done by one of their own.  
 
Hountondji acknowledges that Cesaire’s lines in his poem are moving and capable of 
raising a lot of emotion. “But even more remarkable is the fact that they display a black 
poet spontaneously employing a mode of argument originally devised in white society to 
express his revolt against white racism” (Hountondji: 1997; 158). Hountondji claims that 
Cesiare was not being original in his celebration of the non-technicality of black people 
but that he was merely copying the works of functionalists such as Malinowski which 
was already widespread at the time Cesaire published his poem. He claims that Senghor 
was also equally aware of the writings of Malinowski and other functionalists and was 
only too happy to invert their racism for his own use. For Hountondji, this is clear 
evidence that nationalism in the African colonies has never totally rejected colonialism 
but has only chosen to accept those parts that it thinks are favourable for the third world. 
“An initial stage of spontaneous revolt and unreflective self-assertion has been followed 
by a second stage, involving the discovery of favourable currents in violent contrast to 
colonial practice as it was experienced” (ibid; 159).  
 
For Hountondji, complicity develops between those who see themselves as progressive 
Western anthropologists and the nationalists. Hountondji offers what he considers to be a 
simple explanation of negritude. “This garrulous negrism has a very simple explanation: 
whereas for Cesaire the exaltation of black cultures functions merely as a supporting 
argument in favour of political liberation, in Senghor it works as an alibi for evading the 
political problem of national liberation. Hypertrophy of cultural nationalism generally 
serves to compensate for the hypotrophy of political nationalism” (Hountondji: 1997; 
159).  Thus Hountondji accuses Senghor of having side-stepped the question of national 
freedom by addressing negritude. Negritude is used as a cover that Senghor hides behind 
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embracing issues of culture instead of stepping up to deal with issues of freedom as well 
as economic and political issues. 
 
Hountondji argues that this attitude of reducing political problems into cultural problems 
has the appeal for nationalists and anthropologists of enabling them to compare cultures 
and pretending that all problems are cultural. Political problems are simplified as cultural 
and eventually reduced to folklore. Hountondji argues that comparing a singular Western 
civilisation with African traditions favours a certain misconception which reduces all 
African traditions into a single tradition. This ignores the fact that African traditions are 
not the same but heterogeneous, contradictory and complex. “Above all, we ignore or 
pretend to ignore the fact that African cultural traditions are not closed, that they did not 
stop when colonialism started but embrace colonial and post-colonial cultural life” 
(Hountondji: 1997; 162). I agree with Hountondji that the attempt to present African life 
as static and not open to possibilities of new influences is fatally flawed. The fathers of 
independence, Senghor in particular, make the terrible error of trying to cast the African 
personality in a way that is not sensitive to the possibility of diversity and change. 
Hountondji is probably also right when he observes that; “For both groups this thesis 
functions as a refuge: it enables Western anthropologists to escape from the boredom of 
their own society and third-world nationalists to escape from the psychological and 
political rape perpetrated upon them by Western imperialism, by plunging back into their 
(imaginary) cultural origins” (ibid; 164). 
 
Negritude is a misrepresentation of what African people are. It is an imaginary 
construction that has an appeal to both Western anthropologists and nationalists. They are 
strangely brought together to the same conclusion about African people through highly 
dubious assertions of the African personality that is generalised to the whole continent. 
While some remarks by some anthropologists are clearly racist, the same feeling arises 
when one analyses the works of the supporters of negritude. Serequeberhan rightly 
criticises Senghor’s Africanite thesis that insists on the black person’s mode of knowing 
being feelings and coming to be one with the object. “In this epistemically suspect 
“view” then, Africa is to “cultivate” its own most intuitive reason and Europe its own 
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most discursive reason! Therein lies the “originality” and the “true”-ontologically 
speaking-essential complimentarity of each. Why does one think of Lucien Levy-Bruhl as 
one reads these lines? Is it at all possible that Senghor is trying to pass off Levy-Bruhl’s 
racism as Africanite?” (Serequeberhan: 1994; 46).  
 
Thus the view advanced by Senghor is racist itself. It makes certain ontological claims 
about a certain group of people that are based on the skin colour of those people. Indeed 
it is difficult to see the difference between Senghor’s view and that advanced by 
mischievous racists. Serequeberhan argues that knowledge of immediacy, one that is not 
mediated, was held by Hegel to be a symbol of one being not a human being. Senghor is 
in actual fact endorsing that view and I suggest he ought not to be taken seriously.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to offer a critique of African socialism. I argued that the greatest 
general problem of African socialism is that it tries to take folk thought and generalise it 
to continental thought. It ignores the fact that the continent admits of certain differences 
and contradictions that cannot be stated in a generic manner. I pointed out the difficulties 
that arise in Nyerere’s ideas on ujamaa, particularly his claim that African socialism is a 
state of mind that Africans can easily return to. He fails to give a distinctive 
characterisation of what it is that is in the African’s mind that compels him to be pre-
disposed towards African socialism. His attempt to transfer traditional communitarian set 
up into the modern political world is also beset with problems. Nkrumah’s consciencism 
also suffers the weakness of trying to find a single representation of African experience. 
Secondly his attempt to find metaphysical grounding from which the ethical and political 
proceed is beset with serious problems. Senghor’s philosophy of Negritude fails on the 
account that it inverts blatant racist notions and attempts to pass them off as affirmations 








1. Summary of Main Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are as follows: In the first chapter, where I seek to 
clear methodological issues in African philosophy, I conclude that ethnophilosophy and 
sage philosophy are not different from each other and neither is to be taken as 
philosophical enterprise in the strict sense of the term. I also conclude that nationalist-
ideological philosophy is not strictly philosophical as it is devoted to developing party 
slogans and methods of governing newly independent Africa which are in accord with 
Africa’ s traditions. I argue that hermeneutics and professional philosophy are essentially 
philosophies of apemanship that mirror Western projects. I hold that the artistic trend 
properly ought to be identified as African literary work. 
 
The second chapter concludes that there are two schools of thought in the conception of 
person in African philosophy. The first strand is communitarian whereby personhood is 
understood to be something that is determined by one’s environing community. Although 
the second strand attempts what I have described as a metaphysical view it also returns to 
the conclusion that personhood is actually animated by one’s environing community. 
Thus the African view of personhood is essentially communitarian. 
 
The third chapter discusses the various versions of African socialism as advocated by 
Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor. I conclude that although these early fathers of 
independence did not offer an explicit account of personhood all their versions of African 
socialism relied on the communitarian view of persons. In the fourth chapter I conclude 
that the search for an African difference led to the exaggerated presentation of the 
communitarian conception of persons as the authentic African view. 
 
The fifth chapter concludes that the veracity of Nyerere’s claims about ownership in 
traditional societies is open to refutation. I argue that Nkrumah’s consciencism suffers 
from a simple contradiction and that Senghor’s claims about the nature of Africans is 
inverted racism. 
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2 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis limited itself to investigating the nature of personhood in African philosophy 
and how it has influenced the development of African socialism. As a preliminary I 
investigated the nature of African philosophy in order to clear the methodological 
challenges. I view Oruka’s classificatory schemata as unhelpful for the purposes of my 
project. I think the debate on the nature of African philosophy is interesting but 
congregating into different trends is not helpful. 
 
In my discussion and critique of personhood I noticed that in African thinking the 
communitarian view of personhood is pervasive. In some instances where some 
philosophers attempt to develop a metaphysical view of the self they still return to the 
communitarian view. I do mount criticism against the communitarian view of persons. 
However, I do not seek to suggest what the conception of person ought to be either in 
Africa or in African philosophy. I only discuss the concept of person as explicated in 
literature and how this is used in the development of African socialism. I argue against 
the link between the concept of person and African socialism. I criticise the alleged 
foundations of African socialism. I do not seek to develop any political theory that would 
replace African socialism.  
 
Thus my thesis can be said to have limited itself to a critical and evaluative analysis of 
the concept of person and how it functions in the formulation of Nkrumah, Senghor and 
Nyerere’s different versions of African socialism. Further the thesis embarks on a critical 
analysis of African socialism itself. I find both the concept of person and the notion of 
African socialism open to serious philosophical problems. To my mind, at least, this 
critique is the merit of this thesis.  
 
3 Recommendations for Further Study 
In conclusion I think it worthwhile to offer recommendations for further study. This 
project does not suggest what the concept of person ought to be. However I note that 
there are two trends that articulate that concept. I have identified one as communitarian 
and the other as metaphysical. I think it would be worthwhile to investigate the 
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plausibility these trends vis-à-vis each other. The initial benefit will be that some clarity 
would be shed on the complementary and contradictory aspects of these trends. This in 
turn might either show that there is one concept of person or there is more than one 
concept of person.  
 
A second worthwhile endeavour, to my mind, would be an attempt at investigating a 
political theory within the African context that goes beyond the claims and aims of 
African socialism. I think it is important that there be developed an African political 
philosophy that is responsive to both the genuine needs of Africans on the continent and 
takes into account the various African realities both negative and positive. Such a 
political philosophy would be one that is not only interested in retrieving and furthering 
African traditional beliefs. There is no gainsaying that the African continent is in many 
parts afflicted by political failure ranging from civil wars, power grabs, an absence of 
democracy in the modern and traditional sense, corruption, poor governance that results 
in the spread of otherwise preventable hunger, disease and death-just to name a few. All 
these problems and a plethora of others can be directly owed to political incompetence. I 
think it would be beneficial to develop a political theory that to address all these issues 
and empower African people without crudely resorting to the traditional. 
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